New Caucasus Geopolitics

Perhaps the major event of the Istanbul OSCE Summit was not the signing of a common document or mass denunciation of the Russian campaign in Chechnya. Obviously, the real happening was that the leaders of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have signed an agreement about the future principal route for Caspian oil exports to Western Europe. And now everything is beginning to sort itself out. In modern history, Russia has lost its first big diplomatic war over the repartition of influence on the Caucasus. The winner is not so much Turkey as the US, which from the very beginning backed specifically the Turkish option for exporting Caspian oil, which had to compete with the Russian (to Novorossiysk), Ukrainian (Black Sea-Odesa-Polish border, and other projects—via Bulgarian Varna or Romanian Constantsa. In recent years it was quite obvious that Russia, dogged by internal problems, has been gradually but steadily losing its influence on Baku and Tbilisi, in parallel with the growing activity of the Turkish government and American business in the region.

It is absolutely clear that it was the first big war, and the real battles are still to come. The project to build a pipeline across Turkey is estimated at $3.5-4 billion and there is still nobody willing to finance it. Caucasian stability, which is vital for the success of the project, is quite ephemeral. The West, finally, has begun to understand the very close correlation between the events in Chechnya, unsettled conflicts in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh as well as more far-reaching strategic calculations. In fact, it is obvious that for Azerbaijan and Georgia independence from Russian oil means considerable political independence from Russia. Successful implementation of the Turkish project will signify simultaneously Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s dropping out from Russia’s orbit. Moscow will not be willing to concede this loss, which threatens to become the beginning of the real end of the CIS, an ephemeral structure, currently needed by no one except Russia (and by it only verbally). Thus, it would be reasonable to conclude that the Caucasian crisis will last awhile. However, one can also expect the escalation of Russia’s “fraternal” feelings toward Ukraine. Maybe a great deal will be done to prevent Ukraine’s actual convergence with the West: oil and natural gas prices could suddenly fall, the Ukrainian government will be daily reminded that support in the presidential elections is worth something and thus debts should be paid off. Perhaps a customs union in the CIS will finally be declared (and most likely will remain only on paper), etc.

The American — or Western — victory in the Caucasus could cost Ukraine quite a lot — just as much as Russia’s victory. Over eight years of independence, Ukraine has failed to get rid of its fantastic dependence on Russian energy resources and markets, while falling into huge dependence on IMF loans and Washington’s political will. It seems that time has come to decide, very quickly and seriously: is it worth standing between two fires anymore? It is the time to decide what should be changed now, so that we need not convince anybody of our European nature or that the mighty of this world need seek our company, in order that when adopting decisions affecting our interests — whether in regard of the Balkans or the Caucasus — they take into consideration our point of view. Perhaps this is what we should call strategic partnership.