Doomed to a continuing struggle

Inflation and privatization, portfolio distribution and gas-supply patterns are just some of the questions for which President Viktor Yushchenko has taken Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko to task. Commenting on the situation in Ukraine, the foreign media have come to the general conclusion that the head of the Ukrainian state and the head of the Ukrainian government have not taken into account the mistakes that were made in 2005. This statement can only be partly accepted because, judging by words, deeds, tactics, and strategies, Tymoshenko has taken into account her previous mistakes, while the president is guided by what Tymoshenko was governed by during her first term in office - emotions. But in life as in politics, emotionally-based decisions can hardly compete with sound-minded ones.

Bankova Street has shot many a critical arrow at the Tymoshenko government during the slightly more than two months of her current premiership. But the president prefers to keep an untraditional silence in response to critical remarks about her in the press.

The question of gas supply, always a painful one for the Ukrainian government, has aggravated the far from cloudless coexistence of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, these two erstwhile allies, in the same political orbit. In an interview with the Russian-language newspaper Vremia novostei, the Guarantor of the Ukrainian Constitution noted, commenting on the much-publicized, hours-long negotiations between Prime Minister Tymoshenko and Gazprom chief Aleksei Miller. “As for my reaction to this thing, it naturally deserves the most negative, I repeat, the most negative, appraisal. What kind of a response can there be to this inconsistent behavior? I say frankly: a very wide range of decisions can be made.”

Analysts immediately concluded that the phrase “wide range” can only mean the dismissal of the Tymoshenko cabinet. Nobody seems to doubt that the current government will not last out its entire term, the only question being how soon this will happen.

From the legal standpoint, it is not difficult to dismiss the Tymoshenko cabinet. Article 87 of the Constitution states: “At the proposal of no less than one-third of the people’s deputies of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine may discuss the question of the responsibility of Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers and pass a resolution of nonconfidence in the Cabinet of Ministers by a constitutional majority of those voting.” To put the question point-blank, it is possible to muster more than enough votes to launch this cabinet-killing process.

However, a political factor complicates this extremely simple juridical procedure: the government should be dismissed at such a juncture so that Tymoshenko will not appear hurt and offended in the eyes of society, as she did in 2005, when her dismissal helped her reap a good electoral harvest. So before saying goodbye to the current cabinet, the prime minister’s opponents should demonstrate to Ukraine and the world that the BYuT-led government is not capable of being a viable executive branch of power. Some political scientists claim that there is already a plan to discredit the government. The first stage of this political scheme is the withdrawal of five MPs from the pro-presidential party NSNU. In their farewell statement, the “dissenters” scathingly criticized the current NSNU leadership, especially Viacheslav Kyrylenko, who they think serves the interests of another political force (read: BYuT). The public disclosure of problems inside the pro- presidential party has somewhat diverted attention from the main issue - the challenges that the coalition will have to face after the withdrawal of this well-known “Orange Five.”

Certainly, the departure of these five MPs will not affect the ruling majority de jure. But it is clear that even if these parliamentarians do not quit the coalition de facto, they will still not be voting the way Tymoshenko and her government would like them to. This means that the prime minister is no longer supported in parliament by a stable ruling majority. Therefore, parliament is sure to vote down the bills that are important to the cabinet. Will Tymoshenko and her ministers be able to work successfully without being supported by the very coalition that formed the government? That is very doubtful.

Therefore, it has not been ruled out that Tymoshenko’s opponents — both Yushchenko and Yanukovych — will try to prolong as much as possible the situation where a de facto non-existent pro-governmental coalition majority in the Rada will be a priori trying to bring down the ratings of the cabinet and its leader until the government’s prestige touches the critical negative line in the eyes of the public. Then a vote of nonconfidence can be easily passed and the cabinet dismissed. There will be a sufficient number of votes from the Party of Regions, the Communist Party, and the Lytvyn Bloc, as well as MPs from the NUNS who are close to the presidential secretariat, to do this.

Meanwhile, many experts point out that virtually all the events unfolding in Ukrainian politics today have to do with the approaching presidential elections. Judging by the words and deeds of the top-ranking political elite, they’re probably right, although one is stunned by the shortsightedness of the politicians, who have fixated on the presidential race and for some reason believe that the 2009 elections will be followed by a political Armageddon.

President Yushchenko has begun his game. Will HART, which is so hyped up by the media that only infants are not aware of it, be able to become the president’s solid electoral bulwark? That is very doubtful. Even now it is clear that the new pro-presidential project will be a non-starter, primarily because it is a technological project, not an ideological one. Neither the financial base nor the administrative machine can possibly bring this project to fruition. (This may be a one-time-only project geared to the 2009 elections.) Ukrainian voters are aware of this and will hardly swallow this political bait.

Second, if, as it is rumored in the corridors of power, the new party’s face is the now Orange-leaning Raisa Bohatyriova, in view of objective and subjective factors she can hardly be called a true rival of Tymoshenko in the electoral battle. Third, if Yushchenko becomes the new party’s new ideological leader, his current policies will adversely affect the HART. Why? Because, after being a passive president during Yanukovych’s premiership, Yushchenko began to demonstrate enviable activity during Tymoshenko’s premiership. In general this is good, but there’s a “but.”

The head of state’s unprecedented activity is mostly aimed at discrediting the cabinet in general and Prime Minister Tymoshenko in particular. This factor may mobilize the Maidan electorate, not around him but around the one called the princess of the autumn and winter of 2004. So to dismiss Tymoshenko today is to run the risk of losing the next presidential elections. And although it is noble to take risks, this does not apply to Ukrainian politics which, for some reason, boils down to three names: Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, and Yanukovych.

The enviable ease in the relations between Yushchenko and Yanukovych may perhaps be explained by the fact that the latter is prepared to bow out of the presidential race in exchange for the post of prime minister, which cannot be said of Tymoshenko. What might be an ideal solution to this seemingly endless face-off among the three political favorites is the emergence of a fourth individual equally distant from Yushchenko, Yanukovych, and Tymoshenko. But the question is whether Ukrainian society is prepared to show the red card to those who are in equal measure responsible for the crises of the past few years — Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, Yanukovych — and give somebody else a chance. If it is, this may give a real push to cleaning up the government and prompt the current leaders to become aware of their responsibility to the Ukrainian people, who are the only source of power, according to the Constitution. But what is Ukrainian society today — a spring or a geyser?

A VIEW FROM THE SIDE

“President Yushchenko is being forced to adopt a defensive stance. His party, Our Ukraine, is in critical condition now that several key figures have left it. The successes of the still popular Prime Minister Tymoshenko seem to be unnerving the president. A lot of Orange politicians must be scared that the departure of a group headed by the bellicose Bezsmertny may signal the beginning of the collapse of the government faction or even prompt the conservatives to side with the Party of Regions. The Orange camp still remembers the odes that Yushchenko sang about a grand coalition. However, Tymoshenko’s opponents do not feel absolutely confident, either. Of course, they can provoke an early election if, for example, 150 MPs resign. But, according to all the polls, Tymoshenko will emerge victorious, and this may temporarily dampen the aspirations of her Orange opponents from Yushchenko’s camp to split the coalition.

“So far, the head of Ukraine’s government has been acting in a masterful fashion, and she is not as confrontational as she was during her previous premiership, when she managed to set the entire political elite against herself in a very short time. In Moscow, where she met President Putin and Prime Minister Zubkov [last] Wednesday, Tymoshenko unambiguously approved the recent Ukrainian-Russian gas deal, but this was not a central issue for her. She was noticeably trying to relieve the Russians’ anxiety. She will in no way be hindering Russia’s accession to the WTO, Tymoshenko said, and Kyiv will be paying off its gas debts according to the concluded agreement. The almost playful brittleness of her behavior in Moscow was a sensation and contrasts markedly with Yushchenko’s spiteful and ultimately counterproductive gibes against his government’s head, which cause very little stir among voters.”