Interview with Russian analyst Dmitri Trenin
For the second week running the world’s media have been commenting on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s scandalous speech in Munich. Many regard it as almost a declaration of a new Cold War, while others have recalled what happened in Munich in 1938.
The Day asked Dmitri TRENIN, one of Russia’s leading international analysts, the deputy director and chairman of the academic council of the Carnegie Moscow Center, to share his views on Putin’s statements in Munich. This Russian expert knows only too well how foreign policy is made in the Kremlin, Washington, and Brussels, as evidenced by his many articles on various problems in Russia-US relations. Prior to the Russia-G8 summit in St. Petersburg Trenin’s article “Russia Leaves the West” was published in the American journal Foreign Affairs. His book Integration and Identity: Russia as the “New West” was published last year.
Do you think another Cold War between Russia and the West or between Russia and the US is possible? If not, what was Putin’s goal in Munich?
Trenin: Putin’s speech in Munich was not a declaration of a Cold War against the West. Russia and the United States don’t need this war, which is essentially impossible. The key elements of confrontation between the two countries (above all, a totalitarian messianic ideology) are absent in their relations today and will not materialize in the future. The goal of Putin’s message is a “frank” statement, as a minimum, “to clear the air” in Russia-US relations; as a maximum, to make a breakthrough to new relations on “equal terms.”
Do you think that official Washington and America in general adequately acknowledged Putin’s criticism of the one-sided manner in which the United States is operating in the international arena and his statement that NATO’s enlargement to Russia’s borders would not be tolerated?
Trenin: Putin’s maneuver was risky. So far, it may be said that his goal has been reached only partially. After his speech leading Western media tried to figure out what was behind the Kremlin ruler’s tough statements. A number of American and European politicians issued statements urging that Russia’s interests be taken into account. At the same time other politicians thanked Putin for making the situation clear and demanded that relations with Russia be revised in terms of further toughening them. Which trend will prevail will depend on the degree of the Russian Federation’s cooperation with the US and the West with regard to specific questions, above all Iran and Kosovo.
It would be interesting to know your opinion on the plusses and minuses of a unipolar world. Can one say that the unipolar world has sunk into oblivion after Putin’s speech in Munich?
Trenin: A unipolar world means a situation of hegemony and subjugation to a single center; a multipolar world is the struggle of several centers for power and influence. The first has been traditionally associated with suppression and the latter, with endless wars in order to correct the balance of forces. A unipolar world has never existed in pure form. Despite the exceptional stand the United States took in the world after 1991, there have been other, lesser, but more or less independent centers of forces, like China. The US advantage — compared to, but not over — these other centers of forces will be preserved for at least another two or three decades, probably longer. At the same time, the role and importance of other centers (China, India, Russia, Brazil, the Republic of South Africa, Indonesia, Iran, and the European Union) will probably continue to increase. The structure of controlling world processes will become more complex and competition will become tighter, but the interests of the participants in this system will require closer cooperation in coping with mutual problems. Much will depend on US politics in trying to prevent the world from splitting into opposing blocs and thus reverting to the “classic” multipolar world. In general, the world does not sink into oblivion and does not rise from it because of a single speech.
Assuming that Putin’s objective was to make the world reckon with Russia, will the Kremlin be able to reach this goal right away? Why does Russia need this? If the objective is to create a second pole, will Moscow be able to become it?
Trenin: The Kremlin’s entire policy on the US and EU is aimed at establishing equal relations — above all equal, and later, if possible, relations on a partnership basis. Whether it succeeds will depend primarily on the successful modernization of the Russian economy, its integration into the global environment as a competitive entity, and progress in Russia’s sociopolitical development. Russia will not be able to become the “second” pole, an opponent of the US, and most likely does not want to. Russia is already “one” of the power centers, and one that is independent of the United States.
What consequences can Putin’s speech in Munich have for the world order and perhaps for Russia-US relations?
Trenin: So far the consequences of his speech in Munich are appearing mainly in Washington and Europe’s increased attention to Russia. The White House is not likely to revise its policy concerning Russia before the change of administration in Washington. Afterwards everything will depend on whoever forms the next administration.
Is it possible that Putin’s statements mean that Russia will alter its policy in the post-Soviet space and no longer react to criticism from the West?
Trenin: Russia has already altered its policy in the post-Soviet space. This policy has rid itself of integrationist illusions and proceeds from the primacy of Russia’s commercial and other specific practical interests. Moscow is competing with the US for influence in certain regions, in the new Eastern Europe, Southern Caucasus, and Central Asia. Putin’s speech did not change anything in this respect.
What place do you see for Ukraine in the struggle between Russia and the United States if such a struggle unfolds for influence on Ukraine and its geostrategic choice?
Trenin: Ukraine’s choice will be the one made by Ukrainians (not only normatively but also factually). Russia and the US are influencing this choice both by their example and their actions. However, no one will decide for Ukraine. This struggle will be not so much between Russia and the US as among various trends within Ukrainian society and factions of the Ukrainian ruling elite.
Right now, Europe and Russia — and Ukraine to a degree — are debating the question of deploying elements of US missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russia very actively opposes the idea, although the US has invited Russia to take part in the project. Do you think that this deployment really threatens Russia? How would this move by the US affect the balance of forces in Europe?
Trenin: If Russia had been invited to take part in the European missile defense system (Putin raised this idea in 2000), this situation could have been avoided. The deployment elements of missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic does not pose any threat to Russia but is proof that Russia is mistrusted. The revival of the concept “balance of forces in Europe” attests to the unfavorable state of Russia-NATO relations 15 years after the end of the Cold War.
Why is Russia unwilling to cooperate with the United States within the framework of creating missile defense? We know that both sides signed a cooperation agreement in this sphere in 2002.
Trenin: After 2002 the Russian Federation and the United States collaborated in the missile defense sphere, but this cooperation was too limited. Russia remains interested in maintaining and expanding cooperation along the lines of a European missile defense system.
Can you predict Putin’s successor? Could it be Sergei Ivanov? If not, what kind of role has the Russian head of state assigned to him by appointing him first deputy prime minister?
Trenin: Sergei Ivanov was formally granted equal authority with Dmitrii Medvedev so that Putin does not look like a lame duck. The president told a press conference on Feb. 1: “Don’t push me out too soon.” So when practically everyone believed that the final choice had been made, Putin gave a signal to the effect that everything will depend on him until the very last moment. Therefore, Ivanov’s promotion above all means the strengthening of Putin’s positions, at least for the time being. Putin is the only one who knows his successor. Another interesting thing is what stand will be taken by the new president of Russia after May 2008. The appearance in the political field of an active and popular ex- president will serve as the most important and real amendment to the Russian Constitution.
