How about reform?
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Have the 2002 elections become a step forward in Ukraine? Most likely not. Considering the new Verkhovna Rada membership, we are in for an exciting political show rather than a systemic breakthrough — and the latter was discussed at length and depth during the election campaign. Even worse so, the top priority package of reforms (tax, pension, etc.) is likely to get blocked, for we all know what all those parliamentary games of personal ambitions lead to.
The role played by the regime in the election campaign deserves separate notice. Whereas the turnout of the bloc “For a United Ukraine” is regarded by head of the presidential administration Volodymyr Lytvyn as a personal victory, one scored by a public politician, the overall FUU performance during the campaign is beneath criticism. Their ratings are low because they failed to learn any lessons of the cassette scandal well enough, also because they architected the campaign using nomenklatura office cliches. The main behavioral symptoms of the political style are pathologic envy and pushing back strong partners in power. This is what has actually happened to Anatoly Kinakh with the highest FUU ratings, the bloc’s only figure capable of challenging Viktor Yushchenko. As soon as he had gained popularity and secured the economy a positive dynamic status, he was held back. Some questions could be addressed to Serhiy Tyhypko who feels offended by the TV channels Inter and 1+1, suspecting them of a biased approach to FUU. The fact remains that he, as the party leader, did nothing to prevent the inclusion of the problem politician Andriy Derkach in the roster (#11). Even worse so, he made Derkach-pere a present of his own constituency.
Now the question is whether the regime will learn any lessons from a situation where the FUU, after getting over the election combat fatigue, will find themselves surrounded by opposition, on the right and on the left, with practically no allies in the center. Perhaps the parliamentary factions of the parties joining FUU ought to have taken a clearer stand as opponents of the ousting of the SDPU(u) leader Viktor Medvedchuk as first vice speaker. And the people on Bankova St. ought to have figured out the consequences before surrendering the leader of the party that had nominated the current head of state for the second term and pushed through a number of tough legislative solutions. Indeed, Volodymyr Lytvyn has announced that FUU is prepared to cooperate “with a large spectrum of political forces” in the future parliament. Probably spinelessness, “soft opposition” embodied by Our Ukraine, and “soft power” personified by FUU will be in vogue in the new parliament. If so, how can one expect clear political and social structuring?
Granted: the people has formally expressed its will (there were transgressions, but CEC chairman Mykhailo Riabets and, in part, CIS observers believe that they had no effect on the election turnout). It is also true, however, that no actually democratic standards have set in. Our concepts and aspirations are curious mix of nostalgia (courtesy of CPU), belief that someone big and powerful will come and make every Ukrainian man in the street happy (courtesy of Our Ukraine), conformism of the so-called bloc in power, and hatred of the regime (courtesy of the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc and Socialist Party). Let us hope that this curious mix will not turn into a Molotov cocktail.