Is GUAM back?

“Is Belarus going to take the place of Ukraine in GUAM [the as yet toothless association of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, aimed at balancing Russian power in the region]?” I recently posted a blog entry about Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili’s address to Belarusian and Moldovan young people who were staying at a patriotic camp in Anaklia, Georgia.

According to the president’s spokesperson, Mr. Saakashvili not only assured them that he “believes in a cloudless future for the two countries,” but also pointed out that “Belarus has achieved successes and developed its economy in spite of foreign pressure.”

This was no joke. It is no secret that relations between Tbilisi and Minsk warmed up after Belarus came under fierce verbal fire from the Kremlin. Nor is it a secret that the two countries’ governments have actively begun to develop their economic relations. For example, Tbilisi would very much like Belarus to build a tractor plant in the special economic zone of Poti, while Minsk wants to transport its liquified gas through the port-city. The subject of liquefied gas (which is cheaper and easier to transport than the traditional variety) has become very popular in this region. Belarus is also prepared to build a liquefied gas terminal on the Lithuanian coast. Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Romania signed a memorandum on the transit of Azerbaijan’s liquefied gas to Europe as long ago as last April, and have now set up a joint venture to this effect. Last summer Ukrainian officials, too, began to talk about wanting to get in on the liquefied gas. In particular, there was talk about trying to attract Qatar (now the world’s largest producer and supplier of li-quefied gas), to participate in the construction of a terminal in Odesa.

A further intriguing issue is the deliberate leak of information (disinformation?) that Saakashvili and his Moldovan counterpart Mihai Ghimpu discussed the idea of inviting Belarus to GUAM — against the backdrop of the Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze’s assurances that “the organization is living, …and all the sides are interested in implementing joint economic, energy- and transport-related projects.” Leaders of GUAM member states are going to meet in autumn in New York during the UN General Assembly session.

Mr. Vashadze comments on the potential projects bring us back to GUAM’s very foundation, some 13 years ago. It will be reminded that at first it was GUUAM — together with Uzbekistan — and it was conceived to pursue precisely this kind of goal. The idea of a Baltic and Black Sea corridor was also popular at that time. It was even discussed in Yalta by the presidents of the interested countries, from Latvia to Romania. But it turned out to be mere talk: the proximity of sea and sun was perhaps unsuitable for serious conversations, as confirmed by the official photos of excessively cheerful Leonid Kuchma embracing his Latvian counterpart Vaira Vike-Freiberga in a burst of affection.

It was one of the most long-lived amorphous entities ever seen — even the federations of Arab republics, founded on the generally acceptable principles of pan-Arabism and Arab socialism, disintegrated quicker. There were summits, optimistic speeches, and… nix as a result. In fact, Washington showed interest in the organization and even occasionally dished out 20 or 30 million dollars for the “security component,” such as the joint battalion to guard the future transport corridor. This in turn increasingly irked Moscow, which saw GUUAM as, above all, a US-sponsored anti-Russian political project. Uzbekistan was the first to lose patience and announce its withdrawal due to the absence of any practical actions. The loss of one letter in the name did not bother those who remained very much, which again raised doubts about any realistic joint projects. As time went by, Azerbaijan tried to breathe new life into the organization, pursuing its own rational interests and hoping to create new ways to deliver its energy resources to Europe. Obviously, Baku was pinning its hopes on Kyiv as far as the implementation of this plan was concerned, waiting patiently for Kyiv to stop its mindless somersaults regarding the direction of the Odesa-Brody oil pipeline. Azerbaijan also actively invested in Georgia, developing its transport infrastructure as a link in this chain. Incidentally, it is Poland that played a mean trick in this regard. The Polish government blocked the planned extension of the pipeline to Plock: “We would like to do it… But we cannot force our private businesses to participate.”

It should be noted that GUAM project truly became political during the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko. When he and his child’s godfather Saakashvili lazed around at the Borjomi spa, they established the Commonwealth of Democratic Choice, which immediately went defunct when the fresh “tulip-colored” Kyrgyzstan turned down the proposal to join. Then they began to talk profusely, and made populist statements about “asserting democracy” within GUAM itself. At this point, the Kremlin became even more concerned, lest the “young neocons” foment a “birch-tree revolution” of sorts in Russia. Meanwhile, Baku went on patiently listening to Yushchenko’s unforgettable pipe dreams, which allowed him to continue his search and eventually add another word to the “Commonwealth for Democracy and Development” in 2006. But even after this, Kyiv dragged its feet on ratifying the statute, even though the organization’s headquarters were situated, of course, in Kyiv.

Viktor Yanukovych made several statements before and after his victory, which were widely regarded as signaling Ukraine’s withdrawal from GUAM. However, in Strasbourg in late April Yanukovych said that he was going to try to gather the presidents of all the member states in order to decide what is to be done “to make the organization pursue pragmatic, not romantic, policies.” He also said that he wanted to discuss this separately with President Ilham Aliyev — a good idea considering that Azerbaijan is one of the main motors for any joint projects. There will be an opportunity to do so in October, when Aliyev will come to Kyiv to attend a session of the two states’ Council of Presidents.

President Bashar al-Assad of Syria made an interesting statement on July 26, during his visit to Minsk: “The relations [Syria and Belarus] are building today, are relations between regions of Eastern Europe, not just between states.” In turn, President Aleksandr Lukashenka said that Minsk and Damascus intended to launch trilateral economic projects in the following formats: Belarus-Syria-Venezuela and Belarus-Syria-Qatar. The summits of these countries’ leaders will soon take place.

Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem’s visit to Kyiv two weeks ago remained unnoticed here. I wish it hadn’t — not only because the two sides are supposed to draw up a free trade area agreement by the time the Syrian leader pays his first official visit to Ukraine, later this year. Ukraine will undoubtedly benefit from this for the simple reason that Syria has concluded similar agreements with all Arab states, once again confirming that Syria is Ukraine’s gateway to the Middle East. In our case, the coming visit of al-Assad is interesting because he is eager to see Kyiv support the Belarus-Syria-Venezuela project announced by Lukashenka: Venezuelan oil goes to Belarus via Ukraine, and from there diesel fuel goes to Syria, also through Ukraine.

Would this be worse than the Baltic and Black Sea corridor which floundered in Yalta?