James SHERR: “Ukraine needs a lawfully regulated professional security service”

Ukrainian political and expert circles are very familiar with James Sherr, fellow of the Conflict Studies Research Centre at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. The opinions of this British analyst, who specializes in questions related to Ukraine’s foreign and security policies, should be reckoned with if only because — unlike Western diplomats and NATO officials — he can openly express the West’s opinion concerning processes that are taking place in Ukraine.

In a recent interview in The Day, Sherr expressed doubts that the Declaration of National Unity, signed by the leading political parties of Ukraine, the speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, and the president of Ukraine, will ensure the realization of the goals of this document. He also noted that Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and his milieu have a wrong idea about the West.

What is the West’s view of the latest moves by President Viktor Yushchenko, who made a number of appointments to the National Security and Defense Council? What is the assessment of Prime Minister Yanukovych’s declarations in Washington about NATO? Can a compromise be achieved by the president and the prime minister as the result of establishing constructive cooperation? Should Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) be reformed, and can the Litvinenko poisoning have an impact on our country? Has Ukraine totally forfeited the chance to join NATO? These questions are answered in the following interview with James SHERR:

Will the latest staff appointments to the National Security and Defense Council strengthen President Yushchenko’s position? What are they a sign of?

“On the one hand, many people in the West were both pleased and impressed that the president brought a number of people into his team who are associated with Industrial Soiuz Donbas, and specifically Haiduk’s appointment as the secretary at the National Security and Defense Council (RNBO) and Chaly’s appointment to the Presidential Secretariat. But this early impression seems to have been tarnished by more recent steps made by the president, such as the appointment of a new first deputy secretary of the RNBO. Just like under Kuchma, it looks as if a strong and positive figure is being undermined by the appointment of other people, who do not share his vision. No doubt the president wants to bring the unaffiliated oligarchic groups into his stable. But there is a danger that the power struggle will take precedence over good policy. So some people are again wondering whether the president can take a positive step without undermining it by a negative and contradictory step. This impression is ammunition to those in the West who say that Ukraine is going nowhere except into chaos.”

What about Horoshkovsky’s appointment as Haiduk’s first deputy?

“It is no secret that the relationship between Horoshkovsky and Haiduk is not known to be exceptionally friendly.”

Let’s talk about Yanukovych. Some people in the top echelon of the Ukrainian government believe that the prime minister is learning from his mistakes and has capable people on his team. Do you share this belief?

“I hope so. It is essential, because mistakes have already been made. But let me raise a question about his visit to the United States. Why was it necessary for him to visit Moscow the day before going to Washington rather then a day after? If he simply wanted to reassure President Putin, it would have been better to go the day after the end of his visit to the US. Going one day before suggests that he is trying to coordinate Ukraine’s policy with Putin. So if there is a new multi-vector policy, what does it mean? A good multi-vector policy would complement Ukraine’s Euro-integration by steps that deepen beneficial relations with Russia on the basis of real mutual interests. But there are three harmful forms of multi-vector policy: first, steps that grant Russia the prerogative of coordination or oversight over Ukraine and therefore limit Ukraine’s autonomy; second, commitments that contradict the spirit and substance of European integration, for example through the Single Economic Space; third, tactics and language that confuse Ukrainians, Russians, and Westerners about Ukraine’s real interests. Just like under Kuchma, people are saying one thing in Moscow and quite another thing in Brussels and Washington. The West is not willing or able to go through another period of this two- facedness. And in this respect, is it really in Yanukovych’s interest to make these mistakes?”

Is he a capable learner?

“We hope so and we have to help. We have to help by being extremely clear, consistent, and constructive in what we say and do. This is not always easy for diplomats who are too diplomatic; or for multinational bureaucracies like EU and NATO that speak in the bland languages of consensus.”

In your opinion, can Yushchenko and Yanukovych reach some kind of consensus? Can they, as Marec Siwiec said in a recent interview in The Day, work together — first as Ukraine’s trademark and second, as a good manager?

“The problem is that they have different philosophies of power. The Party of Regions is a power structure. It exists to expand its power and use the power it has. They will accept compromise and consensus out of weakness, but not because they believe in compromise and consensus. When they are strong, they do not say ‘Now is the time to be generous, now is the time to conciliate my opponent and make him my partner.’”

You have heard about the president’s recent decree concerning the reform of the SBU. At the same time Turchynov said that after his dismissal the SBU is being destroyed. Sivkovych said that this organization should not be reformed before reaching an understanding of the purpose of this service. What is your opinion? Should the SBU be reformed?

“Turchynov has always been right about one main thing: the SBU must work for Ukraine’s national interests. It must not be an instrument of any groupings: political or business factions, which in Ukraine are usually one and the same thing. It does seem that even before the anticrisis coalition was established, the Party of Regions was seeking to penetrate the SBU and install its own people and networks. If this is true, then the institutional defenses inside the SBU and the state have not been sufficiently strong. But now it seems that Baloha, possibly the president too, wants to politicize the SBU. And so Drizhchany left his position. So today, both sides have damaged this institution. Now the second question: what is the SBU for? We had a very clear answer to this when Smeshko was the head. It should be a security and counterintelligence body that deals with internal matters only when they involve hostile foreign powers, foreign intelligence services, major state crimes, and criminal structures. But the SBU should not be a law enforcement body. And there should be a separate body conducting foreign intelligence. I personally agree with Smeshko. But there are other legitimate answers, and an alternative must be discussed and understood.

“But at the end of the day Ukraine needs a clear answer. And the answer must be followed up by practical steps to achieve that goal. The country cannot endure constant turmoil, endless debate and studies, with everybody coming into the kitchen and discussing everything. A line must be drawn.

“There have been several years of reform in the SBU, and now they risk being undone because political struggle is again taking precedence over national interests. Ukraine needs a lawfully regulated professional security service where everyone understands what professionalism means, what his terms of reference are, what is legal and what is not.”

So you do not see any need to reform the SBU?

“Reform is the process of achieving an objective that has been clearly defined: effective security in a democratic state.”

What repercussions can the Litvinenko case have for the world, Europe, and Ukraine?

“I have deliberately not spoken to anyone in Britain connected with this investigation, so I don’t know who killed him or why. But I will share a suspicion and worry. Perhaps this incident and the murder of Politkovskaia show that the succession process in Russia has begun. What we call ‘the Kremlin’ is a broad spectrum of personalities and interests. And succession might pose a threat to some of these interests. From a Western perspective Dmitrii Medvedev might look like a statesman. But from the standpoint of many siloviki, he might look dangerously liberal, cosmopolitan, and too friendly to globalization. Some people with a lot to lose might want to remind others that they are there, that they have power and can cause trouble if their interests are not taken into account. And if Litvinenko made enemies among some people in this circle, then he might serve as an attractive example. Worse still, some people might like to create a situation that helps President Putin bow to pressure, set the Constitution aside, and stay in power ‘for the sake of stability.’

“And if that is a real scenario, the author might be President Putin himself. After all, how did he come to power? How did the second Chechen war start? The president has a talent for using crises as a tool to do what he always wanted to do. But let us remember one thing. The fundamental problem with Russia is not President Putin or any other figure. It is the Russian political system that, like the Soviet system, has not met the basic test of political confidence: confidence in the process of succession.”

What lesson should take Ukraine from this case?

“Ukraine needs to ask itself: as we get closer to Russia’s presidential succession in 2008, is there a possibility of a provocation against neighboring countries — the Crimea, in Transdnistria, or in connection with the oil and gas pipelines? And who might have an interest in creating a provocation and by what means? Is anyone thinking about this at the moment? I hope so.”

What signals were sent to Ukraine at the last NATO summit?

“There were signals, indeed, and interesting ones, despite the focus on Afghanistan. The first was the decision to invite all MAP countries to the accession process with a view to joining the alliance in 2008. The language was interesting. It emphasized the word MAP. Perhaps Ukraine should take this as a slap in the face. You have chosen not to join, so you are not in the accession process. The second signal was a long-term one: inviting Serbia to the Partnership for Peace program. In short, two signals to say that the spirit of enlargement is alive and the door is open to Ukraine whenever it changes its mind. There was also a good signal to Georgia, too.”

What is your opinion of the statement by Lavrov, who said that enlargement is a mistake and that all security problems may be solved by institutions other than NATO? What do you think about this?

“He is expressing the view of Russia. But why is it the view of Russia? President Putin has told NATO’s General Secretary that NATO is not a threat to Russia. So why should Russia feel threatened if Ukraine joins NATO? Of course, national interests are not based simply on logic; they are based on the national psyche. And of course both Ukraine and NATO must take Russia’s national interests and psyche into account. The Russian factor should affect enlargement. But Russia should not be allowed to veto it. We have a good precedent for what should be done. In December 1994 the OSCE was founded. President Yeltsin said if NATO is enlarged, there will be a “cold peace” in Europe. And he was right because if six months later we had admitted Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO, we would have had a serious crisis with Russia, and we were not prepared for it. But by 1999 we and the Russians were able to persuade most of the Russian political and security establishments to reconcile themselves to NATO enlargement. That is the model for what needs to happen between NATO, Russia, and Ukraine.”

Why do you think Yanukovych did not make a statement in the US that Ukraine will definitely join NATO in the future? Is he doing this to get some privileges from Russia?

“First, I believe that Yanukovych was expressing what, for him, is a matter of principle. When he said in Washington that Russia is more to him than just a trading partner and supplier of energy resources, he was expressing his real thoughts. Today these are also the thoughts of a large number of Ukrainians. Those who believe that Ukraine’s future lies in Euro-Atlantic integration have their work cut out for them. I am hopeful that this work will be easier in future than it is today.