Foreign Policy: Time to Mature
This writer’s point of view can hardly be considered indisputable. But one of his arguments is difficult not to accept: the foreign policy of a state which lays claim to something should be well-balanced and not depend on seasonal fluctuations of expediency. There can be no divergent interpretations of national interests by various groups that represent the state. There can be no endless zigzags in for eign policy, while interests can and should be constant.
Foreign policy is traditionally the object of the greatest attention of the Ukrainian political community during the seasonal aggravations of domestic political processes. It is no crime that they often confuse the Council of Europe with the European Union: each of them knows only too well where Ukraine’s strategic interests must lie.
In the fall, when the state awaits the winter and Russian energy resources, the opponents of partnership with the northeastern neighbor seem to go into hibernation. In February, they wake up and redouble their efforts to attack everyone whom they suspect of “selling out Ukraine.” I would even suggest we are witnessing Ukraine’s Groundhog Day. Should the people’s deputies not make a statement about the selling-out of Ukraine to Russian neocolonialists, the winter be longer. Should they make one, this means that spring is here and the need for enemy energy resources is not so great.
The activity of the critics of normal relations with the West does not vary so obviously with the seasons, although it becomes far less aggressive in the period of pilgrimage to Mediterranean and Atlantic sun spots. They are more consistent in their likes and dislikes. Everything is logical here: should the International Monetary Fund give a loan, Ukraine will fall prey to the Western colonialists; should it not, it will thus show its criminal essence and perfidy.
Thus Ukraine’s prospects do not appear terribly bright: on the one hand, the sinister Petersburg-raised Putin is trying to appropriate Ukraine, starting with the system of Ukrainian gas pipelines, and, on the other hand, this country is being waylaid by the Texan capitalist predator Bush who is drawing up an anti-Ukrainian defense program.
ON THE HARM OF POLITICAL PHANTOMS
It is already a sad axiom of Ukrainian foreign policy: more often than not, the goals we have set, financed, and worked for prove to be phantoms on closer examination. One of them is Ukrainian-Russian strategic partnership, given a trade turnover humiliating for the countries with a combined population of 200 million. Another phantom is European integration, given the closed markets of Western Europe. The people have so much got used to words having nothing to do with real deeds that few of them doubt that politics is just a virtual reality, a game. So the question “Can foreign policy be of any personal benefit for you?” leaves the ordinary citizen utterly perplexed.
Periodic trade wars with Russia threaten to finally bring our economy to ruin, while Europeans have been hiding from us deeper and deeper in their common European house. At a certain moment we lost our sense of reality, of our capabilities and needs.
For various reasons, only recent changes in the foreign ministry leadership have brought a chance that relevant conclusions will be drawn from the negative experience of the past few years. In particular, Anatoly Zlenko is an independent figure with equally close connections in both the CIS and Western Europe. Despite this, his return to the office of foreign minister was immediately construed by many as a sign of leveling relations with Russia. If this is so, then there is something to level.
One should not confuse the selection of a strategic attitude with wearing blinkers and dogmatism. For example, Poland, while going to the EU, is not ashamed of its Eastern policy but, on the contrary, flaunts it as a trump card in its relationship with the European Union.
We must seek a new tone in our dialogue with Moscow. Moreover, both sides must do so. Russia would do good to finally understand that Ukrainian independence is not something transitory, that Ukraine is no longer a little sister, that she has grown up in the past ten years and will never agree to be a foster child. Ukraine should in turn discard the image of Moscow as the enemy. But we must first overcome our own inferiority complex and become aware that we can simultaneously pursue a European policy of our own and maintain normal partnership with Russia. We will have to break stereotypes, the sooner the better. But it looks like anti-Russian or anti- Western (as well as anti-president, anti-premier, etc.) rhetoric is a very easy way in this country to garner handsome political capital. The more so when it is a foregone conclusion that the object of this rhetoric will never stoop to public polemics over this issue.
EUROPE IS A GOAL BUT NOT AN END IN ITSELF
Debates on the selection of a course and betrayal of national interests often blur the essence of European integration.
If today’s Ukraine has a real opportunity to greatly strengthen its economic position by cooperating with Russia, why not seize it? By all accounts, it makes no difference for the West how we revive our economy. All they care about is that this economy be based on EU principles and legislative norms.
So what is the contradiction between European integration and partnership with Russia? Could Moscow after strengthened its positions on the Ukrainian market just forbid us to move closer to the EU? Yet for some reason Moscow is building its gas pipelines in the direction of Germany rather than China, with EU countries being its main trade partners.
No matter what kind of emotions the idea of European integration might arouse in Ukrainians, there really is no alternative. Not because we want to satisfy our own ambitions and proudly proclaim ourselves EU members. The point is this will enable us to achieve stability and prosperity faster. In addition, European integration is a powerful incentive to speed up reforms: it is one thing to discuss with the EU the prospects of our future membership with our sagging economy and quite another to do this by showing the true signs of economic recovery. The difference is approximately the same as between theory and practice.
If our reforms go successfully, Ukraine can become an attractive spot in the former USSR for free German, Russian, French, and British capital (as was forecast after the collapse of the USSR). This is realistic, given our cheap highly skilled labor, black soil, and computer geniuses.
But, so far, European Union countries keep a discreet silence concerning Ukraine’s European prospects, which is the right thing to do. A state devoid of the elementary culture of political discourse, where political struggle is being conducted using prehistoric methods, where resorting to extremes is the only way to survive for some political forces, can hardly count on sympathy. But if all political forces, no matter whether they call themselves Left, Right, or Centrist, demonstrate their commitment to civilized, realistic, and consistent relations with Europe, our bid for becoming European will be treated seriously.
THE UNITED STATES AND UKRAINE: ON THE THRESHOLD OF A NEW PRAGMATISM
The situation on the American flank looks a bit different. The United States shows purely strategic interest, still looking on us as a remedy against the revival of the Russian superpower. This interest has been and will be unchanged, irrespective of who occupies the While House.
It is not so comfortable to stay in the intersection of powerful gravitational fields. However, it is this balance of interests that can perhaps prevent our state from going to extremes. In any case, partnership with the US, the world’s No. 1 leader, is and will be of paramount strategic importance for Ukraine. We can forecast that the next few months will be especially crucial for the further development of Ukrainian-US relations.
To start with, we must clearly formulate our own priorities in the relationship with that country. A dialogue with the new US administration is special in that it is better to take a negative stand on one point or another than to take none. The ability to advance and consistently defend one’s own positions is a sign of foreign policy maturity. This should become the nucleus of a new foreign policy on all flanks.
A NEW FOREIGN POLICY ON THREE OLD FOUNDATIONS
The necessity of new accents and a new foreign political line within the limits of the old system of priorities has come to a head. Ukraine must find at last the most effective way to realize its interests in the EU-Russia-US triangle. This requires a European policy more pragmatic and oriented toward economic results. It requires a new lease on life to the Ukrainian- Russian strategic partnership. Finally, it requires an active and constructive dialogue with the new US administration.
These steps should be based on tough pragmatism, so much spoken about by the current foreign minister. This means a continuous review of foreign policy activity in order to increase economic effectiveness, reinforce the politically and economically promising positions, and to reject those leading to an impasse. This is a painful but indispensable process. It is an attribute of a mature foreign policy. Striving to be a civilized European state, we cannot afford the luxury of seasonal fluctuations in foreign policy priorities.
