A Once and Future Country?

Something happened three years ago which few had believed possible. NATO aircraft started bombing military targets in Yugoslavia. The result was a heavy blow to what was still Yugoslav society; problems of democratization in Kosovo remained as pressing as ever; Slobodan Milosevic no longer wielded actual power in Belgrade and eventually found himself facing the Hague tribunal. Yugoslavia as such has now vanished from the world map. The consequences of the air raids were the burned-out buildings of the Socialist Party of Serbia, defense ministry, and other official buildings in Belgrade, destroyed bridges in Novi Sad. Predrag, a journalist with the Glas Javnosti, a major newspaper, says that the Serbs try not to mention any of this today, yet they have forgotten nothing. Thousands took part in November 24 rallies marking the third anniversary of the NATO combat operations. This time, as three years ago, the streets were filled with people, many not Sloba supporters. On the whole, however, the Serbs are not inclined to see the US and other Western countries as their adversaries. There is a growing need for European integration and close cooperation with the international community. Polls point to paradoxes; the Serbs are not against EU membership in principle, while three years ago France, Germany, and Great Britain were considered enemies. In addition, 90% of the victims of the air raids were civilians. The country is now living through a period of self-determination. The name of the country is not the only thing that has changed (ranking officials in Serbia and Montenegro joke that they are not sure what country they live in). The process of shaping political elites is only beginning. Experts note that the instability of the current situation is evidenced, among other things, by the espionage scandal involving former Serbian Premier Momcilo Perisic. This country needs major aid, but it must comply with all the Hague tribunal requirements to receive it. Such is the prerequisite imposed by the US and EU. The economic situation is also quite complicated, aggravated by railroad and industrial workers’ strikes. Yet experts in Belgrade do not anticipate mass public unrest like what happened in 2000 when Milosevic lost the election campaign, pressed not only by the West but also by Yugoslav citizens, and the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) came to power. DOS is still in power and the name stays, although it is a coalition of 18 political parties with varying degrees of influence, strength, and different ideologies. Intellectuals, experts, journalists, and young people are almost unanimous in considering October 5, 2000, when power changed hands in Belgrade, the date beginning the new history of Serbia.

The Yugoslav option is impossible in Ukraine, says Milan Nikolic, director of the Center for Political Research, one of Belgrade’s most influential think tanks. The two countries have always taken different historical courses; they have different traditions and speak different languages. Mr. Nikolic stresses that he was the one to recommend the opposition stake on Vojislav Kostunica as the only opposition candidate standing a major chance of winning the campaign. The September 24, 2000, elections were anything but fair and transparent, The Day was told by the CESID Center for Free Elections and Democracy. The authorities tried to tamper with the turnout in some election districts, a great number of ballots for Milosevic materialized in Kosovo, and the Albanians boycotted the elections. According to CESID, a parallel counting of the votes proved Kostunica’s victory in the first round and the center was the first to publish the turnout. People appeared in the streets, carrying posters reading “I Am Ready!” In fact, no one obstructed the promulgation of opposition periodicals in Belgrade; there were billboards and posters in the streets urging to vote for the opposition. Other sources questioned Kostunica’s victory in the first round, but the overall picture showed that he was on the winning side. People of the Association of Independent Electronic Media also told The Day that AIEM had played a major role in the opposition’s triumph; that on the eve and during the elections radio correspondents operated in Serbia and technical personnel manned special bases in Hungary, Bosnia, and Romania. Broadcasts were relayed to Yugoslavia across several border countries. When asked how much all this cost, the answer was simple: a lot. The financing had been done not by Serbian companies, banks, individuals, or organizations. Who had spent how much on the Serbian opposition remains anyone’s guess. It is clear, however, that opposition was in market demand in Serbia, otherwise the whole project would have fallen through. The Serbs did want a change for the better. “Our people are marked by a high level of political maturity,” points out Nikolic. “Over the past decade we have lived through an exceptionally difficult situation and gone through a school that could not break but teach us.” The political research center’s statistics show that the nationalists are supported by 8-12%, lower than in the neighboring states. It should also be remembered that the Serbs had something tangible to lose: before Yugoslavia’s disintegration Yugoslav citizens had a right to freely enter any country of the world; new books and films originating from the West instantly appeared in Yugoslavia; the country maintained lively cultural, scientific, and economic contacts with the West. Any society sooner or later gets tired of wars and hardships it could have avoided.

The results of the Yugoslav option are as follows: close to 50% of the Serbian labor force unemployed (official statistics point to some 30%); GDP, almost one-third that of 1989 (optimistic estimates are that filling the gap will take at least thirty years); the economy is in a lamentable condition. Former Yugoslavia’s public debt to $12 billion (two-thirds of the sum have been written off). The Institute of the Economy, being close to the government, maintains that the shadow economy comprises 40% of all business endeavors. Direct foreign investment was some $100 million last year. About half of GDP is produced by the private sector. Various sources assess the losses incurred by the Milosevic regime at $10-100 billion, including damage from air raids. Corruption is high. There are some 600,000 refugees from Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo in Serbia.

On the other hand, experts from G17, an extremely influential organization (at one time the author of the new DM-affiliated currency), expect the dinar to become convertible as of April 1 (there is a long way to full convertibility, but it is also true that the hryvnia is not sold on international exchanges).

The year and a half of the new regime is not very inspiring for the Serbs. Journalists and experts are also rather skeptical about DOS rule, as are people who cast their ballots for the opposition, expecting a higher living standard in the first place. Polls indicate some 80% disillusioned citizens; 54% anticipate some kind or another of confrontation with the regime. The experts, however, do not think that the situation is fraught with the danger of a mass protest movement.

Reform is slow. Vojislav Kostunica, President of Yugoslavia (currently of Serbia and Montenegro) is accused of indecision; his former brother in arms, Serbian Premier Zoran Djindjic, is scolded for rash decisions and mistakes. SPC Director Milan Nikolic believes that two political blocs are being formed round the two politicians that can be described as social democratic and liberal, or as traditionalistic and West- oriented. This primarily refers to the parties making up the DOS; those favoring Milosevic and Sesel’s radical nationalists no longer have active support in society. In fact, the DOS is on the verge of a split; President Kostunica, embodying traditionalism, wields mostly symbolic authority. The new President of Serbia is expected to have considerably greater influence. Current Serbian Premier Miroljub Labus, an economist from G17, is regarded a likely candidate with a good chance. The process of development is noticeably hampered by political ambitions within the leadership, Serbian experts and journalists agree. This country badly needs a political administrative reform, also that of the army and the police. Numerous comments on espionage boil down to the inference that the army command remains as before. The fact remains that Perisic’s cooperation with the CIA was okayed by Milosevic (supporting documents have been published).

The Serbian government closely cooperates with foreign experts in a variety of ways. Incidentally, Premier Djindjic received his higher education in Germany, a fact to keep in mind. Mr. Nikolic says that Serbia has an advantage over other countries in transition, for it started later and thus has a chance to avoid others’ mistakes. The Ukrainian experience is also being carefully studied in Belgrade, yet no one was willing to dwell on its positive and negative aspects when asked by The Day. The differences, however, are obvious. The Serbs are considerably more active in the public realm. Their trade unions are quite strong, as are traditions of local self-government. The government is pressed from below, and the Serbs have never been overly patient, meaning that those in power will have to pay more attention to the obvious needs of society. Various polls show rather interesting government trust ratings. Despite everything, people trust (a) their president, (b) army, (c) the church, (d) school, and (e) the media. Monarchic traditions notwithstanding, there are not over 10% monarchists.

Most of the Serbs regard the loss of Kosovo calmly — and the place had been the cradle of the nation. Yet everybody is expressly dissatisfied by the treaty with Montenegro, putting an end to even the “former” former Yugoslavia. Premier Labus, for example, points out that such was the EU requirement, so they could bring Belgrade closer to the union. Neither Serbia nor Montenegro will be recognized as independent. No one knows what will happen after the expiration of the three-year transition period. No forecasts are being made.

Belgrade young people are optimistic. All the downtown cafes are packed in the evening, and the atmosphere is mostly calm. The Serbs simply trust themselves and their future.