On the “demons of revolution”

Yuriy Yekhanurov’s confirmation as prime minister does not mean that the governmental and political crisis is over. This is the conclusion of The Day’ s roundtable debate attended by Andriy YERMOLAYEV, director of the Sofia Center of Social Research; Vadym KARASIOV, head of the Institute of Global Strategies; Volodymyr FESENKO, director of the Penta Center of Applied Political Studies; and Yevhen HOLOVAKHA, a well-known sociologist and philosopher, and deputy director of the Institute of Sociology at the National Academy of Sciences. Our invited experts identify the sources of the crisis, offer advice on how to ride it out, and define the public’s interest in this situation. Today the government is expected not only to stabilize the economy but also to carry out long-overdue reforms, signal its readiness for a dialogue with potential allies and, above all, show a clear- cut strategy of transformations.

“THREE IN ONE”

“What is the political crisis all about?”

Volodymyr FESENKO:

“The first version of events, which emerged after the crisis broke out and met the president’s interests, was that it was a crisis of his team. But this version is clearly not enough to explain away the September political crisis. The conflict within the motley team that came to power after the presidential elections is not the sole point in question. To a large extent, it was the president who laid the groundwork for the future crisis by forming a rather contradictory, eclectic, and multicentered pattern of political government. In a way, this pattern tried to follow Kuchma’s traditions, the system of ‘checks and balances,’ whereby the Tymoshenko-led cabinet was to be counterbalanced by the Security Council headed by Poroshenko. A similar contradictory model — the presidential secretariat and staff — was also formed around the president. These contradictions had to explode sooner or later.

“Meanwhile, a crisis in the policies pursued by the new government came to a head in September. Moreover, this was a crisis not only of the socioeconomic policy but the entire political course (including European integration). An additional complication was the bitter conflict of personalities, which abruptly aggravated the institutional crisis. The latter was in turn provoked, to a large extent, by the political crisis. The combination of these three crises finally stirred up the September crisis.

“But the trouble is that the crisis is still ongoing: it is spiraling upward. My impression is that neither side is able to manage it. The president’s team looks more disorganized: it has no clear-cut strategy.”

“They are short of crisis managers.”

FESENKO:

“Yes, but there is also another version. The opposite side shows a glut of crisis management, which only aggravates the tendency.”

Yevhen HOLOVAKHA:

“In my view, the in-depth social cause of what is going on is the public’s institutional unpreparedness for the implementation of the rather utopian programs that are aimed at the accelerated reorganization of society. As a matter of fact, the bomb was planted not only within the personalities and configurations — it was rooted in the original discrepancy between the institutional structure of the traditional way of life in this country and the objectives established during the Orange Revolution on the basis of romantic plans that were very far from the realities of our life. What happened? On the one hand, it became obvious that radical measures to update the institutional structure ended in a total fiasco (combating corruption only expanded the latter, the attempt to change something in medicine led to student riots, and the liberal arts field saw a conflict with academia, etc.). No matter how hard we try to design an ideal model of society based on some abstract moral principles, we will never obtain an adequate result unless we take into account society’s true condition. Unfortunately, this government is walking in the wake of its own idea of updated morality. Yet, public morality can only be updated very slowly. And, although people are prepared to accept ideal moral principles, such as ‘you shall not steal’ or ‘you shall not take bribes,’ they are bound to be disappointed when they see that nothing is being changed. This discontent is not necessarily reflected just in public opinion polls: it is in the air and in the assessments of Western experts, who also see no changes. Finally, this also applies to the economy, which begins to sag as soon as morality intervenes. This is why politics should be separated not only from business (which, incidentally, is also rather utopian in our conditions) but also from morality.”

“What about the president’s preacher-like style?”

HOLOVAKHA:

“This was a very good thing when the old government was being destroyed, but it proved ineffective when the new system began to be built. Moralizing can only worsen the situation in the context of pragmatic management. Even Dr. Spock advises parents to give their children clear-cut instructions in line with their childish natures instead of sermons. The manager, too, should refrain from sermonizing and give his subordinates clear-cut instructions, taking into account the nature of what he manages.”

DESACRALIZING THE GOVERNMENT

“The parliamentary debate on Yuriy Yekhanurov’s candidacy for the post of prime minister was undoubtedly an event that will establish the logic and tactical actions for many political forces. One more thing that we seem to have missed: the political reform is still likely to be canceled. At first glance, this would be the next logical step of the presidential team after the cabinet shuffles.”

FESENKO: “This is possible in theory, but I agree with Mr. Karasiov that the authority, especially the president’s, is weak. Our highest judicial authorities are aware of this weakness, as they were last December. So they will be reacting to governmental weakness as well as to the public mood or, to be more exact, to the mood of the elite, which has already learned to play by the rules of the constitutional reform.”

KARASIOV: “Everyone is prepared except the president.”

YERMOLAYEV: “I would suggest speaking not so much about the name of the future prime minister as about senses and goals in general. Many people say nowadays that all this is aimed at winning the parliamentary elections. But winning a parliamentary election cannot be a goal in itself! It is also an instrument to exercise or redistribute power. I am deeply convinced that Yushchenko’s adversaries now have a real chance to take advantage of the ruling team’s crisis in order, at least, to demand portfolios and, at most, to design the techniques of stripping Yushchenko of his post ahead of schedule.”

FESENKO: “Unfortunately, one of the crucial and most strong-willed players who are in fact setting the tone of this crisis by playing for and aggravating instability, has focused on an early settlement of the crisis rather than on the parliamentary elections. There are two ways resolving the crisis quickly. The ‘soft’ one has in fact been announced: early implementation of the constitutional reform and the formation of a new coalition government. Yuliya Tymoshenko hopes to become the prime minister in this case, which is rather problematic. The other option is to try to solve the problem by force.”

YERMOLAYEV: “Everyone will benefit from having a psychologically isolated and prosecuted president, who is stripped of a strong team. He may remain in office for another 18 months or so. A lot of people would like him to be in this plight. It is not impeachment, but still...”

KARASIOV: “One must not forget, however, that the president also has a lot of staunch supporters among the elite and the populace. This whole Yekhanurov story may simply be a disguise for the informal but early switch to a parliamentary- presidential republic. If Yekhanurov had not gotten through, the president would have either had to keep him (and the entire cabinet, by the way) in a suspended, quasi-legitimate condition of acting prime minister until the 2006 parliamentary elections or accept a compromise figure from someone else’s team. If the parliament proposed a candidate who suited Yushchenko, this would mean that power had in fact begun to gradually shift toward parliament. As for Tymoshenko, she is also counting on a long-term and more formalized implementation of the political reform. But she is unlikely to become a new-style prime minister under new conditions: even if she wins the parliamentary elections, she will fail to form a majority because another majority will be formed against her.”

YERMOLAYEV: “There is another important mission that neither Tymoshenko nor, so far, Yekhanurov seem able to accomplish. The very fact of electing a new prime minister will not overcome the crisis. Moreover, it is crystal clear to everyone that hatchets have just been unburied. By all accounts, we are going to witness major snags in the work of the state apparatus. Besides gradually losing voter confidence and being torn apart by internal conflicts, these conflicts are also beginning to form visible threats of inherent destruction. The new prime minister’s mission is to preserve and maintain the state machinery during crisis conditions. This is a political, not technical, mission. In other words, it should be a person capable of ensuring peace, if not among the elites then at least within the state bureaucracy. Otherwise this mission will remain the president’s headache, and the crisis will proceed in more difficult conditions.”

“Not to mention such ‘simple’ tasks as checking the declining economy and curbing inflation.”

FESENKO: “Yes, the mission of a caretaker prime minister will be to try to manage the crisis and prevent it from taking on uncontrollable contours before and during the election campaign.”

HOLOVAKHA: “It was difficult to imagine during the previous roundtable at The Day that we would be discussing these problems a few months later. But, paradoxically, I think it is better for the president that members of his team showed themselves to be inefficient managers and the crisis erupted now and not, say, in two or three years’ time. The point is that, whatever the case, the Maidan leader is still quite popular. This is precisely his chance. Tymoshenko also has a chance — to fight him, but this is his chance to keep the situation under control. Relying on this support, he is quite capable of making adequate decisions, but now he will have to act as a firm manager, not a preacher. In other words, he must draw up a program to overcome the political and economic crises. If he succeeds in showing that he is a manager (which he has failed to do so far), this will be a big chance for him. In any case, it would be impossible to avoid an economic crisis two or three years later, but in that case the attitude to the president would be the same as it once was to Kuchma: people would be running down the streets with placards saying ‘Down with Yushchenko!’ We don’t have all this now. On the whole, mass consciousness is disoriented — I mean the relative majority that has been supporting the ongoing processes. These people have not yet changed their romantic solidarity, so to speak, with the new government to hatred of it. And as a rule, disorientation does not lead to radical actions. The question is who will take advantage of the reserve of hopes and preferences. Yushchenko could do this all right, for he has more administrative and other kinds of leverage.”

YERMOLAYEV: “Yushchenko and Tymoshenko have done a terrible thing from the institutional angle: they have desacralized the government. In addition to exchanging accusations of corruption, they have in fact exposed the true mechanisms by which the elite retains power and manipulates society. This applies to such basic problems as property, portfolio distribution, foreign relations, etc. The labels attached and the information disclosed require some sort of national investigation into a conspiracy against this state. At the same time, experts, politicians, and intellectuals are admitting the possibility of reconciliation and saying: let them strike a deal. This only shows the decline in public morals, and self-humiliation: knowing the nature of their relationships and the degree of their cynicism, one suggests that they come to terms, while the rest will turn a blind eye to the constitutional, legal, and criminal aspects only to let them rule together in the name of the Maidan.”

KARASIOV: “I don’t rule out ‘privatization’ of the Maidan — stone by stone, ribbon by ribbon, and so on.”