Copenhagen: Signaling No Signals
The latest Ukraine-European Union summit that ended on July 5 in Copenhagen was important for Ukraine primarily because Ukrainian diplomats admit this country still remains somewhat isolated and suggest assessing the summit precisely from this standpoint.
President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine told the summit that the expansion of the European Union means Ukraine will come closer to this area of stability and prosperity, which is an unequivocally positive fact.
The final general statement of both sides, in contrast to the previous one, contains no scathing criticism of Ukraine. Instead, the document notes Ukraine’s progress in democratization and praises the declared European choice: Kyiv managed to achieve the inclusion in the communiqu О of a phrase that President Leonid Kuchma’s speech will promote the further development of relations between Ukraine and the EU. On the other hand, the summit still said nothing about Ukraine’s European prospects. Actually, Western experts had warned on the eve of the summit that the Copenhagen meeting would not discuss the issue of granting Ukraine EU associate membership and that this subject simply irritates many in Brussels and the capitals of EU member states. Western diplomats and experts think it more realistic that Ukraine might be proclaimed a market economy country in the next few months.
Conversely, Kyiv says the question was provoked to a large extent by the statement about Ukraine’s possible EU associate membership made by German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in Kyiv on December 5, 2001. Now, by elementary logic, the “Europeans” have no more chances return the ball. Yet, such attempts are obviously being made, even occasionally by representatives of the German government. It is only clear that Mr. Schroeder made this statement impromptu.
So the EU has not responded today to the Verkhovna Rada resolution that calls for supporting Ukraine’s desire to join the union, and this is not always objectively connected with the truly serious problems Ukraine itself has. It is perhaps for this reason that President Kuchma said bluntly that he was not very satisfied with what he heard in Copenhagen.
Simultaneously, Interfax-Ukraine quotes Mr. Kuchma as saying this means marching forward rather than marking time. The next step will be the meeting of the foreign ministers of EU candidates to be held next year in Ukraine. The document does not include such words as “association.” “Ukraine’s associate membership,” “Ukraine’s integration into the EU,” or “Ukraine’s determination to meet the Copenhagen criteria.” This is a kind of signal that shows indirectly that it is Ukraine’s own job to satisfy EU membership criteria (democratic development, a developed competitive market-oriented economy, a developed civil society), and that the European Union is not currently interested in discussing Ukraine’s prospective membership.
The document also sets a period of several months to complete Ukraine-EU talks on granting Ukraine the status of a market economy state and allowing this country to enter the World Trade Organization (WTO). This would pave the way for negotiations on establishing a free trade zone and later a customs union. This course of events would further aggravate the problem of the choice between the two, European and Eurasian, alternatives for this country’s further development.
Each of these has its champions and opponents, with some people remaining utterly indifferent. West European representatives deny that Russia was granted market economy status for political reasons alone; they claim that Ukraine was late to move on the issue but the results will come soon in any case.
The communiquО also supports Ukraine’s attempts to reach agreement on the readmission (repatriation) of illegal migrants from neighboring countries (mainly Russia and Belarus). The EU is keenly interested in signing this kind of agreement with Ukraine, while Moscow so far refuses to conduct a dialogue on this issue with Kyiv. Ukraine links taking a readmission commitment with the liberalization of visa requirements by EU countries: only in such a case will Verkhovna Rada ratify the agreement. History shows that, for example, Poland was granted visa-free border treatment by Germany a few days after the readmission agreement had come into force. In the case of Ukraine, the EU is rather reluctant about such linkage, although its representatives admit unofficially that this problem will have to be solved one way or another. Another problem is finding a replacement for the proposed ineffective format of “good-neighborly” relations between the expanded EU, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova: Ukraine’s leaders and experts take with a grain of salt the very idea of the EU-Ukraine relationship model patterned on the model of relations with Minsk.
Ukrainian diplomats emphasize three factors that keep Kyiv from marching in the European direction: the EU problems that arise from the Union’s expansion and uncertain future, the traditional Russian factor such that the EU cannot afford to underestimate a Moscow widely viewed as a strategic partner in the region, and Ukraine itself with its perennial problems and slow reforms. At the same time, Kyiv is obviously adopting a policy of more determined defense of its interests. We will simply have to wait and see.
