The German factor

After the NATO summit in Bucharest, where Ukraine failed to receive the coveted MAP status, Germany and France were at the receiving end of criticism from many Ukrainian politicians and journalists. Many people believed that the two countries opposed to Ukraine obtaining this status had succumbed to Russia’s influence, considering Russia’s adamant opposition to Ukraine’s NATO membership.

Has Germany changed its stance in the aftermath of recent statements by Russian politicians, who said that Ukraine is not a state and once again are raising the issue of returning Sevastopil to Russia? What must Ukraine do in order to receive a positive signal at the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in December? What kind of assistance is Germany prepared to give Ukraine to this end? These and other questions are raised in the following interview with Reinhard SCHAEFERS, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Federal Republic of Germany to Ukraine.

THREE SPHERES AND MEASURES OF TRUST

Mr. Ambassador, what questions should Ukraine resolve in order to receive MAP status in December?

I think the point in question is not a list of clauses that must be implemented and then reported on in December. I have often spoken publicly about the three spheres that are the basis of our public opinion.

The first sphere pertains to the situation in Ukraine — in other words, popular support, including matters concerning domestic stability, which is oriented toward further prospects.

The next group of issues relates to the contribution to general European and regional stability. For example, if Ukraine becomes a member of NATO, this is where the well-known “Russian factor” starts to exert its influence. Germany does not consider that Russia has the veto right. However, we are prepared to give broader consideration to the attitude of Russia’s leadership and its people to the very fact of Ukraine joining NATO. I have often pointed out that we — NATO and Ukraine — should jointly strive to make the issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership more acceptable to Russia. To this end, I have brought up old concepts that should also be applied now, specifically European “measures for strengthening trust.” It is precisely in regard to the second group of problems that we expect a serious approach from Ukraine. We expect Ukraine to realize its own significance, its own weight and influence on the general political and regional situation in Europe, and that in view of this it will form relations with its partners in a serious fashion.

The third group of questions has to do with the so-called “homework” in the military and military-political spheres, which Ukraine must complete in collaboration with NATO. It is in this sphere of Ukraine-NATO collaboration that we observe a certain deficit that has been revealed in the past few years.

Do you agree with the British expert James Sherr that Ukraine should change the tone of its relations with NATO by offering something rather than demanding anything from the alliance?

What Mr. Sherr said is not the point. Ukraine should not just look at itself and make certain demands. It must bear in mind that, in becoming a member of NATO, it will have to facilitate the stability and security of all its European partners, and to increase this stability and security. This aspect should be seriously considered, taken into account, and discussed with its NATO partners. Then, of course, this will define the tone of the Ukraine-NATO talks.

WE CONDEMN ALL STATEMENTS THAT ARE DAMAGING TO UKRAINE’S STATE SOVEREIGNTY

Toward the end of the Bucharest summit President Putin of Russia issued his well-publicized statements. Recently Yurii Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow, issued a statement about Sevastopil, in which he called into question Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Have these statements influenced Germany’s position on Ukraine’s MAP status and its speedier admission to NATO?

I have repeatedly said that neither the threatening tone we heard in Bucharest nor any subsequent statements have any direct political bearing on my country.

We condemn all statements that are damaging to Ukraine’s state sovereignty and regard such statements as counterproductive and destabilizing.

Will Germany or NATO respond to Russia’s statements?

You may rest assured that during our bilateral contacts the Federal Chancellor and the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs have always told the Russian side that Russia does not have the veto right in this matter, and that one should be careful about one’s statements. There no need to overrate what Mr. Luzhkov had to say because what he said is nonsense.

But the Russian foreign ministry has not condemned the Moscow mayor’s statement. Moreover, Liubov Sliska, deputy head of the pro-government faction in the State Duma, declared that the Russian parliament intends to deliberate the issue. Isn’t this an alarming signal for us?

We believe that this signal will not lead to anything. We are ignoring it.

UKRAINE MUST BE A KEY PLAYER

Does Germany agree with British Minister Jim Murphy, who said recently that the NATO allies should assist Ukraine with its speedy admission to the alliance? How do you think the alliance, particularly Germany, should assist our country?

This question of aid relates to the third group of problems that I mentioned earlier. Germany is one of the countries that have been assisting Ukraine on the largest scope. Over the past 15 years Germany has been providing annual financial aid worth 5.5 million euros to train Ukrainian army officers and conduct refresher courses. However, the main problem is not our assistance but what Ukraine must accomplish by relying on its own resources and what will assist your country’s progress. All this was known even before the summit in Bucharest.

Let me say again — although not everyone is willing to hear this — that Ukraine must be a key player and take decisive steps.

Do you think that NATO’s interests will be served by Ukraine’s speedy admission?

I talked about this at the beginning of the interview: now is not the time to resolve the issue of Ukraine’s MAP status and subsequent candidate member status. However, Germany continues to abide by the thesis that we expressed in Bucharest, namely, that Ukraine will eventually become a member of NATO.

Germany believes that, if Ukraine receives MAP status and then NATO membership at this time, this will generate more problems instead of resolving existing problems. Whether you like it or not, you have to consider this aspect and understand it. This topic should be discussed.

What about looking at this question from a different angle? Won’t the European security system be at risk if Ukraine is not admitted to NATO in the nearest future?

We believe there is no such threat.

During the discussions that were organized around the commemorations of Europe Day in Kyiv you mentioned the need to improve Ukraine’s image in the eyes of Europeans. How do you see our country’s image, and what should be done to improve it?

My impression is that Ukraine is having problems building its image in Europe. Most likely these problems have to do with the lack of information about Ukraine in Europe or distorted information. Ukraine is only partly responsible for this. To a certain extent, this has to do with history, insufficient information in Europe, as well as the series of political crises and instability. In terms of the recent past, this is also connected with a degree of disillusionment and despair after the Orange Revolution. What should you do? I know that the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian missions abroad have drafted a special image-building program. However, the main thing that should be done is to give a signal of stability and consistency in Ukrainian politics as well as in Ukraine’s domestic life.

THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY AND RAPPROCHEMENT IN ALL DIRECTIONS

Does Germany support President Nicolas Sarkozy’s idea of offering Ukraine a “transfer to a new level of neighborhood policy” at the Ukraine-EU summit in September?

Yes, it does. Germany is proceeding from the fact that President Sarkozy made this proposal after consultations held in keeping with the established procedures of German-French relations. The details of this plan still have to be discussed.

So what is your attitude to the position of the UK, which declared that the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) should not be understood as an alternative to EU membership? It’s no secret that a number of Ukrainian diplomats regard this policy precisely along these lines.

You see, the European Neighborhood Policy is a policy that is fixed in a certain time period. This means that Ukraine does not have any concrete membership prospects at the moment because the European Union has still not agreed on its temporary membership prospects. Opinion is unanimous, however, that there should be a policy of close cooperation in all spheres so as to bring Ukraine as close to the EU as possible in a businesslike manner. The ENP documents do not say anything about membership prospects or that there will be no admission. What will happen in the very near future? No one can say right now.

However, what we are doing today and will be doing tomorrow is not deviating from Ukraine’s future admission to the EU. This does not mean embarking on a new path. On the contrary, this means rapprochement in all directions.

CONSISTENCY IS VERY IMPORTANT IN POLITICS

Mr. Ambassador, you have been observing events in Ukraine. Do you think that the political struggle between our president and prime minister has affected Germany’s cooperation with Ukraine?

Ukraine’s domestic political situation is certainly affecting your country’s image as a partner. Naturally, your domestic policy instantly surfaces and manifests itself in your foreign policy. We would like to see Ukraine — a very important partner for us — as a stable country. Consider our economic and cultural contacts. We are interested in Ukraine. We treat your country as a friend. We know your country well. It is very important for us to have Ukraine as a reliable and stable partner. Consistency is very important in politics — I have pointed this out on many occasions. We believe that Ukraine’s economy and society are in the 21st century, but its political class, its political elite, has still not entered this century.

Do you think that constitutional reform and using Germany as a model will help increase stability in Ukraine?

Our countries have very different political systems. We are a federal country, so for a country like Ukraine, which is a unitary state, our example can be adopted only to a limited extent. In addition, my country is a young democracy: it became a democratic country only in 1949. Therefore, we believe that our highest priority is to strictly and unequivocally delimit the rights and responsibilities vested in the executive and legislative branches, and those vested in the judiciary and executive authorities.

What you have in Ukraine, you will never find in any European country. Of course, we can’t say we are the best example, but you could learn something from us, especially in the judicial sphere. We are supporting Ukraine in this matter. Here in Kyiv we have the German Foundation for International Legal Cooperation, which for a number of years has provided practical assistance to the Ukrainian government in implementing legal reforms, for example, by organizing refresher courses for Ukrainian judges.

THE PROBLEM OF APPOINTING A NEW AMBASSADOR AND THE CHANCELLOR’S VISIT

Ukraine appears to be having a problem appointing an ambassador to such an important country as Germany. A top-ranking Ukrainian diplomat even said recently that it is easier to appoint a new foreign minister in Ukraine than an ambassador to Germany. Do you agree?

I don’t know about Ukraine’s plans in regard to its ambassador to Germany, but if they want to send a diplomat who knows German to our country, then the list of candidates shrinks, of course. At the same time, command of the language is not the only criterion. You have to remember that Germany is a federal state, and the Ukrainian ambassador will have to visit various federal lands, so knowing only English might not be enough in some of them. Of course, we are very interested in having Mr. Dolhov, the ambassador who was recalled and replaced by a new one, but I must say that Mr. Dolhov was held in great esteem in Germany.

Mr. Ambassador, can you say when the intergovernmental consultations between our countries will be resumed on the chancellor-presidential/prime-ministerial level?

As your president has already announced, the German chancellor’s visit to your country will take place soon. We will talk later about the intergovernmental consultations, which should have taken place a long time ago.

Can you give a precise date for the German chancellor’s visit?

The probable date has been established and we will announce it jointly with the Ukrainian side.

Will it be in this half-year or the next one?

It will take place before the summer vacations.