Off to a flying start

Although the presidential elections in Russia are almost 18 months away, one can already feel their breath on one’s neck. The inner circles of Putin and Medvedev seem to be increasingly nervous. There are two reasons behind this. Firstly, there is not so much time left to finally see whose sails are being filled with wind and who is destined to remain a solitary white spot in the blue sea mist. This is a very complicated problem because it is next to impossible to unravel all mysteries in the Kremlin’s configuration of forces. But you have to guess right, for otherwise you will surely end up in dire straits. Secondly, there will be parliamentary elections in the next spring. Although the State Duma matters little, this will be a review and a show of the teams’ capabilities — above all, as far as the formation of lists and, hence, the composition of the lower house, is concerned. One must also guess who will be on which part of United Russia party’s list. This is a no less complicated puzzle, especially if you take into account the increased struggle for the vacant office of State Duma deputy speaker.

As is known, before being appointed chief of the cabinet staff and vice-premier, Viacheslav Volodin also held two offices: secretary of the presidium of United Russia’s General Council and the parliament’s vice-speaker. There are no problems within the party. In all probability, Volodin will give way to his first deputy Sergei Neverov, but it is still unknown who will replace the former. A fierce struggle is now underway between Volodin’s and Gryzlov’s supporters. The latter’s candidate is Andrei Vorobyov, chair of United Russia’s central executive committee. His rival is Pavel Krasheninnikov, chair of the parliamentary legislative committee. It is common knowledge that he is one of the president’s closest confidants.

Naturally, it is not the party leadership but entirely different people in other offices, who will pick the vice-speaker. This is where the intrigue is. The rivalry for a relatively insignificant office has assumed paramount importance because its result will show, to some extent, the true clout of the Kremlin and the White House. Yet a seemingly simple decision may be made at this stage, as evidence of a certain balance of forces: the office of the State Duma sixth deputy chairman will simply be abolished.

This result is unacceptable for Medvedev. He managed to oust Luzhkov from Moscow, but, to quote Julius Caesar, “tanto detrimento illa victoria”: this victory cost him too much. The president had to concede two important appointments to Putin (Den, No. 294, October 26, 2010).

So, under the rules of government-corridor games, it is now very important for Medvedev to correct the tilt. And he must win this local battle at all cost.

Until recently, the premier’s and the president’s spin-control exercises were similar to a fault. If one is driving a car across the wide Russian expanses, the other is also standing conspicuously on some transportation vehicle. Suffice it to recall a recent meeting of the heads of Ukraine and Russia in a vintage Zaporozhets car and their promise to ride a train from Moscow to Kyiv. But they have opted for a different course of late. The president is pursuing an active foreign policy, and he need not be afraid of the premier’s rivalry here because, according to the Constitution, this is the prerogative of the head of state.

Putin has taken a pro-European, instead of an anti-Western, direction. The establishment of an informal Moscow-Berlin-Paris axis, a sudden fulfillment of promises given to France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy after the Georgian-Russian armed conflict, and withdrawal of Russian border guards from some disputed villages on the border of South Ossetia and Georgia, preceded the summit of the three leaders in Deauville, France. But that was just an overture followed by proposals on settling the Transnistria conflict. Medvedev is clothing himself in the mantle of a peacemaker to show his ability to resolve some conflicts in the CIS. In the same line is the summit of the presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia in Astrakhan, addressing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This meet produced expected results, which was a foregone conclusion, but Russian diplomacy — of which none other than Medvedev is in charge — put the very fact of these negotiations to its credit.

This diplomatic activity is supposed to enlist foreign support for the nomination of the current president’s candidature. For the people on whom so much depends in the future elections are very sensitive to Western opinion. The president is a modernizer not only inside the country, where he has launched such projects as Skolkovo, but also in a vast array of crucial international issues. The West ought to understand that it is better and easier to deal with none other than him. This is not said out loud in the Russian capital, but what matters here are deeds, not words. If the Transnistria settlement shows some progress after the November elections in Moldova, the Berlin and Paris partners will undoubtedly appreciate it.

But diplomacy is a domain of the elect. It is far more important to begin to clearly explain to the very cautious and inapt under whose colors they should stand. To serve this purpose, there were two loud interviews. Igor Jurgens, head of the Institute of Modern Development, told the newspaper Kommersant bluntly: “Putin stabilized the country after the Chechen War and dealt with all the nonsense that was typical of the late-Yeltsin period. Kudos to him! But if you go on stabilizing all the time, it will result in stagnation. What we need is a modernization breakthrough. And both in the West and inside the country, this is associated with Medvedev. Putin’s refusal will be a sacrifice on his part. The high rating and the people’s love, which Putin won during the stabilization, will be sacrificed on the Fatherland’s altar. But modernization is Medvedev’s affair.”

In his interview with the German business newspaper Handelblatt, Rosnano general manager Anatoly Chubais said in more reserved but clear-cut terms: “That Premier Putin and President Medvedev have different sets of top priorities is a question of generations. The people of Putin’s age believe that modernization is possible on a very limited scale only. At the same time, he stabilized the country. Medvedev is a young person, and modernization is his field.” This comment of Chubais drew a barrage of criticism. He had to provide his own printout of the original interview. Yet he is obviously backing Medvedev, particularly, as far as the necessity of political modernization is concerned.

Jurgens is a free person who is not part of the state apparatus and is protected by the fact that the president has something to do with his institute. So his political leanings are easy to understand. He also used to say before that Russia needs Medvedev. Chubais is a totally different case. He enjoys a different status and wields considerable clout in business circles. And the fact that he chose to support Medvedev, even though in rather cautious terms, and clearly showed his negative attitude to the Khodorkovsky case, speaks volumes. Many people may follow him.

Incidentally, Medvedev has stung Putin more than once in seemingly trivial matters. He last did so in mid-October at a meeting with rock musicians in a Moscow cafe founded by, among others, Andrei Makarevich, frontman of the music band Mashina Vremeni. Asked by the well-known musician and poet Boris Grebenshchikov why Yury Shevchuk was not among the invitees, Medvedev said: “Unlike my colleagues, I know who he is and how he looks like.” The president was referring to the notorious dialogue between Putin and Shevchuk in Saint Petersburg: “And, sorry, what’s your name?”; “Yury Shevchuk, I am a musician.” And this is further evidence that the two sides are on a war path.

Naturally, it is too early to draw conclusions. Putin has quite a few aces up his sleeve, and his clout should not be underrated. But still, given a wise approach, Medvedev is standing more chances.