Main problems in Ukrainian-Russian relations are a thing of the past
Kyiv and Moscow are satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations between President Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine and President Vladimir Putin of Russia, which took place recently in Moscow. The meeting of the intergovernmental commission resulted in the approval of the 2008 Russia-Ukraine Action Plan, which outlines the key directions for cooperation in various fields. According to the Ukrainian president, it was very important to “set in action the mechanism of the Putin-Yushchenko intergovernmental commission, which makes it possible via the 2008 Action Plan to address two to three dozen of the most complicated issues that have appeared in our relations.” Yushchenko also pointed out the good dynamics of the negotiations over border delimitation in the Sea of Azov.
The Russian president also expressed his satisfaction with the results of the “meeting that enabled us to synchronize our watches and coordinate joint steps in order to flesh out our partnership with specific actions for the good of both our peoples.” In Putin’s words, the outcome of the commission’s meeting and the negotiations with the Ukrainian president confirmed the mutual inclination to continue building bilateral cooperation. At the same time, he acknowledged that Russia and Ukraine’s priorities are not always the same. This was especially manifest in his reply to the question raised by a Ukrainian journalist. The question was about the Kremlin’s position on reformulating relations with Ukraine if our country joins NATO. Putin said that it is theoretically possible that Russia will aim its strike missiles at Ukraine if it decides to host NATO military bases. Yushchenko explained to journalists that the Constitution of Ukraine stipulates that military bases of other countries and blocs may not be located on the territory of Ukraine. “We are proceeding from the fact that every nation and country formulates its own concept of defense and security policy,” he said.
The interests of the two countries are clearly at loggerheads when it comes to celebrating certain historical events. Putin said that the two sides agreed on a dignified way to celebrate the 1,020th anniversary of the Christianization of Rus’ this year and the 300th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava in 2009. Ukrainians are known to have conflicting attitudes to the latter date.
How do Russian and Ukrainian experts assess the results of the recent presidential negotiations? What political price does Ukraine have to pay for keeping gas prices at the current level? What does Putin mean about Russian strike missiles being aimed at Ukraine? Can the successful talks between Putin and Yushchenko be viewed as evidence that in the next presidential elections the Kremlin may support the current Ukrainian president?
Nikolay PETROV, member of the Expert Council of the Moscow Carnegie Center:
“There seem to have been different expectations. In general, the meeting may be considered quite successful. This is because the main problems were resolved, or at least progress toward their resolution was claimed, and the scheduled gas shutoff was first delayed and then cancelled completely. It is too early to say whether the problems have been put to rest, but we can at least conclude that the meeting between Yushchenko and Putin went quite well and the parties managed to discuss a number of important issues.
“Negotiations on the other problems will continue. Now about Putin’s warning that strike missiles may be aimed at Ukraine if NATO bases are located on its territory. I believe that the political agenda in Ukraine and Georgia is such that they will hardly try to speed things up with NATO, which to a certain extent allays Russia and Putin’s fears concerning the possibility that these two countries will join the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) right now.
“It seems to me that Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko’s last visit to Brussels is proof that Ukrainian politicians are not likely to risk NATO membership, which is a very complicated issue in the perception of Ukrainian society and a hot topic that may severely damage relations with Russia, not to mention that NATO and the USA, as the main vehicle of NATO expansion, are very concerned about their domestic political problems and elections. Now, perhaps, it may be possible to speak about a certain postponement of the MAP subject, if not a moratorium. These problems are no longer urgent and in this sense they have become less acute for Russia’s relations with Ukraine and Georgia.
“I believe that right after an event it is always very difficult to judge the entire array of problems that were discussed. It was clearly a vast array. It is equally clear that in the light of the forthcoming presidential elections, designing Yushchenko’s elections campaign, and predicting what Tymoshenko’s campaign will look like, relations with Moscow are much more important for Yushchenko than a whole series of specific topics that complicate Russian-Ukrainian relations at the moment. It is hard to say in what way this was discussed, among other things. However, there must be some agreement if we judge by the fact that the Russian side made concessions on the gas supply issue. One can only guess what this agreement may be. It may be connected with Ukraine not hurrying to join NATO, or one can link it to some of the other scenarios that abound in Russia-Ukraine relations.
“I would also like to emphasize the extremely important element in our relations, namely, Russia’s refusal to use the Ukrainian Missile Attack Warning Stations (MAWS). Furthermore, because Ukraine will join the WTO before Russia, Kyiv’s position regarding Russia’s accession to the WTO will be important. This is the set of issues that are paramount for the two presidents right now. However, it seems that the main problems and complications in Russian-Ukrainian relations are generally a thing of the past. The shock linked to the abrupt change of Gazprom’s gas policy was a one-time phenomenon.
“Regardless of how badly it affected our relations, this degree of deterioration is no longer possible. This is because another approach, a very pragmatic, strict, and much more understandable one, is being implemented, and it precludes any concealed discontent of one side or the other. The economy is the economy and politics is politics. Both in Kyiv and Moscow politics underwent major restructuring caused by this shock. The continuing challenge now is not to let domestic political battles and problems take our relations hostage. This, of course, is connected with the Ukrainian presidential elections and the way the political situation will develop in Russia. It is understood that we are neighbors, and it is clear that Ukraine needs to balance and combine the western and eastern vectors [of its foreign policy]. Now, at least, we get the impression that this has been realized and accepted by both parties. The current balance between the two vectors in Ukrainian policy is not skewed-it is a true balance.
“As far as Russia’s refusal to use MAWS is concerned, it seems to me that it is possible to say that Russia is taking certain steps to distance itself in terms of military- technical cooperation. In this area there are a number of apprehensions on Russia’s part that are caused by Ukraine’s movement toward NATO and which have been connected precisely with these aspects. It is possible to change in an instant the system of ties in the military-industrial complex between our countries, as well as a certain dependence of the Russian military on Ukrainian technical equipment. On the one hand, the refusal to use MAWS is connected to the fact that Russia has already worked out alternative ways and, on the other, it means that there are fewer points left that may cause a very morbid reaction to Ukraine’s gravitation toward NATO.
“As concerns the future presidential elections in Ukraine, it is clear that Russia is a very important factor in Ukrainian politics. No serious candidate can afford not to think about building relations with Russia. As Putin said on many occasions, especially after the failed attempt to influence the last presidential elections, Russia is clearly inclined to preserve the status quo. In this respect, it would be incorrect to say that the Kremlin will fully support Yushchenko in his electoral rivalry with Tymoshenko. But it seems obvious to me that there will be no clear-cut stance: support one against another one. In what way these relations are going to be built is a question of politics. If we consider the last elections in Serbia, there was a candidate who was considered pro-Russian. Before the run-off election the incumbent Serbian president Boris Tadic came to Moscow. He signed a series of treaties that were important for Serbia and Serbia-Russia relations. In this way he demonstrated to his electorate that if he stays in power, relations with Russia will improve rather than deteriorate. It seems that this is the indicative position of the Kremlin and it may appear during the elections in Ukraine.”
Oleksandr SUSHKO, head of the Center for Peace, Conversion, and Foreign Policy of Ukraine:
“The outcome of the meeting met expectations. The presidents signed the prepared documents and resolved the acute gas issues that had recently surfaced. The parties also exchanged their views on the problems that have somewhat spoiled our bilateral relations. It is clear that on most issues their views remain unchanged.
“Did Yushchenko have to pay a political price for settling the gas issue and the gas price? This is a special topic. Typically, we first learn about the good news and then, after a while, about the bad news, which was concealed to begin with. So I will not venture a prediction now. We remember all too well Jan. 4, 2006, when the first news left the impression that everything was all right, and then it turned out that Ukraine had gotten itself into a trap.
“Putin’s words about possibly aiming Russian missiles at Ukraine are rhetoric for an incompetent audience. This is one of the few traditional bogeymen used by Russia. Any competent person should know that there is no connection between the NATO membership of certain countries and the location of elements of the Anti-Missile Defense System on their territory. These elements are set up according to bilateral agreements between the USA and individual partner countries, no matter whether they have NATO membership or not. Moreover, there will be no need to set up American ballistic missile defense units on the territory of Ukraine. Perhaps what we are seeing here is a clear lack of argumentation: the arguments used to justify why Ukraine’s entry in NATO is undesirable have no relation to NATO membership.
“About the possibility that Ukraine will speed up the process of acquiring NATO membership: Ukraine has applied for the NATO Membership Action Plan, which is now being considered by NATO. The application may be revoked or Ukraine may continue waiting for a response from the alliance. There is nothing that depends on Ukraine and its actions now. One thing that Ukraine could do is to announce that it anticipates joining MAP not in Bucharest but in a different place in a few years’ time. In this case, the application will have to be amended correspondingly. Right now it has been submitted to NATO, and the alliance will decide when to accept Ukraine.
“About the dynamics in the negotiations on border delimitation in the Sea of Azov, which was claimed by Yushchenko: I do not have any data indicating that the parties reached an agreement on the main bone of contention: recognition of the administrative borders of the former Soviet republics and drawing the border east of Tuzla Island.
“About the joint celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava: if we were talking about modern-day European nations, they would quickly find a formula for the tripartite celebration of these events. What we are seeing here is Russia’s attempts to celebrate another glorious landmark rather than a mere anniversary and to present the celebration as one of the key symbols of restoring its imperial power. Clearly, this context is unacceptable, first of all for Ukraine but also for Sweden, I think. Under no circumstances should there be a celebration of the imperial grandeur of one of the participating states. It is true that we need to engage in a dialogue in order to avoid having two different celebrations. In the course of this dialogue we need to find the proper scenario and format for the festivities.
“We can hardly speak about Kremlin’s possible support of Yushchenko in the 2009 presidential elections. He is not perceived as “one of us” in Russia. He has a different system of values. Besides, Russia is unlikely to openly support any candidate in Ukraine. They will most probably put their eggs in different baskets depending on the configuration at the time of the elections. It is impossible for them to place their bets on either Yushchenko or Tymoshenko.”
