Grounds for anxiety
Ukrainians and Western experts alike have been wondering about the so-called non-alignment status adopted by the incumbent Ukrainian government. The authorities emphasize that this decision has brought our state great political, economic, and security dividends. However, how should one interpret the appeals of our leaders to join the non-existent European collective security system? What are the challenges lurking in Ukraine’s non-allignment status, and in the incumbent regime’s attempt to follow the Russian power patterns? These questions were discussed in The Day’s special interview with James SHERR, head of Russia and Eurasia Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs Chatham House.
Mr. Sherr you have heard the argument of Deputy [Foreign] Minister Oleksandr Gorin that nonblock status brought benefits for Ukraine, notably in the security sphere. What can you say about this?
“I have two questions about the non-bloc status: what does it mean, and what is its purpose? Clearly it does not mean neutrality, because the status of a neutral state is codified and guaranteed by treaty. It is far from clear that it means non-alignment, because non-aligned states (like Sweden and Yugoslavia during the Cold War) assume major burdens for their own defense. Not only do Ukraine’s defenses continue to deteriorate. There is no military doctrine articulating how the country is to be defended in these conditions.
“The purposes of the law are clearly to reassure Ukraine’s population — the majority of which today finds NATO membership objectionable — and to reassure Russia. But surely the first aim would be ensured by a purposefully non-committal policy rather than a law foreclosing options for the future. And whilst Russia might indeed be reassured by this law, its promulgation raises an equally salient question: how is Russia to be restrained? Before 2002 Ukraine wisely refused either to commit itself to NATO membership or rule it out. At the same time, NATO helped Ukraine mo-dernize and reform its armed forces. By these expedients, Russia was restrained without being alarmed. The NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership helped Russia see the wisdom of concluding the Black Sea Fleet accords and recognizing Ukraine’s unrestricted sovereignty over the Crimea.
“Thanks to the Law on Non-Bloc Status, Ukraine’s security is dependent neither on its own strength, nor on international guarantees, only on the kindness of its neighbors. Of course, a future government could repeal the law, but it could face serious internal and international complications if it did so. [It would be] far better not to have adopted the law in the first place.”
You know that the Ukrainian authorities agreed to Russia’s request to modernize this fleet. What implication may this have for Ukraine’s security?
“This also raises questions. What precisely has been agreed? Has it been agreed in written form? If so, who has agreed to it, and who has seen it? The fact is that the Russian Black Sea Fleet is deployed in Ukraine on the basis of intergovernmental agreements, partially unpublished and not substantially mo-dified since 1997. It is not deployed on the basis of what NATO calls a status of forces agreement. Such an agreement is codified and scrutinized by those constitutionally empowered to review and approve it. It spells out as precisely as possible the rights and obligations of the respective parties. This is not a theoretical matter. The 1997 accords left a number of key issues unresolved. Over the years, they have become serious. They include the economic assets of the fleet and the way they are assessed and taxed. They include the way these economic assets are used — some of them are clearly used against Ukraine’s interests. They include the activities of intelligence structures that operate under the shelter of the fleet. Most important of all, they include the operational deployment of the fleet in conditions of conflict. Should the fleet’s operation against de facto allies of Ukraine (e.g. Georgia in 2008) not be a subject of parliamentary and public discussion in Ukraine before such ‘agreements’ are concluded?”
Mr. Sherr do you see signals that Ukraine is increasingly falling under Russia’s influence?
“The Russians themselves certainly have the expectation that the accords reached in Kharkiv are the beginning of process that will lead to a large measure of economic and security integration with the Russian Federation. On some of these points Ukraine’s state authorities plainly do not agree. That is to be expected. Yanukovych is not a tool of Moscow. But by what means does he propose to defend Ukraine’s state interests? Have the Kharkiv agreements strengthened or weakened Ukraine’s means of defense? I think there are grounds for concern, and the matter certainly deserves serious discussion.”
So one may say that Ukrainian already crossed the line dividing a close partnership and a loss of sovereignty, in spite of the statement by the minister of foreign affairs in Chatham House, about how the leadership of Ukraine is acutely aware of this line and does not intend to cross it?
“The issue, now as in the past, is the extent to which Ukraine has the capacity to act independently and defend its sovereignty. The reason I spoke of the ‘mortgaging’ of independence is that Ukraine has unilaterally ceded some of that capacity — a convincingly effective NATO counterbalance and some degree of independence in energy — in the hopes that Russian goodwill would provide more international maneuverability and more time for the new authorities to consolidate their authority in the country. Well, there was always something of a gamble in this. And also a naive assumption that Russia would diminish pressure on Ukraine rather than increase it. Today, we can plainly see that Russia is increasing pressure. So without questioning the objectives that the foreign minister expressed, we can still question the wisdom of what he expressed.”
Mr. Sherr, do you agree with Hryshchenko’s statement, about how Ukraine, Russia and other post-Soviet countries are Europe’s largely untapped resource, which cannot and should not be overlooked any longer. Admitted, dealing with them is sometimes difficult. Yet overlooking them is much more costly, especially in the long run.
“Good God, no one overlooks them — certainly not Russia! But where ‘untapped resources’ are concerned, almost no one knows what to do. Russia is a country that is adamant about its European character but does not want integration with Europe. It wants ‘equality’ with it on the basis of its right to be different. Ukraine wants integration and investment, but maintains political, institutional and economic arrangements that make both virtually impossible. The institutions that in today’s Europe guarantee impartiality and protection for entrepreneurs and fo-reign investors, are in Ukraine nothing but the instruments of state authorities for pursuing their own political and economic interests. Yanukovych is strengthening this system’s ‘vertical.’ He has shown no interest in changing the system.”
Do you see sincerity in the Ukrainian authorities intentions to realize “a civilization choice,” i.e. integration with the EU and adoption of European values and standards?
“No, at least not on the part of the narrow group that wields power today. But within the Party of Regions as a whole, and amongst some of the business interests that support it, some speak with sincerity. But they also speak out of ignorance, ambivalence and apprehension about adopting European norms, because those who dominate the Ukrainian economy today will lose this dominance if these norms are adopted.”
Is Yanukovych’s policy similar to the Russian vertikal vlasti (power vertical)?
“Yes and no. Let’s understand what has changed in Russia over the past ten years. In the 1990s money in Russia bought power. If you had enough money you could privatize that part of the state you needed in order to advance your private interests. Today it is quite the opposite. Power buys money. If you have enough power and want somebody else’s assets and property, you take them. And the courts, police, and security service will provide all necessary support. I fear that there are those in the current Ukrainian government who would like to extend this system to Ukraine. In short, the only guarantee of economic security and success will be privileged ties with the state and on the state’s terms. But Ukraine is not Russia, and this Putin model will not work here. Even so, the attempt to implement it will be damaging to a number of people and a number of important democratic liberties, too. And this enterprise has absolutely nothing to do with European integration.”
Can you say whether the EU has some leverage to apply soft pressure on the domestic authorities so they follow European practice in deeds, not just words?
“Today there is very little leverage. Until President Yanukovych gets into trouble, he will do what he wants, irrespective of what Europe thinks. (Of course, there will be limits. He will employ modern and sophisticated electoral technologies rather than brutal and crude ones.) But he will get into trouble, because his current economic model can only succeed in the very short term. Beyond that, the difficulties and contradictions will rapidly accumulate. Then Europe will be listened to — but only if by then Europe has something to say! Until then, we in Europe should be talking to all the stakeholders: all the principal players in the Ukrainian economy, as well as those who are being shut out of it — genuinely private entrepreneurs. And we need to maintain our relationships with those who care deeply about Ukraine’s state interests and security. We cannot allow ourselves or Ukrainians to forget that European integration depends more on the harmonization of internal policies than foreign policies. If the Ukrainian authorities dislike this, they should be honest enough to abandon the aim of European integration.”
The last question is about the NATO summit, which will take place in Lisbon. Will it be defined by Russia’s agenda, considering Moscow’s pressure on this organization to take into account Russian interests?
“I do not believe that. I suspect NATO’s new Strategic Concept will make almost no mention of Russia. We can expect it to describe the Alliance’s interests and priorities in thematic and generic terms. The Russians would like the Concept to contain a statement that NATO rules out any military threat from the East. I think they are unlikely to get it. Even the so-called NATO Treaty (the Washington Treaty) of 1949 did not mention any country by name when it stated that ‘an attack on one will be treated as an attack on all.’ The words ‘Soviet Union’ do not appear in it, despite the fact that many feared we were on the verge of a hot war at the time. One year after the conclusion of the Russian military exercise Zapad 2009 (which ended with a simulated nuclear exchange), how could today’s Alliance of 28 members agree to that? Russia also wants NATO to endorse its ‘equality.’ I would be very surprised if NATO departed from the language of ‘cooperation.’ Finally, NATO is unlikely to institutionalize Russia’s role in NATO’s own decision making. Countries that are not NATO Allies will not be accorded the prerogatives of NATO Allies. So, despite the very positive change in atmosphere — and the possibility of more concrete and effective cooperation with Russia — the new Strategic Concept is most unlikely to produce a revolution in the NATO-Russia relationship.”
