Europe’s First Warning
Last week Ukraine received from Europe its first real warning in recent years, which augurs major losses for Ukraine. This was in spite of the fact that negotiations on the Ukraine-EU Action Plan finally began early last week. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has issued a sharply worded resolution on Ukraine followed by a statement from Ireland on behalf of the EU. Both organizations have voiced concern over attempts to amend Ukraine’s Constitution half a year before the presidential elections and questioned the transparency and fairness of presidential elections under such conditions, calling on the Ukrainian leadership to respect its own Constitution. PACE has recommended appointing a special envoy for Ukraine and is considering putting the question of suspending Ukraine’s membership in the Council of Europe back on the agenda. Ukraine is urged to react in a positive way to the conclusions of the Venetian Commission of the Council of Europe on the bills on Constitutional amendments in Ukraine.
Under such conditions one can pass oneself off as a saint all one wants, complain that Europe does not want to embrace us, accuse European institutions of applying double standards and the opposition of foul play. Yet the country’s reputation would not have suffered a major blow — self-inflicted for the most part — if someone had not been “playing with the rules.” Over a year and a half ago EU High Commissioner for Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana called on Kyiv to “play by the rules” and stop “playing with the rules.” Moreover, the PACE resolution states clearly that in joining the Council of Europe Ukraine has undertaken certain commitments, which it should honor. For this reason, the resolution calls the statement by Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry on “interference in Ukraine’s domestic affairs” by the PACE Monitoring Committee rapporteurs unfounded and unjustified. Incidentally, during Kuchma’s second term in office the Ukrainian leadership has not made similar statements with respect to Russia, even though it has had ample reason to do so.
Meeting one’s commitments has always been a weak spot for those in power in Ukraine. Suffice it to recall the prolonged debate with PACE on banning the death penalty. Recall the arguments put forward by the then Ukrainian leadership. The question of stripping Ukraine’s delegation of its vote and suspending Ukraine’s membership in the Council of Europe was raised then, but apparently this time everything is much more serious. Of the thirty critical remarks prepared by the Ukrainian delegation only one has been taken into account. That Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Kostiantyn Hryshchenko — who planned to attend the Ukrainian-Polish consultations on European Integration instead — and his first deputy Oleksandr Chaly joined the Ukrainian delegation did not help matters. The arguments advanced by the majority representatives and Communists did not particularly impress anyone. Allegations that the opposition is to blame for obstructing normal work in Verkhovna Rada fell on deaf ears. Moreover, one clause of the PACE resolution expresses “disappointment over for the measures to which the opposition resorted to obstruct the usual work in the parliament.”
One can say for a fact that representatives of the West do not understand or know the specifics of Ukrainian politics, this being a popular argument in Kyiv. Yet this is not the reason why Kyiv faces problems where no problems should have arisen a priori.
The PACE resolution and statement from Ireland on behalf of the EU (also signed by prospective EU members Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Norway, and Liechtenstein) not only appear to be timed to coincide but also express a common view of the problem. This view, to put it bluntly, conveys extreme distrust of the current Ukrainian ruling elite. This distrust has been accumulating for years, and although the Ukrainian opposition’s recent appeal to the Council of Europe structures did the trick, it was more a catalyst than a direct cause of the resolution. What is much worse is the fact that only sixty deputies attended the PACE session addressing the so-called Ukrainian question, which could be evidence of Europe’s waning interest in Ukraine. Worse still, they did not overlook the fact that participants of the political game in Ukraine have apparently decided to exclude the Ukrainian people from this game.
At least the signal from the EU is evidence of Europe’s interest in the events unfolding along its borders. The bottom line of the statement is that any rapprochement can be discussed only after Ukraine passes a test, which will certainly not be viewed as Ukraine’s domestic affairs anymore. Understandably, if Kyiv waited for some signal from the EU then it was definitely not this kind of signal. This is not and cannot be considered a failure of Ukraine’s diplomacy. A country’s foreign policy cannot be more successful than the country’s overall development, and in this case diplomacy becomes the hostage of domestic affairs. If the diplomats attempt to explain to their Western partners that Ukraine’s declared course toward NATO and the EU in fact remains unchanged but this is not happening, then perhaps the problem is the real orientation of the course itself and the difference between words and deeds. As a result, the prospects of another wave of international isolation are not all that unrealistic.
Ukraine cannot afford to miss a step in its dialog with NATO. However, Ukraine’s hopes of joining the Membership Action Plan can now materialize perhaps only at the summit following the forthcoming NATO Istanbul Summit at best. It is unlikely that work on the Ukraine-EU Action Plan will be suspended, yet the general climate could have been more favorable. The US will follow events in Ukraine with as much attention as the EU and Council of Europe. Ukraine’s progress toward both NATO and the WTO will largely depend on the stand taken by the US. Thus, Ukraine’s losses could outweigh gains.
That the participants of the political process in Ukraine are urged to solve their problems peacefully can hardly be seen as evidence of the maturity and dignity of the state. Ukraine’s chances to be received in the world the proper way, which have never been very high, will now decrease with each unsuccessful or incomprehensible step taken in the domestic realm. On the other hand, examples of Slovakia and Croatia suggest that changing political course at the right time is neither a tragedy, nor an impossible thing to do, but simply a norm.
