Compromise: Harmful or Healthy?
The United States and the European Union have welcomed the Ukrainian Parliament’s resolutions aimed at ending the political crisis that was triggered by the rigged runoff election. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that the said resolutions should secure free and fair elections. EU High Representative for External Policy and Security Javier Solana said that the fact that most Ukrainian MPs voted for the compromise reform package bill (402 in favor) was a good sign. Russia’s stance remains practically unchanged and can hardly be corrected. In any case, the Russia-NATO Council’s latest statement reads that the steps taken by all parties to resolve the political crisis were duly considered. This is further graphic evidence that Moscow and the West have failed to come to terms. Russia has not refuted or even soft-pedaled recent statements made by its politicians. Early last week President Vladimir Putin declared that the opposition in Ukraine was trying to adjust the current legislation to its interests. Russian Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov went even further, saying that the victory of government-nominated candidate Viktor Yanukovych would be the only way to secure Ukraine’s unity: “I’m perfectly sure that Yanukovych’s victory will make it possible for Ukraine to remain a solid undivided polity.” It is difficult to say how such statements tally with the international mediator status that was granted Mr. Gryzlov while he was in Ukraine to help resolve the crisis. This is only the first of many radical declarations. Earlier he stressed that the situation in Ukraine would result in a rift or bloodshed. How do Western political scientists view the latest resolutions passed by the Verkhovna Rada? What course will political events take in Ukraine? The Day asked Polish, Belarusian, and Russian experts to comment.
Anna GURSKA, Center for Eastern Studies, Warsaw:
The strengthening of the Ukrainian political system is a good sign because unlimited central government has never led to anything good. My overall assessment of the situation is that Ukraine needs changes in its political system, so parliament can have more authority as a cornerstone of democracy. If you analyze the latest parliamentary resolutions in the light of various interests, a different picture emerges. First, there is no denying the victory of the current president, Leonid Kuchma. He spent two years fighting to push through the political reform bill and finally did it. Moreover, he did it within the timeframe he had predicted: before stepping down as head of state. One thing he failed to achieve is that the constitutional amendments will take effect September 1, 2005, meaning that the next president will have time to make changes in the system to conform to his domestic and foreign political guidelines. Once again it should be stressed that the latest resolution marks a victory for Leonid Kuchma and all those political forces that didn’t stand a chance of exerting any degree of influence on the Ukrainian political process after the presidential election. Speaking of the opposition, Viktor Yushchenko has implemented some of his interests-primarily in terms of changes to the presidential election law.
The new delimitation of powers doesn’t pose that much of a threat to Viktor Yushchenko as the next president. I believe that Yushchenko’s tactical defeat boils down to essentially different parameters. He spent two years fighting against the constitutional amendments not because he wanted to wield unlimited power, but because he regarded the reform as a tool to be used by the new government in order to maintain its presence in the international political arena, and to retain its political influence. Therefore, the fact that Yushchenko had to back the vote for these changes after two years signifies a markedly far-reaching compromise.
As for the people campaigning in the streets, their victory became certain after the Supreme Court’s ruling on the rigged runoff turnout. This was a victory gained by a nation struggling for truth and for the right to cast ballots in good faith.
Was it possible to avoid making these decisions? A compromise had to be achieved. Viktor Yushchenko could have chosen a different path leading to victory. He could have seized power on the early days [of the Orange Revolution], but then it would have been difficult to answer questions, like what he was going to do about eastern Ukraine; whether the people there would recognize him as a legitimate head of state. Yes, he could have seized power and held a referendum to legitimize his authority. This could have been an approach subsequently to be defined as formal. But then his presidency would have been questioned by a large proportion of Ukrainian citizens, as well as by the international community. Therefore, a compromise was badly needed. But it could have been different. For example, I don’t understand why Viktor Yushchenko agreed to the package bill vote during that roundtable with the international mediators. Perhaps because of the situation, rather the way he saw it, or because he had no alternative. Personally, I think that Yushchenko’s biggest mistake was signing the memorandum. The situation couldn’t be changed afterward. I don’t know the particulars, but I think that his signing the document came a bit too easily. He could have agreed to the political reform, but not on terms and conditions that make one wonder about blackmail by the government. I wouldn’t rule out the possibility that the political reform was inevitable, but I’m sure that a different format could and should have been used. After all, this has everything to do with the Constitution of Ukraine, and amending it that way hardly signifies respect for the fundamental law.
Leonid ZAYIKO, head of the Strategy Analytical Center, Minsk:
I believe that Ukraine has succeeded in achieving a progressive compromise. Belarus has faced similar problems. Regrettably, none has been resolved. At first, the presidential republic allowed the good old party nomenklatura to exist and create neo-Soviet polities that were by and large unable to solve any problems concerning the creation of new economic and social entities. In Belarus, a presidential republic was established to fit the image of the then Premier Kebich, who personified the party nomenklatura that managed the economy. The transition from totalitarianism to democracy through an authoritarian phase involves markedly clumsy and even hazardous procedures. A parliamentary republic with limited presidential powers, but with a variety of large and influential political parties, might be a better way to run the post-Soviet countries.
Together with foreign colleagues we carried out research in the post-Soviet space; over the past 15 years the domestic elites have been restructuring very quickly, transforming into more mobile and differentiated financial, industrial, and agrarian groups. Restructuring these elites in terms of interest facilitates the formation of a party matrix relating to a given society, where it is possible to draw a clear line between the left and right wings, and the center. In the early 1990s political parties were formed stochastically; this was reminiscent of a theater cloakroom; today we are witness to new political figures and forces setting about their tasks, and efforts are being made to tidy up their respective political rooms. Another matter is what branches of power the nomenklatura will choose. Naturally, it would be naХve to expect the Ukrainian parliament to rid itself of its usual hot-air sessions. However, the primary growth period of political parties is past; they have all formed more or less adequate teams, which is true of most of that “post-Soviet space,” albeit in varying degrees. I think that the party structure of a given society may come to the structure on a “two-and-half” basis, with two powerful parties that will play the principle role during a parliamentary election campaign, with one, or maybe two, smaller parties that will have a tangible impact on the allocation of seats, depending on their respective orientation.
Gleb PAVLOVSKY, President, Effective Policy Foundation, Moscow:
I believe that any kind of compromise is a minimal victory because it’s based on the parties being prepared to agree to the least acceptable terms and conditions. For Russia, it’s the average acceptable minimum of compromise and a very positive one because it paves the way for a real balance of forces of the future government in Ukraine and rules out the monopolization of power, which was the main problem for Russia in the past decade. Another very important aspect is that that monopoly mediator between Russia and various social and political groups within Ukraine is disappearing, so we can establish a direct dialog and maintain [adequate] relationships with them.
It’s safe to assume that the president has scored a conceptual rather than political victory, because the main political reality marking the finale of his presidency was a crisis and he is leaving his country in that critical situation. This is a victory scored by the script writer rather than the stage director.
Anyway, the election campaign is still underway and I wouldn’t want to predict the outcome. We would like to see Ukraine ruled by a legitimate government; this is very important first for Ukraine, and second, for us. This crisis presents a sufficiently clear picture of the basic elements of any future balance [of power] in Ukraine; these basic elements will serve as the foundation of Russian politics. In other words, the crisis [in Ukraine] laid bare forces that are aiming to integrate with and help develop cooperation within Ukrainian society, including its Russian-speaking components. It further revealed the stand taken by the Ukrainian Diaspora in Russia, which was another noteworthy factor, and which is becoming consolidated as a serious lobbying force. I believe that most of the above elements are positive.
Russia doesn’t intend to dominate the “post-Soviet space” — or even in the Eastern Europe, lest anyone be reminded of the Soviet Union. Russia wants a family of nation-states there with partnership or alliance ambitions backed by strong state institutions. And so we come out in support of the legitimate principles of the continuity of power, because we want to build a system capable of becoming a full- fledged partner in a united Europe; we also expect the European Union and “Euroeast” to converge. In view of this, I don’t think that dominance is on the agenda. I believe that what’s happening is part of an ideological dispute, part of an election campaign; it’s something we don’t need. After the election campaign we’ll have to cope with heated ideological debates.
Will the political events in Ukraine affect other countries? Yes, naturally, for we are a civilizationally close space. But what kind of influence? Belarus has been subjected to such spin-doctor technologies and it has been inoculated. Russia isn’t likely to feel threatened in this respect; unlike Ukraine, we have experienced several revolutions. We have become even firmer in understanding revolution as a form of government we shall never accept. I believe that events in Ukraine will strengthen Russian politicians; that they will help establish an anti-revolutionary consensus among politicians representing the left and the right, liberal as well as nonliberal forces, so that they can work out a constructive approach aimed at preventing such revolutions.
