Kosovo as an Intellectual Challenge for Foreign and Ukrainian Politicians 

This is the opinion People's Deputy Yevhen Marchuk expressed in an interview with Interfax-Ukraine.

"You cannot attribute everything to Milosevic's intransigence or the Albanians' belligerency, and many decades full of contradictions. There are ample grounds to believe that the great powers have a direct bearing on the current exacerbation of an old conflict," said Mr. Marchuk.

The People's Deputy stressed in this connection that what is necessary is a thorough inquiry by respective UN institutions into the actions of the Serb and Albanian sides, Western countries and Russia, which caused the conflict to escalate. The inquiry should include representatives of all the interested parties. A considerable role might be played in this case by such neutral European states as Ukraine, as well as authoritative members of the Nonaligned Movement.

According to Mr. Marchuk, the commission's final report should lay the basis for documents that will make it impossible for similar conflicts to break out in the future. Special attention should be paid here to keep such crisis situations from outside interference.

"The very mechanism of such crises should be exposed, for it is this mechanism that threatens the stability of dozens of countries, including Ukraine. Our involvement in the inquiry would be significant not from the viewpoint of abstract prestige but for purely practical reasons," thinks People's Deputy Marchuk.

On March 24 when the first NATO bomb fell on Yugoslavia the Kosovo conflict turned into a European and world crisis. As far as the number of countries involved is concerned, the Balkan crisis is even today comparable to a world war. The humanitarian disaster, which broke out in the region, also reaches far beyond its borders. I mean not only the exodus from Kosovo of the hundreds of thousands of Albanian refugees but also the despicable condition of millions of Yugoslavs as a result of a total destruction of their national economy. Add to this the complete helplessness of the international institutions, unprecedented human rights violations, along with important geopolitical changes, and it becomes absolutely obvious that this is not a local and spontaneously triggered conflict. Kosovo is the most important link in and a new stage of a great geopolitical game of great powers. It is also, oddly enough, a direct continuation of the Cold War.

Ukraine is greatly alarmed by the fact that each new stage of Western geopolitical accretions is associated with a tougher and more categorical restriction of Russia's sphere of influence. At the first stage at the beginning of the 1990s Russia voluntarily vacated many traditional Soviet spheres of influence. The list included dozens of the countries of Africa, Asia, and even Latin America. The second stage saw strong pressure to force Russia to resign itself to NATO expansion. The Russians were ousted from the greater part of Eastern Europe. At the third stage, force was applied in contravention of not only Russian interests but also of international law. After this, the waiting list of real candidates for NATO membership increased almost twofold, at the expense of, among other countries, some former Soviet republics.

Ukraine and Central Asia remain the last large prizes in this dangerous game. Which of them will be the first and what will be methods at the fourth stage is not so a hypothetical question as it might seem. We are face-to-face with a great danger to our national security, which may become irreversible at some moment. The world has not stood the test of the Balkan crisis: the West was not sufficiently farsighted and objective, Russia proved to be less consistent than necessary, and Ukraine failed to be sincere enough even with itself.

BALKAN STALEMATE

There is now a stalemate in the Balkans. Both sides are seeking a way out of the crisis. There are both tactical and strategic reasons for this. Some of these reasons are obvious enough, but let us outline them to be fully in the picture.

Slobodan Milosevic's position seems more precarious. Each day of bombing adds up to the destruction of the Yugoslav economy. An oil embargo threatens to complete the process, and creates extremely unfavorable conditions for offering resistance during the ground-operation phase of war. Inside Yugoslavia one can hear a more and more distinct voice of opposition, and Montenegro, loyal to the West, always makes itself heard. There is almost no hope of Russian intervention left for Milosevic. The last chance is the possibility of Russia's armed resistance to the oil embargo.

But on closer examination, the situation is no less complicated and tangled for the West. Although destruction of the Yugoslav economy will sooner or later lead to increased discontent with Milosevic, no one knows how long it will take. Milosevic encourages the army to commit reprisals in Kosovo, and many commanders are bound to him by inseparable corporate ties of blood. This means the army could remain loyal to the state indefinitely. There is also much uncertainty in other matters. For example, how to make Russia observe the oil embargo. And what if Russia does not give in to pressure and reinforces its tanker fleet with warships? What happens then: let the Russian fleet through, block it, or bomb it? But a retaliatory strike on US ships is also possible. And each sunken ship means hundreds of dead bodies. This would be a complete shock for the Western man in the street, who is unfamiliar with the horrors of the Chechnya campaigns.

There are also problems with the air war. It proved insufficiently effective militarily. Strikes are regularly made "by mistake" on civilian targets, including refugees and humanitarian convoys. Sometimes the bombings are so "highly precise" that the bombs hit a country other than that at which they were aimed. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson has already said NATO may face the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia if bombings of the civilian population are classified as a war crime.

To try to radically change the situation, one will have to overcome the psychological barrier of bombings from the altitude of 3000-3500 meters (the range for shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles). In that case one could see better both the refugees and the Yugoslav equipment camouflaged under the trees that came into leaf in April. But the attempts to lower the altitude and the speed of flight will abruptly bring about a heavy death toll in the air force. One may, of course, bomb from the previous altitude and make a wider use of reconnaissance commandos, but what if somebody is again taken prisoner?

It is also clear, in all probability, that a ground operation is almost inevitable. Its legitimacy is highly dubious and consequences unpredictable. Public opinion in the NATO countries is not optimistic about the ground-operation phase. Western public opinion as a whole is always unstable. Any conspicuous failure, let alone a protracted war, could critically upset the balance.

Of course, the situation may be changed by unexpected successes on the front line (for instance, unexpectedly highly effective use of Apache gun-ships or non-precision weapons, succesful operations of the rearmed and newly-recruited Kosovo Albanian Liberation Army), Russia's readiness to de facto observe the embargo, or an overt split in the Yugoslav leadership, etc.

But so far the two sides are at an impasse. And this impasse provides hope for vigorous peace initiatives and also allows us to sum up the first results of NATO operations on the Balkans.

A PROBLEM OF INTELLECTUAL INADEQUACY?

The process of establishing a new world order is in full swing. And we could hardly have hampered it. In general, there is hardly any sense in blocking it, for changes can no longer be put off. What we see is only the making of a new correlation of forces in various regions. I think Ukraine should be preoccupied with something different: what kind of world order will there be? To what extent will it be fair and, I would say, intelligent? Will global politics also lead to a terrible and illogical crisis, as did the hasty development of the global economy?

What is going on in the Balkans is far from reasonable. There were many ideas, rationales, and fears. But the politicians and the military pay them no heed. The situation has seesawed so much that it began to unfold under the laws of the theory of instability, when it is next to impossible to calculate, forecast, or correct anything. By all accounts, we face the problem of intellectual insufficiency in late twentieth century world politics. Global processes have proven so rapid and complex that there is not enough time to adequately consider them. Something similar could be seen in the USSR during its collapse. Yet, as I say again, the intellectuals have lots of ideas. But far from all politicians are ready to accept them.

Each of the countries involved in the conflict one way or another has not got exactly what it expected. The Serbs underrated the dangers of the coming semi-war and bombings against its barely-hidden economic and sociopolitical background. They had done nothing over a decade to win over Western public opinion. They might even have "overplayed" their game of independence, for Tito's course was never truly isolationist. It was to the West's liking, and the West treated Tito well, as it later did the rebellious Poland and wrote off its multibillion debts to spite the USSR. Western tourists enriched Yugoslavia, Yugoslavs were willingly used as a workforce in many European countries.

What the Serbia of Milosevic had only to do was to resolutely come closer to Russia. Although playing up to the West, Moscow largely continued to harbor great power ambitions. The deep-rooted kinship of Yugoslavia and Russia is obvious. This is also the reason why the imperial Russia so painfully reacts to the rout of Serbs. Russia's way of life and whole system of values have proven to be nonviable. Yugoslavia's neighbors forgot Orthodoxy and Slavophilism as soon as they saw the prospect of a place in an affluent Europe. "First comes the 'basis' and then the 'superstructure'," the Marxist classics taught them.

Milosevic had several chances to come closer to Russia well in advance. For example, had the Serbs resolved to join the Union of Russia and Belarus even in January or February this year, there might have been no bombings at all. Milosevic, too, would have depended on his partners in no other than formal terms. Lukashenka's degree of dependence, however, seems to constantly rising. But now, a ruined Yugoslavia is a dubious gain.

As to the pluses of the Serb position, I would point out its consistency and absolutely clear objectives. One should not perhaps underrate or overrate Milosevic. He is a very strong man but hardly an equally strong strategist.

Unlike the Serb leaders, their Russian counterparts have not developed a clear or at least single line in its Balkan policy. The Russian intellectual game turned out blocked at the decision making stage. All leading political and intellectual forces were ostensibly united in condemning the aggression. But then "the god of details" intervened. It turned out that the choice of a line of behavior in the Yugoslav conflict "too literally" presupposes the choice of Russia's future way of development. Either breaking the arms embargo regime and isolation from loans, trade, and investments, or loyalty to the West and absence of real action.

Incidentally, the same dilemma has also paralyzed Ukraine. This country is yet to choose where it is going. It has not yet decided whether to defend its own economic interests or beg handouts.

The Americans have again had a pratfall with their notorious linear (or is it straightforward?) analysis.

"We shall press and they will retreat."

"Why will they retreat?"

"Because we shall press..."

The US not only failed to assess the conflict's global consequences, such as encouraging nuclear and missile armament among threshold countries. It had been looking into the Kosovo situation for several months (and perhaps, covertly, even years), but had not had any standby contingency plans. The US acted ex-tempore, entering into temporary alliances with various European partners. It did not provide any legal and ideological support even inside the country for its many concrete actions, such as bombings, embargo, or the ground operation phase.

The enthusiasm for force was so great that the Church's request to suspend bombings during Easter was turned down. Now the shortsightedness of this step is quite evident. The bombings have been going on for a month and a half without much success. If they had been suspended for a few days, it would have changed nothing in military terms. But there would have been far fewer doubts that Western countries defend moral values in Kosovo, rather than banal economic and political interests.

Nor did the US foresee the symmetrical answer of the Serbs: creation of a refugee wave or taking American soldiers prisoner. It did not assess the probable psychological consequences of the losses of its magnificent machines. The F-117A stealth fighter was deployed with great fanfare, but then one was suddenly shot down. The Apache gun-ships were thrown in with equal pomp and glee, and two of them have already been lost during practice flights.

The Balkans have always been for European politics as subtle a matter as the traditional Eastern Question. And the Americans are wrong in hoping that all issues can be solved by brute force.

What the Americans gained in the current crisis is tremendous experience. No previous military campaign since Vietnam has given so much food for thought.

The Europeans quite unexpectedly encountered the problem of Albanian refugees (and perhaps the related problem of the ever-growing influence of Albanian drug barons). They also got a US-controlled source of constant pressure on the euro. And Muslim enclaves on the territory of Europe will continue to play this role in the future.

The most important, if latent, gain for the Europeans is that they have played a significant role in the operation. Germany has overcome its postwar stupor and complexes, France has rejected many of its prejudices, and Italy has also cleared some barriers. Europe has become more independent and active. The operation was for the first time actively participated in by the WEU nucleus.

"OBEDIENT" UKRAINE AND THE CRISIS

Ukraine has also tried to work on increasing its authority. But its intellectual resources, as in the case of Russia, were tightly blocked at the decision-making stage. The authorities lacked a clear-cut stand and the understanding of why they should make the effort. There was not the faintest effort to defend Ukrainian interests. What could the analysts calculate without an elementary point of departure for such calculations?

This is why all conversations were held in an abstract light. Should the UN Security Council authorize bombings, we will support them; should it authorize a ground-operation phase, we will support it, too, and so on. This is far from a full-fledged stand. Violations of international law is but one aspect of the problem. However, the point is not only in a formal authorization of the bombings by a UN Security Council resolution. There are two most important challenges the Ukrainian authorities lacked the courage to outline. The first is Ukraine's economic losses. Following persistent demands in Ukraine, the state has begun to display some "attempts" in this direction. But the second challenge is still valid: the mechanism of crisis making has not been exposed. Official Ukraine lacked the courage to give a proper name to what we all see and understand (and thus will not tolerate such things in this country). The Ukrainian, as well as Western, media hastily put everything down to Milosevic's whimsicality and the intransigence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). But Yugoslavia has been gradually, step-by-step, torn apart and divided into influence spheres over the past decade. And in Kosovo, too, the Albanians have been supported and provoked from the very beginning. The KLA is 90%, if not 100%, artificially created, while the European security structures, which had some leverage on the situation in Kosovo after last October, have failed to play a stabilizing role. Why this happened is what we must clarify. What we must find out is who turned the opposing sides in Kosovo on each other and upstaged moderate politicians from resolving the problems. This is what one must speak about, visiting European (and other) capitals.

The Ukrainian stand is too far from meeting such an acute and profound challenge. This is why it was decided to hush it up. It was pretended that the crisis had begun on March 24 and so it might be settled by peacemaking efforts.

Incidentally, I would distinguish in principle between the German, Russian, and Ukrainian versions of peacemaking.

In the German version, it is another attempt to affirm Germany's leading role in Europe. This fits in with the well-established system of its national interests and is the continuation of German policies from preceding years.

Russian peacemaking is an attempt to fix at least some positions, stabilize the shattered front-line wherever possible, and pursue at least some geopolitical interests.

The Ukrainian peacemaking is myth-making. It is of no use, for it is not aimed at fixing any important proper positions. For instance, "obedient" Ukraine in fact did not lay emphasis in its peace plan on guaranteeing Yugoslavia's territorial integrity. Ukraine was only interested in an abstract "image." But if an image does not begin with a position, then with what?

Nobody recalls Ukraine's peacemaking plans today at all. The President of independent Ukraine, unrecognized as peacemaker by the European and American leaders, snatches the attention of a German state governor and seeks his advice about Ukraine's involvement in the peacekeeping operation (!). He would also do well to consult Kursk oblast, just in case.

The only achievement is that NATO is now saying that Ukrainians should be included in the peacekeeping forces. Frankly speaking, one must give a second thought to whether we should agree to take part in the contingent. Under what conditions will it be sent in, who will it be composed of, to what degree of bitterness will the warring sides have brought the conflict by that moment, to what extent will order be protected by the peacekeepers?

So far, peacekeeping in former Yugoslavia has given us nothing but a heavy death-toll and Western press reports about Ukrainian smugglers. Our country has no real impact on the processes, nor does it have a clear strategy. This is why the use of peacekeepers to defend national interests (techniques may be different) is also bound to fail. Why then should we put our people at risk?

There also were some specific miscalculations caused by the government's conceit and inability to adequately assess what is going on. The President's trip to the NATO summit in the heat of bombings is an ample example. A not-so-bad wording was coined for the national Ukrainian media: it was a "noble" mission to go and coordinate a peacemaking plan. This was calculated precisely for the Ukrainian media controlled by the executive power. Earlier, too, they always presented any given failure as a major success.

In reality, the plan was rejected, and GUUAM (association of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) was formed in less than the best time and place. How is Russia supposed to react to this? For the Russian media are not accountable to Mr. Kuchma. Ukraine has showed itself in the worst light, only adding up drastically to the mistrust between it and Russia. The moral gains, connected with the preparation, signature, and ratification of the Grand Treaty, have been completely lost.

Some observers interpret the President's anti-Russian lashing-out as a sign of declining to run for another term. Obviously, an anti-Russian candidate will not win in Ukraine today. But he may have quite a good enough image in the eyes of the West which might then overlook the dissolution of Parliament and scrapping of the elections (e.g., by a referendum whose results will not be so verifiable as those of the presidential elections).

I also doubt that Kyiv's pro-NATO vector has been evoked by such exalted considerations as concern over integration into Europe. The point is rather in an opportunistic desire to pander to the US and receive new IMF loans. We will be paying for Presidential team's maneuvers with lost contacts with Russia, a dwindled share on the Russian market, and jobs, as usual

Inability to foresee events and adequately react to the on-going financial crisis and the political crisis concerning Kosovo shows that this country needs new decisions and new people. Whether Ukraine will be really able to defend its national interests greatly depends on this.

INCIDENTALLY

There are no humane weapons

The NATO air force has recently deployed graphite bombs against Yugoslavia. They are designed to put out of order any electrically powered facilities. Since the bomb goes off in the air, there is ostensibly little threat to human lives. "Miraculous weapon," "humane weapon": these are the NATO experts' epithets enthusiastically printed by the Western media.

And what do Ukrainian experts think?

Candidate of Sciences (Chemistry), deputy department chair for natural and man-made safety at the Ministry of Ecological Safety, Anatoly Bilous commented on this fact to The Day's Ruslana Pisotska as follows:

"I am sure there are no humane weapons. From the viewpoint of toxicity, graphite presents no danger. But, since it is a modification of carbon, graphite may react during a burst with the explosive and form toxic compounds.

"During the explosion, tiny particles of graphite may settle in the lungs. Their effect on human health resembles that of road dust which sometimes also gets into the lungs. But we know occupational diseases of coal miners, which break out under constant contact with carbon, such as lung silicosis, etc.

"In addition, graphite is dielectric. Its impact with electrical wiring causes short circuits, fires, and power outages. Nowadays, these put a great strain on the human psyche."