Men who knows the ropes

The Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Poland to Ukraine, Jacek Kluczkowski, has been in Ukraine for just a few weeks, but he has already met Ukraine’s key politicians from both the opposition and the government, including Viktor Yanukovych, Yuliya Tymoshenko, Oleh Rybachuk and others. Mr. Kluczkowski is not a career diplomat. His previous appointment was as deputy state secretary of the Polish prime minister’s staff, and before that he was President Kwasniewski’s adviser. Well informed diplomats maintain that Warsaw decided to appoint as ambassador an individual who is not only knowledgeable about Ukrainian issues but also “knows all the ins and outs” of Ukrainian politics. Mr. Kluczkowski had friendly relations with many politicians long before he began his diplomatic career. In fact, he was part of the Polish group of intermediaries during the Orange Revolution, and his contacts helped Ukraine avoid bloodshed. Aleksander Kwasniewski recalls that plans to use force against the Maidan protesters were dropped thanks to the speedy actions of Kluczkowski, who used his cell phone to get in touch with Viktor Yanukovych’s campaign manager.

“POLAND IS NOT GOING TO CHANGE ITS POLICY TOWARD UKRAINE”

“Do you still have that historic cell phone?”

“Yes, I still use that phone in Kyiv, but a lot of numbers have changed, you know.”

“We’ve been looking forward to your return because it is important for us to learn first-hand about the formation of the Polish government and its future policy toward Ukraine.”

“Poland is not going to change its policy toward Ukraine. The parties that won the elections — Law and Justice and Civic Platform — are very interested in cooperation with Ukraine, and they have already done a lot toward this end. Law and Justice sent nearly 2,000 observers to the presidential elections in Ukraine at its own cost. The European Parliament members who represent Civic Platform also supported Ukraine during the elections.”

“NO NEED TO DRAMATIZE”

“The political reform will come into force on Jan. 1, 2006. Many think that it very much resembles the Polish model. What are its main dangers?”

“I don’t see any special danger. Every model should take into account, one way or another, the state’s past, societal experience, the way political parties work, and the level of political debates, if any, among them. Under the Polish system, the president has very limited powers, although he is elected by the people and can insist on his viewpoints, relying on public support, as Kwasniewski did. In Poland, power changes hands as a result of the free will of the majority of voters. How will this work in Ukraine? I find it difficult to distinguish between parties on the basis of their programs, e.g., what they are going to do about taxation, etc. In Poland, we know all this more or less. This is not my first time in Ukraine; I know politicians and read their program statements, but I’m not sure I can guess who plays against whom, let alone understand what they would like to offer to the people.

“Still, I think the system of a parliamentary republic suits our countries better, but only time will tell.”

“You have come back to Ukraine at a rather critical time — after the cabinet’s dismissal and scandals. Who do you think is to blame for this crisis?”

“I don’t know. Nor do I think that we look on this as something very bad. First of all, I think it is natural. I consider it a difference of priorities on the part of various forces. I wouldn’t say the current cabinet is well put together, but in the Tymoshenko government this difference was even more pronounced. I recently talked with the distinguished US analyst and lobbyist Bruce Jackson, who asked me, ‘And what was going on in Poland 10 months after the revolution? What was going on in Romania 10 months after the fall of Ceausescu? And in Czechoslovakia? And Serbia?’ He said the situation in Ukraine is much better than it was in Poland, Romania, and East Germany.”

“But Bruce Jackson also says that Ukraine does not have as much time as Poland, Romania, and especially East Germany.”

“That’s right, but we shouldn’t dramatize. Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were sort of a ‘dream team.’ We, Poles, also wanted this team to work together at least until the elections.”

“Many participants of the Orange Revolution have taken an extremely negative attitude to the memorandum between Yushchenko and Yanukovych, because it is in fact what Yanukovych wanted but failed to achieve during the revolution. And what is the attitude of international mediators? Or have international mediators stayed out this time?”

“No, no, there were no mediators.”

“Do you agree that the root cause of the latest crisis was the formation of a cabinet by the quota principle?”

“This is a Maidan coalition, a presidential coalition, because the Socialists are still in the government. It was common knowledge that all those parties were not born on the Maidan — they have histories, priorities, and their own values. We know all about the Socialists. This is a separate political force, and they also have different ideas about the economy and international relations. Yet, this is really a coalition of popular resistance. Together, they stood up for the people’s right to choose. I wouldn’t like to comment on the conflicts they had. It is clear to everyone that this is a mixed coalition.”

ODESA-BRODY-PLOCK PIPELINE TO BE REBORN IN THE SPRING OF 2006

“It is almost eight months since power changed in Ukraine. Why did the much-expected investments never come to this country?”

“The past year has not been a successful one for Ukraine. It is no wonder that the investment climate has taken a downturn. Business circles were very well disposed toward Ukraine since the Orange Revolution, but this is a general mood, because when it comes to investing in specific projects, enthusiasm clearly wanes. You know perfectly well that not only foreign but also domestic investments have dropped 20 percent compared to the first six months of 2004. Obviously, the government’s policy was the cause. As far as I understand, investments were not a top priority for the previous cabinet. Take the cancellation of special economic zones. I fully agree that everybody should pay taxes, and offshore firms should not deceive the state. Indeed, Ukraine did not need those economic zones. But there were investors who worked honestly and met their commitments to Ukraine. The Polish companies that had invested in Ukraine were medium-sized business, and the conditions that were created were of great importance to them because they don’t have money to burn. Polish businessmen are extremely dissatisfied. I know that some Polish companies have taken a wait-and-see approach and slowed down their investments in Ukraine.

“The government’s policy has resulted in increased revenues and lack of investments. How can the dream of a developed Ukraine come true? I don’t think the state budget alone can help achieve this dream. Development at the expense of the budget was only possible under communism. Now European countries are developing at the expense of invested funds. If you want to solve social problems, you must support investors above all. This is the instrument of economic development, and I see no other way. Ireland and Poland can serve as examples. We have received about $60 billion worth of investments: this, not revenues, is the main source of development. You must build a competitive economy.”

“What is the current situation with the implementation of joint Ukrainian-Polish energy projects? Can we expect the Odesa-Brody oil pipeline to work in the originally projected direction next year?”

“We can and do expect this. I understand that Ukraine will not benefit from the reverse direction. Ukrainian experts themselves say there is a cheaper way of transporting Russian oil. If that is so, reversing the pipeline was a political decision. Specialists are supposed to complete a feasibility report on this pipeline by the end of this year. As far as I know, it may start pumping oil from Odesa to Brody early next year. It is up to Ukraine to decide. Then we should build a section from Brody to the Polish city of Plock. According to the most optimistic estimates, the construction may take 18 months: if it begins next spring, we may finish it before the end of 2007.”

“So construction will start next year?”

“It’s possible. The feasibility report may be ready by December. This may in turn help attract investments in building the Brody-Plock segment. This should be a more Europe-oriented investment, it must work for Europe. We will be able to achieve this.”

“What can you say about Ukraine’s steps toward European integration? Does Ukraine have any grounds to expect positive comments from its European partners during the Ukraine-EU summit that will be held in December?”

“In my view, Ukraine has done a lot. Your political leaders are pro-European. Undoubtedly, the attitude to European integration is now better than it was in Leonid Kuchma’s time. How is Ukraine fulfilling the Action Plan — in my opinion, very well. Recently, there was a meeting between the EU trio and Borys Tarasiuk, during which Ukraine received very positive marks.”

“There was an exchange of gibes between Warsaw and Moscow after the Orange Revolution. It seemed that everything would be OK and the two sides would reach an understanding. However, a Russian expert recently joked in Kyiv: Kwasniewski goes but Putin stays. Do you think the bitter polemics between Russia and Poland have ended?”

“Things cannot change in an instant. True, Russia is still Ukraine’s most serious partner. It seems to me that Russia wants to reestablish its links with Ukraine but has no fresh proposals for your country. It is very important for your two countries to develop economic and interregional relations. But can this possibly change the economic situation in Ukraine for the better? Or will it slow down restructuring and the construction of a really competitive economy? I think new offers to Ukraine should be based on democracy and a free market and be aimed at acquiring state-of-the-art technologies and manufacturing competitive products.

“We, Poles, are also thinking about our offers to Ukraine. Such things as democracy, human rights, modern economy, and new technologies are available in Europe and the US. And I think that Russia, too, should be interested in gaining many of these benefits. Poland wants no polemics with Russia, we are also interested in friendly relations, but it seems to me that Russia’s weakness in Ukraine lies in its unwillingness to support modern things, the things that people, especially young ones, dream about.”

THE ORANGE REVOLUTION: WHAT ARE WE GOING TO CELEBRATE?

“On Yushchenko’s initiative, Ukraine will soon be celebrating the first anniversary of the Orange Revolution. Do we have something to celebrate now or will we in the future?”

“We do. Will we have anything to celebrate in the future? I don’t know. The current public mood in Ukraine is that people are not very satisfied with the situation. Still I am sure you have something to celebrate. A modern political Ukrainian nation was born one year ago. The people successfully defended their choice. Ukraine is now much closer to European standards and can conduct a more meaningful debate on its future. It is now an entirely different country. Oligarchs no longer wield power. Even though there may be some links between business and the government, it is not a government of oligarchs. Everything has changed radically. This reminds me of the first years of Solidarity’s rule in Poland, when there were sweeping changes and the populace was also disgruntled with many things. But the country changed radically.”

“A year ago the Polish side and you personally saw to it that no force would be used against the Orange Revolution demonstrators. Could you give us more details about the roundtable discussions that were held with the participation of foreign mediators? Among other things, were any guarantees given to the former leadership?”

“Not to my knowledge. You know, there are things that don’t need to be discussed, for they may be quite obvious to some people. But this is a domestic political issue. There were no foreign guarantees, nor could there be. Nobody ever said anything like: I will not use force and you will then guarantee me immunity. We heard from Kuchma that he was not prepared to use force in principle. Yet there were attempts to intimidate us and the Ukrainian people. The situation was on the brink of a disaster. We conferred with politicians from many parties, including those who supported Viktor Yanukovych. Those politicians insisted in a heated debate that they could not accept the proposed conditions because that would mean the loss of Ukraine’s sovereignty. They seemed prepared even to accept a split Ukraine in order to stand their ground. We also gained the same impression when we watched television, especially Russian TV. We replied: Do you want to live in the same conditions as the Belarusian leadership, even though your business is closely linked with the West? I saw this was a very powerful argument for them. Then they said that Ukraine would not be split. Later we quietly watched Russian television, fully aware that it was just a game. Kuchma also played this game a lot. Still, we observed the rules of the game when we participated in the ‘roundtables.’ We were patient enough and finally saw a positive result. We just didn’t bow to intimidation. In October 2004 I met with Yevhen Marchuk, and he tried to calm me: don’t be afraid, the Ukrainian army and security service will never come out against their own people.”

“Ihor Shkiria, a member of the Regions of Ukraine party, said in a recent interview that they struck a deal with the government because they put Ukraine above everything else. Shkiria comes from eastern Ukraine. If he were from western Ukraine, he would immediately be branded a nationalist for saying this.”

“Last year we could talk frankly with different political forces. I am aware that no other Western embassy had such close contacts. Foreign diplomats very often learned about events on television, so they could really be frightened. We received many signals, including some from Kuchma’s circle, that this was a game that we should play to the end. There were a lot of critical moments. We noticed that Kuchma was not always able to manage the situation.”

“Still, was there a real danger that force would be used against the demonstrators? Were any troops stationed near Kyiv, as some politicians said?”

“There are many centuries ahead of us, and historians will find out what happened in reality. There were several instances when force could have been applied. President Kwasniewski recounted one of them in an interview. I wouldn’t like to overestimate my role and especially the role of my cell phone in that situation. But this actually happened, and Kuchma himself was not sure if he could do anything. And there were fears that things might go out of control.”