Lukashenka as an Indicator?

Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenka visited Ukraine on March 12. Ukraine’s attitude to this political leader is best described as flexible. He has both fans and foes here, but virtually no one can remain neutral. At the official level, the attitude is utterly vague: extreme caution on the one hand, with open and covert flirtation on the other. In fact, this is characteristic of Ukraine’s domestic policy even more than its diplomacy.

Indeed, there is every indication that those here in high office are strongly tempted to follow the Belarusian example, particularly in the economic domain where isolationism, underway for the past several years, have recently taken on unprecedented scope and the Ukrainian President has even said they were among his national priorities. In politics “Lukashenkization” is creeping along almost imperceptibly, but no one can guarantee that it will not out one day burst out into the open. True, the Ukrainian President’s entourage is not likely to benefit much, for there are sure to be other people more fit for the role of Ukraine’s father, modeled on the “father of the Belarusian people.” The most likely candidate would be Oleksandr Tkachenko, of course. We will not argue whether or not Belarus has embarked on the right path. One thing is certain: by starting along this road Belarusian society and its elite chose to dramatically simplify their lifestyle, adjusting themselves to a comparatively primitive standard. It is easy to adopt but difficult to discard; a Belarusian type society is like an alcoholic who not only knows that he is one, but, even worse, is proud of it. For Ukraine, still Europe-oriented officially, transition to the Belarus option would mean acknowledging its own incompetence in the first place. The Lukashenka factor in Ukraine is, therefore, an indicator showing the degree of evolution or regress and his visit will serve to take another reading of this process.

RETURN WHAT YOU DIDN’T LEAVE AT HOME

This visit is both useful and enjoyable. Ukraine is Belarus’s second largest economic partner after Russia, and Belarus found selling its goods a big problem; thus, both sides can discuss trading sugar for tractors and butter for MAZ (Minsk Auto Factory) heavy-duty trucks. This is the useful aspect. The enjoyable one is that Minsk owes nothing to its other brother Ukraine, unlike big brother Russia, so no one is likely to demand payments or goodies, threatening gas supply cutoff. On the contrary, Kyiv has owed Belarus about $180 million since Soviet times, but Belarus makes no big deal of this, despite its being embarrassed financially. Unable to afford payments for Russian gas and Lithuanian electricity, Belarus is prepared to accept Ukraine’s compensation in terms of wheat flour.

Comrade Lukashenka’s nostalgic feelings about the recent Soviet past are understandable. At that time Belarus ranked among the most prosperous USSR republics and had nuclear weapons meant to “protect world peace.” The first Belarusian President mourns both powers he never had and those he has had but is losing.

NEIGHBORS ARE NOT CHOSEN

Aleksandr Lukashenka has of late been planning alliances on a remarkably broad scope, linking Minsk to Beijing among other things. Yet pragmatic Belarusians and Ukrainians understand that having friendly people next door is more important. In fact, the Belarusian President pointed out once that neighbors are not chosen.

The President’s position is vulnerable in a way; his 5-year office formally expires July 20 and the West, after refusing to recognize the 1996 referendum, is scratching its head trying to decide what to do about this oh-so-zealous opponent of NATO and the US who, despite the spectacular decline in the Belarusian living standards, still seems popular with his people. His Polish, Latvian, and Lithuanian neighbors will develop their relationships with Belarus depending on the EU’s stand. For the time being they refuse to acknowledge the National Assembly formed without elections.

Still uncertain about its attitude to the constitutional conflict bound to take place after July 20, the West cannot ignore the fact that the opposition’s Central Election Committee members are thrown behind bars or that its chairman, Viktor Goncharuk who went on a dry hunger strike is still in prison, without defense counsel and qualified medical help. Even OSCE officials were refused a visit (Goncharuk was arrested and sentenced to 10 days for conducting an unauthorized meeting).

“Exciting passions about the so-called Central Election Committee headed by Goncharuk cannot facilitate the development of an equal and constructive dialogue with the Republic of Belarus. The results of the referendum are an expression of the will of the Belarusian people, and their legitimacy is beyond all doubt. Nor does it need confirmation by any other states,” reads the Belarusian Foreign Ministry’s statement.

President Lukashenka is sure to remain legitimate in the eyes of Belarus’s number one partner and ally, Russia, so its official recognition is in itself a solid guarantee of the Belarusian ruler’s political survival.

Ukraine is likely to steer a middle course. On the one hand, the Verkhovna Rada delegation led by the Speaker made best friends with the Belarusian leadership. On the other, a number of Ukrainian parties and factions openly welcome the Belarusian opposition’s effort to topple the President.

Aleksandr Lukashenka arrived in Kyiv with his well-rehearsed idea of Slavic integration, offering Ukraine to benefit from an alliance with Russia with benefits that he himself has yet to see. Minsk believes the idea will be attractive to the Ukrainian side as much as it is to Belarus which is formally in the process of active preparations for creating a single union state with Russia.

At the same time, Central Asian states continue to drift away from Moscow. Kyrgyzstan, a signatory to a quadrilateral customs union, went as far as join the WTO. Their leaders seem to have been chagrined of later by the Belarusian zealot’s calls for rallying under the Kremlin banner.

Is There Something to Integration Propaganda After All?

Comrade Lukashenka left Kyiv with exactly the same political luggage he had brought, reports Viktor ZAMYATIN, The Day. He proposed a Ukrainian to occupy the CIS Executive Secretary’s post and hoped that Russia-Belarus-Ukraine strategic partnership consultations would start soon. The Belarusian President seemed nonplused by the fact that Ukraine is not among CIS Charter signatories. Another bureaucratic paper, no big deal. As for the Ukrainian President’s statement with these words, “The CIS seems to exist on the one hand, but on the other hand it seems not to exist,” this apparently leaves vast room for interpretation.

In terms of the visit’s formal results, one might as well surmise that the two Chief Executives met and talked things over, ending on a futile note. They discussed the possibility of a Belarusian-Ukrainian sugar-refining joint venture, simplified citizenship procedures, yet all these topics are not to be decided by the Presidents, brotherly as they might feel. And the issue of $217 million Kyiv is supposed to owe Minsk is not likely to be solved shortly. Ukrainian-Belarusian trade turnover is dropping with each passing year, perhaps for want of solvent buyers on both sides or because there is just nothing to offer. And it looks as though the Ukrainian-Belarusian border delimitation issue was left untouched.

The Belarusian leader (persona non grata in all civilized European states) was patiently listened to in Kyiv, probably because the Ukrainian politicians can sense that the days of the CIS are numbered. And perhaps because his visit fell at the beginning of what is officially recognized as a radical change in the geopolitics of Europe.