First Europe’s Own Voice
The international anti-terrorism coalition as established after the acts in New York in Washington on September 11 has shown signs of a rift. This became quite obvious in spite of the politicians claiming the opposite and West European leaders assuring Washington of their absolute solidarity.
The reasons for this rift to become visible are very simple. First, the United States’ absolute superiority in terms of military technology to all its European allies together also gives Washington a basis for dictating its political will, which provokes jealousy even from the most pro-American Great Britain. Second, European Union member countries are far from delighted with the fact that they will have to support Washington’s course to destroy what it defined as the Axis of Evil, which includes Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, since this would cause major troubles from which Bush administration would probably distance itself. Third, these countries are not ready to unambiguously support Israel in the current situation in the Middle East. Perhaps the reason is that many of them have large Arab communities.
All this triggered a number of statements from the Europeans warning the United States against turning international relations into just the fight against terrorism, simplifying views on international life, and being one-sided. However, only the respected ones are saying this out loud: representatives of first France and then Germany, Great Britain, and Spain. The smaller fry are so far keeping silent: they depend on the American position more and thus find themselves in quite an awkward situation.
Maybe all this would not look like a tendency if White House policy was criticized only in Paris and Madrid: this has already become a certain tradition which nobody had really objected to. But joining the malcontents by the European Union Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chris Patten delegated by Great Britain and Berlin’s representatives makes the whole affair more serious and makes one ponder over the very existence of the West that had always been viewed as a more or less single whole. On the other hand, now one can say that the EU common foreign policy, which has been discussed so much, is finally beginning to take shape.
The rift became more evidence that the monopolar world established after the victory of what is now called Transatlantic community in the Cold War has itself been a transition model, and at least the most developed countries are prepared to call into question the orders from Washington headquarters. The European Union cannot call itself a primarily economic union anymore. After such statements it has to develop within the framework of a political alliance with all the necessary components and attributes, thus revealing its claims that European life should be defined primarily in Europe. This also includes its contribution to the indeed necessary fight against terrorism.
What does all this have to do with us? This question would be appropriate had it not been for the view on Ukraine from the outside. If its relationship with Washington becomes cooler, this does not mean that with Brussels it will turn warmer. The question is thus not which side we should be on (we will have to decide this sooner or later) but what we could contribute to this side. The result will depend precisely on this; in part, carrying out Leonid Kuchma’s request to prepare the country for entering the European Union in the next ten years.
