An expert warning

Head of the Russia & Eurasia Programme, British Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatem-House) James Sherr is known well to Ukrainian, Russian as well as Western expert circles. He has been following the development of events in the post-Soviet countries in the security dimension for a long time. What meaning will Russia’s recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia for the regional security and the situation in the world? What will be the consequences of this conflict for Ukraine? What conclusions should be made by the Ukrainian government? Why is the NATO Membership Action Plan a distracting moment? These and other questions are raised in The Day‘s exclusive interview with the British expert James SHERR.

“Let’s keep in mind the primary issue. On Aug. 8, Russia was given a magnificent opportunity to use military force on a limited and responsible scale. It didn’t. If it had done so-if it had ejected Georgian forces from South Ossetia and stopped at the border-it would have won a convincing military, political and psychological victory, and it would have come a giant step closer to securing that mantle of legitimacy as a ‘guarantor of stability and security’ that it has always aspired to in the former USSR. The West would have felt humiliated, it would have been apprehensive about Russia’s longer-term game plan, but it would have been in no position to object to anything or demand anything. Despite all the evidence that Russia had provoked President Saakashvili to take the rash and wanton step he took, Russia would have secured the moral high ground, and the West would have been consumed by self-reproach.

“Yet from the moment Russia occupied Georgian ports and cities, cut its key transport arteries, threatened the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline, brought its Abkhaz allies (and its own forces in Abkhazia) into the conflict, allowed its Osetian satraps to ethnically cleanse South Ossetia of Georgians and displayed swaggering contempt for the agreement it concluded with President Sarkozy, one thing has become clear to everyone: the issue is not Saakashvili, but Russia. The West is profoundly divided about what it can and should do, but there is no serious division on this point.

“And two other points of division have disappeared. No serious person can now doubt Russia’s determination to re-establish its dominance over what it still calls ‘post-Soviet space’. For 17 years in the West, the emotionally placid, ideologically complacent and intellectually over-sophisticated dismissed this ‘rhetoric’ as a ‘legacy of the past’ that would recede as Russia ‘adjusted’, became more self-confident, more prosperous, more integrated into the global economy. All the latter things have happened. Yet what kind of Russia have they produced? Answer the question yourself.

“Moreover, who can now claim that a strong Russia is good for Europe? Many leaders of the G7 speak with urgency about the importance of cooperation with Russia. But which leader wants Russia to be stronger? This question also answers itself.

“These divisions were disappearing even before Russia recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia on Aug. 26. So the question inevitably arises: Did Russia consider this fact before crossing this Rubicon? Here, the answer is not self-evident.

‘No, they are dizzy with success.’ ‘Yes, but they are dizzy with success’....Neither of these answers are adequate. They miss the key point: Russia is not only determined to use its new-found power, it feels entitled to use it. (As Putin put it in 2006, ‘Russia has earned a right to be self-interested’). And they miss a key nuance: Russia is more contemptuous of the West than confident of itself. The astute editor of Rossiya v Global’noy Politike, Fyodor Lukyanov (who supported Russia’s action of 8 August) is as convinced as I am that, with every step, Russia has calculated on Western division to secure its success. Yet whenever Russia’s leadership saw that it overestimated these divisions, it has ‘taken a more radical position’. In Lukyanov’s words, ‘the Russian leadership like the overwhelming majority of Russians was shocked by the unanimous support the West gave to Saakashvili’ and so, ‘in this emotional atmosphere’, on Aug. 26 ‘it took a great risk’.

“Consider the irony. Western division and Western toughness, in equal measure, now provoke Russia ‘to be self-interested’. Consider the implications. In the 1990s whenever the West reacted more negatively than Moscow anticipated, it sought compromise or backed down; today, it doubles the stakes. Consider the greater implication: when rational calculations prove faulty, ‘emotional’ considerations take over. Conclusion: we are not only in uncharted waters, but dangerous waters.”

How do you see the implications for Ukraine?

“Precarious, but far from desperate. Ukraine will come under greater pressure from Russia. It will be offered greater ‘inducements’, too About these two things, I have no doubt. I also have no doubt that when Russia planned war with Georgia and finally found the excuse for one, it had Ukraine on its mind as much as Georgia. But that does not mean Ukraine is Georgia. War between Russia and Georgia is shocking, and it is also threat to the entire Black Sea region. But war between Russia and Ukraine is a threat to the entire Euro-Atlantic system. And it is a threat to Russia as well. Russia’s preferred mode of action in Ukraine, even under threatening circumstances, is different from what it was in Georgia, and its timetable is longer. The challenge for the West as well as Ukraine is to keep it long: to slow the game down and equalise the players as well. At one level, that should not be difficult for Ukraine. Ukraine, unlike Georgia, has never provoked its neighbour. That is not Ukraine’s way.

“But equalizing the stakes is very difficult for Ukraine. I can only endorse what Anatolii Hrytsenko has recently said and what I have said in almost every previous interview. Ukraine can no longer allow the greatest threat to its security to be Ukraine itself. It must act with purpose, not parade its principles. It must implement policies, not declare them. It dare not promise (let alone threaten) what it has no means to deliver. Its leaders must bring competent professionals together and listen to them. They must revive institutions, get the wheels of the state machine to turn, motivate the people inside it and raise the morale of people outside it. They must stop finding scapegoats for their own mistakes. They must remove every ‘subjective’ factor that obstructs people of dedication, competence and integrity and stop rewarding servility, venality and laziness. They must think about the future and make plans for it. And that means modernising the Armed Forces, the security services and the energy sector.”

Does that mean you agree with Hrytsenko that Ukraine should withdraw its MAP application?

“Of course, Hrytsenko proposed this as a gesture of strength. Today, I fear that it would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and, whatever the actual motivation, many in the West would simply come to the conclusion that Ukraine had capitulated to Russian pressure. But on the basic issue, Hrytsenko and I are of one mind. MAP is a distraction. The tough, indispensable issue is how to strengthen Ukraine’s capacity, security and defences in concrete terms. And how we, NATO, can help Ukraine strengthen it-not just by ‘enhancing cooperation’ but by practical measures of assistance. That course of action will prove more rewarding, more convincing and less provocative than MAP, and it will prove more reassuring and less divisive in Ukraine itself. That is the commitment that Ukraine now requires from NATO, not MAP. And that commitment will be the litmus test of our relationship. If NATO is unwilling to provide real assistance, then what value could MAP possibly have? If Ukraine does nothing to help itself, then who will agree to assist?”