It is up to Ukraine itself to choose its role in the new security system

A glance at the election programs and statements of the blocs and parties that are likely to form a majority in the new Verkhovna Rada makes it clear that, first, the latter, in contrast to the previous Ukrainian parliament, will enhance its role in formulating this country’s foreign policy and, secondly, the greater part of political forces (including even the Communists, provided only it is done after Russia) will not oppose more active cooperation with NATO. The degree of this cooperation may, of course, vary: today most commentators voice the view that the prospects of Ukrainian membership should be discussed later and that Ukraine should be part of the Atlantic security mechanism rather than of the military-political alliance. A higher level of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO has also been high of late on the agenda of the talks between Ukrainian officials and Western representatives. Western diplomats and experts also agree that this revision is necessary. It has become obvious in the last few months that both NATO and Moscow seek such ways of cooperation that would implement the very idea of partnership, starting with the struggle against terrorism. In addition, the November NATO summit in Prague will extend invitations to new members of the alliance now comprising nineteen countries. As it is expected that the newly invited will include at least one Baltic country as well as Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia, this means Ukraine faces the problem of at least not losing its already achieved level of cooperation if it really wants to be integrated in all European and Euro- Atlantic mechanisms, which our top officials keep repeating. Accordingly, Kyiv should make sure that relations with it do not develop in the shadow of relations between NATO and Russia, at the backdrop of a new wave of NATO expansion, and cannot be reduced to empty declarations, which is now very typical of the relations between Ukraine and the European Union.

In May NATO headquarters hopes the Reykjavik meeting of NATO foreign ministers will present the so-called twenty (NATO + Russia), a new cooperation body supposed to reflect changes in both the geopolitical situation and the political mentality. The November NATO summit in Prague is supposed to be the summit of not so much expansion as transformation of the alliance, and by that time NATO will perhaps be working with Moscow in a new format. When British Prime Minister Tony Blair came up with the idea of the twenty, comprising NATO and Russia in December, many interpreted this as a likely attempt of the West to persuade Russia not to oppose the membership of the Baltic states. Western press publications on this matter differed. For instance, James Sherr, analyst at the Conflict Studies Research Center (Royal Military Academy, UK), told The Day that, among other things, the Financial Times article on the likelihood of granting Russia the right to participate in making decisions about NATO itself was “inaccurate.” Russia says in turn, without revealing the proposals it has received, that they are insufficient but does not reject the very possibility of striking a new bargain. Although Moscow supposedly will not apply for membership, the experts are convinced the question is now far closer than that of cooperation. As The Day was told at the NATO Information Center in Kyiv, the attitude of NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, is that Russia should become an equal partner, participate in debates and decision-making in some issues. This new step forward is the essence of a new vision. NATO is sure all differences will be ironed out before the Reykjavik summit. Meanwhile, the NATO- Russia Fundamental Document, which has not in fact been working, was far deeper in content than the NATO- Ukraine Charter. The Russian mass media have instantly changed their tone about relations with NATO as soon as President Putin made his diplomatic efforts, which may well illustrate that country’s course in general. “If we cannot stem the tide, we must ride on the crest of it,” Sergei Karaganov, one Russian foreign policy ideologist, told The Day. In this new geopolitical situation (the latter is all Ukraine can offer the West), it would be perhaps worth heeding Mr. Sherr’s advice, “The West should pursue different policies toward Ukraine and Russia.” In this expert’s opinion, from this perspective NATO is far ahead of the European Union. Yet, there should be no different standards.

Obviously, to avoid speaking about different (double) standards in this sense, it would be very important for Ukraine to receive a formal invitation to the Prague summit well before the foreign ministers of NATO countries and Ukraine meet. This would establish, in particular, a certain political space in which it would be possible to draw up a new document to illustrate qualitative changes in NATO-Ukraine relations. This subject was high on the agenda of Ukrainian Prime Minister Anatoly Kinakh’s visit to Brussels. Experts and the mass media also raised this problem before and after the visit. Poland is now the only country to have voiced support for this idea. NATO representatives have always emphasized that our special partnership is on a very good level, that projects have been better implemented recently, and that Ukraine is making a very notable contribution to peacekeeping and regional stability. That is all. Similar comments come from representatives of the US establishment (suffice it to recall the live television dialogue with Condoleezza Rice, US National Security Advisor).

The decision to invite Ukraine to the Prague summit will depend on how democratic the elections will be, Deutsche Welle quotes a NATO Polish mission representative as saying. The diplomat says the NATO headquarters has not yet decided whether to invite Ukraine. This was also clear from the answer of NATO spokesman Yves Brodeur to The Day’s question in mid-March.

Ukrainian officials, bureaucrats, and experts are confident that the charter does not meet the requirements of today for various reasons. It contains no full-fledged security guarantees. It says nothing about the war on terrorism and other radical changes of the past few months. Unlike the proposals to Russia, it does not suggest anything like associate membership. The charter does not mention military-technical cooperation, joint designs, or the modernization of hardware. It does not call for a mechanism of mandatory consultation with Ukraine in matters that concern its interests (as a result, NATO is still dissuading Ukraine from selling weapons to Macedonia, though Kyiv considers this problem solved). After all, even the fact that the Bundeswehr makes use of Ukrainian transport aviation goes beyond this document’s limits. Moreover, Kyiv would like to expand this kind of cooperation, as well as its participation in operations to prevent and settle conflicts (starting from offering bases for peacekeepers’ training). There are many proposals and opportunities for cooperation. Many in Kyiv are likewise convinced that the current situation requires revising the format of relations and that Ukraine could make a far greater contribution to European security than it does now.

So the question of the elections has assumed a truly geopolitical dimension, and whether or not Ukraine will remain an independent player and will be important for the West will greatly depend on the extent to which the new parliament will be united and the new majority viable and effective. Moreover, Ukraine and NATO have never severed contacts even in the worst conditions, and the alliance has made no harsh statements. Since everything now shows that the West has chosen Russia as a geopolitical partner, Ukraine will be required either to become part of Western policies (which Mr. Putin, incidentally, is also trying to do) or to restrain its ambitions in accordance with reality.