A “gift” from Putin

Qui tacuit, cum loqui debuit et potuit, consentire videtur (Those who kept silent when they could and should have spoken, consented)
A formula of Roman law
The Ukrainian-Russian honeymoon was doomed to be short-lived. Problems already began to appear while the ink on the Kharkiv agreements was still wet. And nothing could stop this process. The more often our president and prime minister met with their Russian colleagues, the more troubles emerged. It seems that meetings between the two parties, as well as various summits and conferences, served to collect difficulties and not to solve them.
The first “gift” from Moscow concerned the most sensitive issue — gas. Vladimir Putin coarsely stated that there had been no, and there would be no price decrease for natural gas. Mykola Azarov swore at a talk show that he would reach an acceptable price. Where is it? The year will soon end and after January 1 the bill will be based on the formula that takes into account the increased oil price. It is clear that Azarov does not fuel his cars at gas stations personally, it’s not becoming to a prime minister, therefore, perhaps, he doesn’t know that prices have changed.
Contradictions with Moscow, unfortunately, are not limited to gas. Problems are everywhere. Smiles, conversations, and nothing behind them. It is interesting that they thought Moscow would be satisfied with talks of brotherhood and Tabachnyk’s speeches about history. It was not the case. In this very social sphere — history — the government received a loud slap in the face: personally from the Russian premier, in public, and in a most humiliating manner. A big number of Russian television viewers watch the national leader respond to questions. Consequently, the resonance from his statements was substantial and even more offensive.
Putin openly said that Russia won the Great Patriotic War and could do it without Ukraine and other republics of the USSR. “We would have won anyway, because we are a country of winners… Moreover, there is clear evidence of this. If we look at the statistics from Second World War, we will see that Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic incurred the biggest losses — about 70 percent. This means that the war was won — I do not want to offend anyone — primarily owing to the resources, human and industrial, of the Russian Federation. That’s a historical fact, it’s all in the documents.”
But nobody protests the role of Russia, its people and economic potential in the victory. However, the Russian premier is twisting the figures. How does one count, for example, human losses? Relative to the total population, Ukraine incurred much greater losses than Russia. In absolute figures, then Russia, of course. But there are also other factors. Would tanks move and planes fly without Baku’s oil? In Tatarstan oil extraction began only at the end of the war and in a relatively small amount. How would one produce explosives and sew overcoats and soldier’s blouses without Uzbek cotton? Without Kazakh molybdenum, vanadium and lead it would be impossible to produce high-alloy steel. This can also be gleaned from the documents the Russian premier referred to.
The strategic importance of Kyiv was so considerable that Hitler stopped the attack on Moscow and turned the tanks of Guderian and the army of von Weichs to the south. The Fuehrer understood that it was extremely dangerous to leave Kyiv behind the lines of his army attacking Moscow. So it looks that the tactical pause in the German attack on the Soviet capital led the Wehrmacht to the strategic defeat in December 1941 – April 1942. Fans of alternative history, including the Russian premier, can meditate on the topic. The contribution of all peoples was immense, regardless of their numbers. The famous commission on history falsification should address Putin’s confusing historic events with propaganda.
Despite the historical appearance, the remark of Russian premier was directed not at the past, but at the present, and in some way at the future.
The domestic policy aspect is absolutely clear. This statement is closely connected with other ones. Right after the speech the host of the program Vesti v subbotu Sergei Brilyov asked Putin about his opinion on the State Duma campaign of 2011 and received the answer: “In this case it’s too early to talk about it, but on the whole, especially in today’s capacity, I do not exclude this.” The loyal thankfulness was flowing like the Amazon river. The acting secretary of the general council’s presidium of the party United Russia Sergei Neverov swore to the chieftain right away: “The fact that he doesn’t make it impossible for him to head the lists of the party during the election to the State Duma is certainly a high evaluation and a big trust that we must justify.” Deja vu, anybody?
One can ask, what is the connection? The most direct one. The chieftain solves all issues, including historical ones. Stalin dealt with linguistics, he was a big scholar.
Is the leader of United Russia any worse? Linguistics is now an exact science, it uses mathematical methods. One cannot succeed in it quickly, one should fluently operate with formulas and theorems, so it’s a problem. But not with history. Satisfy the people by praising the glorious past, since the Russian government doesn’t have anything else to offer. And if one humiliates neighbors at the same time, no one will refuse from it. A kind of election publicity and a demonstration of a strong leader heading the list of the government party. That is what the people crave.
One more issue. After negotiations with the Latvian president Valdis Zatlers, Dmitrii Medvedev announced at a common press conference: “There are historical topics which will always be very complicated. And if one starts politicizing them, it is likely to stop a normal friendly dialog and will provoke mutual enmity.” According to his words, this concerns not only relations between Russia and Latvia, but also those with a number of other states, Ukraine included.
The principal difference in approaches is apparent. While the Russian president, at least officially, tries to refrain from the unnecessary politicizing of such complicated and sensitive issues, his formal subordinate acts in an opposite way. There is an impression that he creates problems for the head of the Russian state on purpose. In this view, the statement about the role of Russia in the war should be regarded as intensifying the confrontation in Moscow’s corridors of power, which emerge in public with increasing frequency.
The foreign policy vector of Putin’s statement was pursued in meditations about the necessity of closer cooperation between the former republics of the USSR. Nothing new on the face of things, but in fact in this multilayer pie there is a direct threat, though Ukraine is not mentioned explicitly.
Firstly, the annoyance caused by the non-compliance of the Ukrainian government regarding integration and economic issues has been growing for a long time in Moscow. Something is solved, but so that the game is not worth the candle. If the Russian MTS does not win the competition on the privatization of Ukrtelecom, and there are some doubts regarding it, retaliatory measures will come soon. It is interesting to see what secular affairs Patriarch Kirill was solving during his meeting with the Ukrainian premier. If the Russian Orthodox Church undertakes the burden of lobbying, the future of Ukrainian-Russian relations is uncertain.
Secondly, the visit of Viktor Yanukovych to the Belgian capital and the promises he made there provoked Moscow’s irritation, notably the statements of our president regarding Romania and Transnistria, such as the promise of a more active policy in this strategically important region. The Kremlin could not like it. Moreover, in the triangle Moscow-Kyiv-Chisinau there is a conservation law. If the role of Ukraine increases, it is not difficult to guess whose will decrease. How can the Russian government agree with this?
Thirdly, Ukrainian-Georgian negotiations, which were mentioned by the deputy prime minister, and the Georgian Minister for European and Atlantic Integration Grigori Baramidze in an interview to the magazine Ekspert didn’t add warmth to relations with Moscow either. The mollification of tension between Georgia and Russia is in favor of Medvedev, Putin doesn’t need it at all. The Kyiv’s diplomatic basis is too weak to play the role of a mediator in solving this difficult conflict. Moreover, any contact between Georgia and Ukraine irritates our northern neighbors, to put is softly. Quite recently, Moscow newspapers again started writing about the supply of Ukrainian weapons to Georgia. Such things cannot be accidental.
Yanukovych underwent an information attack, which put him in a very difficult situation. The country and its veterans were publicly humiliated, though this was accompanied by a hypocritical note that “this in no way diminishes the importance that the republics of the former Soviet Union played in the common victory.” What shall the Ukrainian government do now? How to react? One can agree and refer to the aforementioned statistics. We will not be surprised if Tabachnyk does it without hesitation. But this will not diminish the very fact of humiliation.
One can object and show the real role of Ukraine in the war. I have an inkling that our government will lack courage for this. Moreover, it is in a state of extreme confusion. They didn’t expect it after Kharkiv. Since they honored the neighbor in the Black Sea Fleet deal, what for is this disgrace?
There is a third option. To keep silent as if nothing happened — our government’s strategy. If it chose this way, then they imply consent. Does it mean they agree? They surrendered in Kharkiv, so now come the consequences. It is time to take a stand.
TO THE POINT
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine considers that Putin expressed his personal opinion on the Great Patriotic War. The director of the department of information policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Oleh Voloshyn declared this at a briefing: “We do not argue with Vladimir Putin because we don’t have reasons to think that what he said is an element of state policy.” Voloshyn singled out that no official document or statements of Russian politicians doubt the contribution of the Ukrainian people in the victory in the Great Patriotic War. “Therefore we suppose it’s unnecessary to react to these meditations on an official level,” he added. Voloshyn reminded that the official position of Ukraine is that the victory in the Great Patriotic War is the victory of all the peoples of the Soviet Union without exceptions.