Impasse or compromise?

What kind of a coalition agreement will be formed in Ukraine and most importantly, how will the most “sensitive” issues be formulated in it? These questions probably have far more weight than the distribution of portfolios in the future cabinet of Ukraine. As soon as it was learned that Our Ukraine, Yulia Tymoshenko’s Bloc (BYuT) and the Socialist Party were going to form a coalition, it became clear that these politicians would find it difficult to come to terms about Ukraine’s integration into NATO.

Our Ukraine has taken the most clear-cut stand on this matter — full support for membership. The BYuT’s position is somewhat less clear: its members seem to prefer to follow public opinion (the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians still take a dim view of NATO membership). The socialists are in fact taking a firm anti-NATO stand, too. Early last week the media released a statement by BYuT’s Vasyl Onopenko, who announced that the coalition parties had reached a compromise about Ukraine’s prospects for NATO membership: the coalition agreement will stipulate that accession to the alliance can only be resolved by a nationwide referendum.

The Party of Regions also announced on June 1 that the decision on Ukraine’s accession to NATO can only be taken after holding a referendum. Will the new government be able to lead this country to the North Atlantic alliance through such a “compromise?” Were there any other efforts to reach agreement on this issue? We asked some experts to reply to these questions.

Myroslav POPOVYCH, corresponding member of Ukraine’s National Academy of Sciences and director of the Institute of Philosophy:

“References to a referendum do not constitute a compromise but an attempt to thwart Ukraine’s entry into NATO. A situation like this can only be called a compromise if the referendum is deferred for 10 years. So far one cannot say that any agreement has been reached: Our Ukraine has just made a concession to the opponents of NATO membership. It is senseless to put this issue to a referendum unless large-scale explanatory work has been carried out. I have just returned from Lithuania, a NATO member. We must tell everyone about this country’s achievements, air TV programs about the Lithuanians’ living conditions, and write about them in the press. Only after such ‘reconnoitering’ can we discuss the advantages of joining NATO. Otherwise, we will have another face-off.”

Viktor CHUMAK, political and security expert, International Center for Policy Studies:

“The problem of NATO membership should not necessarily be resolved by a referendum, but in this case it is the most favorable compromise within the coalition format and the format of cooperating with the president. It is quite possible that a well-developed information campaign about NATO will change the public mood. Then, all the socialists will have to do is support this decision. After all, foreign and security policies are the president’s preserve.

“The president has said in no uncertain terms that the Euro-Atlantic course will not change. Active cooperation with NATO will continue and target-oriented plans will be implemented later. And membership is not the question of the year 2008 — it is only possible to implement the NATO Membership Action Plan by that year — it is the question of 2010-2011. It remains to be seen how the coalition will tackle other acute problems. What will the socialists say about the land issue? Will a compromise be reached there too?”

Ihor BALINSKY, political scientist, Western Information Corporation, Lviv:

“The compromise about a referendum is to some extent a case of opportunism. As recently as three or four months ago, a similar statement about a referendum on joining NATO came from the opposition bloc Ne Tak, while government officials tried to persuade us that this referendum was an attempt to split Ukraine. A mere three months later the socialists announced that Ukraine’s accession to NATO would be decided via a referendum.

“As a matter of fact, this is a speculative idea. Southern Ukraine’s mistrust of NATO is so deep that even lengthy and systematic explanatory efforts will not change the situation in the next few years. This means that the so-called referendum is just an attempt to deflect or eliminate the serious differences that exist in the Orange coalition. It seems to me that the very idea of a referendum is impossible today because Ukraine is clearly divided over NATO: western Ukraine and part of central Ukraine (including Kyiv) takes a pro-Western and pro-NATO stand, while the southeastern, more populous, regions are against NATO.

Still, strategic issues should not be the subject of bargaining even within the Orange coalition. As for the attitude of conservative socialists to NATO, a different mechanism should be at work here: subordination of the minority to the majority, as is the case in any democratic country. What we see today is an ideological disparity among the Orange coalition’s partners. And the problems that arise from this should not be resolved as follows: ‘we will leave this question alone and you will give us this or that.’ Problems should be solved on the basis of strategic national interests. If the socialists take a principled stand on banning the sale of land and the BYuT keeps insisting on something else, this coalition will never be viable.”

Serhiy DZHERDZH, deputy chairman, Coordinating Board of the Ukraine-NATO Civic League:

“It is not necessary to hold a referendum to be admitted to NATO. The alliance does not have such a requirement. No Ukrainian documents contain such a commitment, either. So there are no legal grounds for doing this. Therefore, certain political forces (even influential ones) should not undertake this mission. One must consider what a referendum will give to society.

A referendum is an important instrument for gauging public opinion at a certain time, but the situation is changing. Ukrainians are learning more and more about NATO, and six or twelve months from now there may be an absolutely different picture of Ukrainian perceptions of the alliance. Shall we hold another referendum then? Public support for NATO membership is, of course, important, but this can be also measured by sociological surveys, which are far cheaper to conduct. And, in general, it is reasonable to discuss a referendum right before entering NATO, immediately after receiving an invitation to join.

“The problem is in understanding the importance of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Obviously, not all political forces understand and interpret this the same way. By playing with the idea of a referendum, we are driving ourselves into a dead end from which it will be very difficult to extricate ourselves. This is why I disagree that this ‘compromise’ should have been included in the agreement in this particular form. If certain political forces do not support early membership in NATO, others could insist on more painstaking public outreach efforts. We should speak about joining NATO only after politicians and ordinary people, not just experts, become aware of all the advantages. It would be politically unwise to present the referendum as a duty.”