Moscow strives to look an equal partner
January 28, two Presidents, Leonid Kuchma and Vladimir Putin, signed ten bilateral documents. Most of them dealt with healthcare and education issues, while one settled a land dispute over the Ukrainian-Russian border. The Presidents pointed out achievements have been made in solving problems between the two countries.
A day before, the opening of the Year of Russia in Ukraine took place — a solemn, pompous, grandiose event, though it started half an hour later than it was scheduled. It was held in the Ukrayina National Palace, included the participation of both Presidents and was crowded with spectators. Two state anthems, Russian (i.e. former Soviet) and Ukrainian, marked the beginning of the occasion. These were followed by a series of speeches.
The first word was granted to the host. “We need each other,” Leonid Kuchma stressed. He continued to say that countries need to rise to the challenges of new times. The first challenge is a comprehension of democracy and living in a free society. The second one is globalization. “The Year of Russia in Ukraine will give evidence to the fact that two great and wise nations live in Europe side-by-side,” President Kuchma said in conclusion. The hall burst into applause.
Another storm of cheers was given to Vladimir Putin. The audience broke into ovations after almost every phrase, doing justice to his orator skills and sophisticated pauses. Apart from this, Russian President’s speech had much in common with the one of his Ukrainian counterpart. Putin spoke of the great achievements of the two nations, of their deep roots of friendship and relationship, “which will grow and develop with time.” Meanwhile, there were approximately a hundred people outside the Ukrayina Palace protesting against the Year of Russia in Ukraine and yelling anti-Russian slogans.
Currently, it is stylish within the former Soviet Union for countries to celebrate years of friendship and Ukraine is no exception to the rule. Vladimir Putin set a precedent by proclaiming 2002 the Year of Ukraine in Russia. Kyiv decided not to leave this initiative unanswered and proclaimed 2003 the Year of Russia in Ukraine. To a certain extent, last year Astana took advantage of the Ukrainian experience, proclaiming 2004 the Year of Russia as a response to the Year of Kazakhstan in Russia.
Probably, this initiative was intended mostly for the public. Moscow needed to demonstrate that it treats Kyiv as an equal partner. The Kremlin tried to give positive impetus to bilateral relations on several occasions. For example, last year Russia organized economic forums, where representatives of the business elite could meet each other. In addition, negotiations over distributing ex- Soviet property abroad began last year. Russian regions exerted some efforts to improve their contacts with Ukrainian regions. In the city of Surgut (Siberia), which has a high Ukrainian population, a Ukrainian Cultural Center was opened. At the same time, Russian-Ukrainian relations remain uneven. One may recall last year’s events in the Ukrainian-Russian cooperation. Ukraine gave its consent for creating a gas transporting consortium, which benefits Russia only. Ukraine became an observer in the Euro- Asiatic Economical Community, where Russia plays the key role among the five so-called equal members. However, the Kremlin seems unsatisfied with this level of Ukraine’s participation, and repeatedly reminds Kyiv of the need for Ukraine’s membership in EurAsEC. One might also recall the plans for joint work on history textbooks, which met an ambiguous attitude in Ukraine, or the advice from certain Russian politicians on what parties should be in Verkhovna Rada.
The Year of Ukraine in Russia was planned for the good of bilateral relations or, as Russian Ambassador Viktor Chernomyrdin put it, for better recognition. This is how the year unfolded: Ukraine was recognized in Russia by works of art, and Russia in Ukraine — by businessmen. The leaders of the two countries demonstrated a friendly atmosphere in the face of decreasing economic cooperation and the absence of Ukrainian investment in Russia’s economy. According to Ukrainian Ambassador to Moscow Mykola Biloblotsky, in 2002 the commodity turnover between the two countries was $69 million less compared to 2001. Besides, many Ukrainian politicians used the Year of Ukraine in Russia for informal contacts in Moscow, i.e. for their personal purposes.
“If there are any talks about Russia’s imperial ambitions, I want them to stop now,” said Leonid Kuchma after signing the Treaty on State Border between Russia and Ukraine. “If there were any ulterior motives in the Russian Federation, this treaty would never have been signed,” the Ukrainian President stressed. It should be recalled, however, that negotiations over the Ukrainian-Russian border have been held for more than a year, and the sides still have not come to an agreement on its sea border.
The major question of the CIS informal summit in Kyiv was whether the President of Ukraine will be elected the Head of the Council of CIS Leaders. This issue was settled when Vladimir Putin announced that his Ukrainian counterpart was in fact elected for this post unanimously. However, this created a number of questions. Why exactly the Ukrainian leader? Why was the decision made at an informal summit? What goals did Putin pursue when making that proposal to Kuchma? Why did the latter accept it? And finally, in what way does this correspond to the Ukraine’s declaration about the European choice?
The Presidents answered these questions in part.
Last Wednesday, President Putin admitted that he wanted Leonid Kuchma to be elected the Head of the CIS Leaders Council as early as last year at the Chisinau summit. Not all presidents agreed with the Russian delegation’s proposal, and the issue was postponed for the next occasion. Leaders of the Commonwealth countries had their reasons not to admit Kuchma to the honorary post. Aliaksandr Lukashenka said that Kyiv should first work through some procedure issues connected with signing and ratifying statute documents of the post-soviet organization. Ukraine has never been a CIS full member but only a founding and participating state. “Our country deliberately avoids taking part in some CIS cooperation. In fact this means incomplete but full membership within the limits of this voluntarily defined incompleteness,” representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine stated on the summit’s eve. This incompleteness for many, both inside and outside Ukraine, has become an argument for expelling Ukraine from the list of countries whose leaders can preside over the CIS. Minister of Justice Oleksandr Lavrynovych, in his turn, said in an interview to a TV channel that Ukraine’s statute in the CIS “is absolutely sufficient for having a right to head the Council of CIS Leaders.”
In fact, CIS documents read that the Council can be headed by any president of a member country. Ukraine, and Kuchma, meet this definition. However, did CIS leaders have legal grounds to elect the chairman at an informal summit instead of a Council’s meeting? This question is still to be cleared. Another question is, how can a decision be taken unanimously in the absence of 4 of 12 presidents? CIS rules state that “deviation from established voting procedure is admitted only if a decision must be taken immediately.” In this case voting can be held using every president’s original signature. Obviously, such a decision took place. Leonid Kuchma was elected, and he expressed his sincere gratitude to all presidents. The Ukrainian leader promised to carry out his duties responsibly. President Kuchma connected the fact of his being elected with the previous summit in Chisinau where he “put forward a number of fundamental proposals on reforming economic cooperation” within the CIS.
The Ukrainian establishment’s attitude towards Leonid Kuchma’s election as chairman of the CIS Leaders Council was ambiguous since the very beginning. Through this post, the Ukrainian leader strengthens his image of a politician more disposed to develop relations with the East than West. This seems quite a logical step for Ukraine, though it regretfully cools relations with Western countries. On the summit’s eve, many politicians called Mr. Kuchma not to take Russia’s proposal, exposing to risk our country’s course for integration in the European Union and NATO. Heads of the Rukh People’s Movement (Hennady Udovenko), Reform and Order Party (Viktor Pinzenyk), and Ukrainian People’s Party (Yury Kostenko) made public a statement referring to the idea of Ukraine’s chairmanship in the CIS Leaders Council as contradicting Ukraine’s foreign policy. “Behind this there are attempts to prevent Ukraine from integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, which is Ukraine’s key priority, and tighten its ties with the amorphous and ineffective CIS,” leaders of the three parties stressed.
Some believe that since Kuchma consented to the Russian leader’s proposal, he seeks to secure his future after his presidential term is complete. This is doubtful since a president can only preside in the CIS Leaders Council for 12 months. After the term, the role is given to the next president in Cyrillic alphabetical order. In the case of the Ukrainian president there are two precedents being broken. First, formerly only Russian presidents, Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, have headed the CIS Leaders Council. Second, according to CIS regulations, the next president to head the council (according to the alphabet) should be Emomali Rakhmonov. In the first case Leonid Kuchma managed to break an old tradition, and in the second — evade CIS regulations.
Why would Ukraine need the chairmanship in the CIS Leaders Council? The roles of the chairman are narrow: opening and closing meetings, putting to vote rough documents, presenting the agenda and time limit, etc. The Ukrainian president seems to expect that this post will enable him to bring a second wind into the Commonwealth. Leonid Kuchma announced that in September 2003 an agreement On Free Trade within CIS framework is to be signed in Yalta. Putin, in his turn, stated that Ukraine has now agreed with Russia’s logic according to which VAT on Russian energy product in Ukraine is disadvantageous for Russia’s budget. “We suggest to make an exception and compose a timetable for gradual transition to create a free trade zone for all CIS countries,” the Russian leader stressed. It also looks like electing Leonid Kuchma for the honorary post, which will bring him no real advantages, was a part of a package of agreements whose results will finally show in the last days of election campaigns in both Ukraine and Russia.
Analysts do not rule out hidden motives of Leonid Kuchma presiding over the CIS Leaders Council - in part, in the energy sphere. What profit will this bring to the average Ukrainian? So far, only taxes... This is the only conclusion one can draw from a Foreign Ministry representative’s statement made two weeks before the summit, “In terms of potential and current contribution to the CIS budget, Ukraine is second only to Russia, drastically surpassing all other member countries.”
Now it is obvious that the tactics of isolating the Ukrainian president taken by the West during the Kolchuga scandal have proved ineffective. So far, Russian politicians have beaten Western ones, though the latter take advantage of Ukraine’s actual problems. The “isolation plan” ruffled Ukrainian authorities, and it seems that they decided to accept the “Hand of Russia.” What will come out of this? One is reminded of the situation in Belarus in the early 1990s. The West staked on Zenon Pozniak, the People’s Front’s radical leader, as a counterweight to “nomenklatura” premier Kebich. In the end, Lukashenka has come to power.
