The OSCE dimension

On Jan. 1, 2008, Finland took over the chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. One of the first visits of the Finnish foreign minister was to Ukraine. What are Finland’s priorities for the duration of its chairmanship? How is Helsinki planning to go about OSCE reforms to increase its efficiency? These and other questions are answered by Finland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Ilkka KANERVA in his interview with the Ukrainian journalists Mykola SIRUK ( The Day ), Volodymyr KRAVCHENKO ( Dzerkalo tyzhnia ), and Iryna TYMCHYSHYN (1+1 Channel).

OSCE: TRADITIONAL CHANGES

Kanerva: Ukraine is a very interesting country for us. Speaking of the challenges we’re facing, particularly Transdnistria, we have to join our efforts in resolving them. Ukraine, being a big country, obviously plays an important role here. This is how I personally see the situation. I hope that by strengthening cooperation and contacts, we’ll be able to jointly assess aspects that can guarantee positive development. I believe that Ukraine’s progress will serve as a good example of the development of democracy. Finland thinks highly of Ukraine’s efforts along these lines. Ukraine is showing other countries how to facilitate the implementation of OSCE values.

Mr. Kanerva, what are Finland’s priorities for the duration of its OSCE chairmanship?

Jokingly, I would say that we are marking our priorities on a map and must submit them soon. Seriously speaking, our reference point is the fact that we are living in a time of great challenges. Progress has been in a positive direction since the Cold War. At times this approach may result in a situation that is not as good as we would like it to be. Perhaps an organization such as the OSCE is experiencing this kind of situation. One should keep in mind that the OSCE is the only organization that deals with matters of security for all of Europe, and that it has a transatlantic dimension. We must not allow a kind of progress that would undermine the functional basis of this organization. The OSCE’s inner culture envisages unanimous approval of all resolutions. Naturally, we must listen carefully to what all the sides have to say. We must also work and act so as to make all the participants feel confident about everything the OSCE is dealing with. In addition, we must help observe the underlying principles of the OSCE because the three traditional OSCE changes will be present in our activities. Naturally, the challenges facing this organization envisage and provide for solutions to certain problems. Here I am referring to such a topical issue as the monitoring of elections. On the one hand, there is the issue of Kosovo and the settlement of frozen conflicts. I think it is very important that we can facilitate true dedication to the OSCE’s underlying principles.

Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov declared recently that the OSCE lacks confidence in its current form. How do you see ways to reform the OSCE?

I am essentially a humanist and proceed from the assumption that only direct human contacts and cooperation can create an atmosphere of mutual trust, build a capital of confidence, where the resolutions being discussed within the OSCE will be based on principles germane to this organization. Also, none of its members must feel that they are being persecuted. On the contrary, every member country must be aware that its presence in the OSCE strengthens that country’s national security and international status. Every OSCE country must have an opportunity to develop its statehood as a participant in this general forum, along with facilitating the overall objectives of this organization. I support my colleague Lavrov’s view that we need further measures to enhance confidence in this organization. Therefore, on my part I will try to travel to OSCE member countries as much as I can for the duration of our chairmanship. It is good to start with a friendly country, such as Ukraine.

BETTER A CARROT THAN A STICK

Speaking of the system, this is one of the elements. What are the other elements on the road to improving the efficiency of this organization?

Many years have been spent looking for answers to this question. Here no success is possible without political will. We have had discussions in the EU about the Constitutional Agreement for several years. Now resolutions will be adopted by a majority of votes, except for especially important matters relating to the EU’s external relations and security. I have received proposals to the effect that the OSCE also has to adopt the method of passing decisions by a majority of votes. I believe I would be taking a very great risk if I proposed this to the OSCE. Naturally, we must consider our priorities and purposes for which we are using the political capital that exists within the OSCE. It should be understood that this organization is not likely to solve problems, like reductions of conventional weapons, the settlement of Kosovo’s status or frozen conflicts within a single year or to work out equal regulations relating to the OSCE’s third — human — dimension, and resolve matters pertaining to the monitoring of elections. Without such priorities there is spontaneous development, without anyone controlling the process. I guess the main point is that the incumbent chairman supports the concept of continuity and is trying to focus on topical problems and pressing issues as they emerge.

In October 2006 OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut told The Day that there is a very good chance of settling the Transdnistrian conflict within an acceptable period of time if all sides combine their efforts to adopt this settlement. Almost a year and a half have elapsed and the situation remains the same. Do you see any ways of solving the frozen conflicts in Transdnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh? Perhaps this requires pressure from the great powers and the European Union.

I think that it is always better to use positive methods of influence than pressure. The OSCE is the kind of organization that will soon find itself in a difficult situation if it conducts a policy based on sanctions. I haven’t fully familiarized myself with the details of these frozen conflicts. Yet even at this stage I would say that it’s best to approach them with a carrot, not a stick.

Although you haven’t studied the problems of these frozen conflicts at sufficient length, what does Helsinki see as a solution to the Transdnistrian problem? We know that your visit to Ukraine is in many ways linked with this problem.

Yes, one of the main objectives of my trip to Ukraine is to discuss this issue. I have a rather egotistical interest in, and reasons for, visiting Ukraine. Obviously, I need the assessments, views, and suggestions from the Ukrainian side in regard to the Transdnistrian conflict. Without a doubt, Ukraine knows more about it than Finland, so Ukraine’s experience, knowledge, and know-how are involved. We appreciate Ukraine’s efforts in resolving the Transdnistrian problem.

Finland isn’t likely to contribute anything essentially new to the deliberations of this problem. After this visit we will have to correlate our proposals with those of other countries — and I don’t mean just Finland’s stand on the matter. Any country presiding over this organization must take into account its interests and those of its members in general. I can only emphasize that at this stage it is too early to offer an exhaustive commentary on this issue.

Kosovo is one of the OSCE’s priorities, although you have said you doubt that the status of this region will be resolved this year. There is, however, the possibility that Kosovo will proclaim its independence and it will be recognized by the international community. Moscow continues to declare that if Kosovo is recognized, the international community will have to recognize the independence of such post-Soviet republics as Transdnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. To what extent can the Kosovo case apply to these unrecognized republics as well as to the Turkish republic in northern Cypress?

The Cypress issue is being discussed in the EU. There is a well-known argument that Kosovo is not an exceptional case, but that it can serve as a precedent. The ongoing discussions in the European Union indicate a desire to support this process, which can ease the situation. However, we are well aware that this envisages an international presence. Therefore, aggravation of the situation does not lead to chaos. In the course of this discussion most EU countries consider that the Western Balkans must be given prospects so that they can take part in the cooperation, which at the moment is headed by the EU.

OSCE PRINCIPLES AND A CREATIVE APPROACH

I beg your pardon, but your reply does not clarify to what extent the Kosovo case can apply to these unrecognized republics. I would like to hear your comment as a minister representing Finland, the country that currently chairs the OSCE.

I’m referring to discussions being held within the European Union, inasmuch as they coincide with our view on the matter. It is very difficult to say how much the resolution that will be passed by the EU will apply to other cases. The world would probably be a very comfortable place if the same resolution model could apply to other cases. Naturally, the presence of all sides is a necessary element. It is crucial to recognize the important role being played by Serbia. How we will be able to support Serbia, in what way, remains a complicated matter. For example, there is such an element in Serbia as EU membership. To reach this goal, the Serbs must answer the same criteria as the other EU members.

Don’t you think that the recognition of Kosovo threatens the system of collective security that was created in 1973, in the building of which President Urho Kekkonen of Finland took part?

The Final Act of 1975 was adopted in order to remove the boundary lines of the Cold War in Europe. After the collapse of Yugoslavia we discovered that we had to have other principles as well. For example, UN Resolution #1244, supplementing the OSCE’s principles, can be such a principle. I know the principles that were adopted in 1975, and Finland will try to act so as to keep them intact. Sometimes, however, it is necessary to make adjustments or use these principles creatively, depending on a given situation. In this case, it is likely to be a UN mandate or resolution.

DOUBLE STANDARD, TRUST, AND THE OSCE

Russia keeps criticizing the OSCE’s indispensable role, although it fails to honor its own commitments, first and foremost the Istanbul Agreement of 1999. Mr. Kanerva, as the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, how are you planning to build relations with Moscow?

Russia is playing an indispensable role in the OSCE. We cannot expect good results without political will on Russia’s part. That was why we launched a discussion with Russia last year to learn how it views these issues. I have a copy of a list of questions that Russia believes must be resolved. This applies to other countries as well. I know about Russia’s headaches caused by the OSCE. I see no alternative but to sit down at the negotiating table with Russia and solve these problems. We have good cooperation and contacts with Russia, even though we do not always have the same views on all matters. I want Russia’s opinion always to be taken into consideration, although it must not prevail over those of OSCE members. I think it is very important for us to return to election monitoring in Russia, come March 2008. Since Russia says that it is a democratic country, the OSCE is a forum where Russia can adequately demonstrate this. Therefore, we are calling on Russia to invite observers for the elections. Here it is necessary to understand the view of the other side. We cannot just say that the Russians are always wrong or always right. It is always important to have a dialog, a discussion, and comprehend the other side’s position.

How do you understand Russia’s withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)? Isn’t this move a threat to Finland and the European Union?

We must, of course, act so as to ensure that all signatories to this treaty observe it. I would say that the CFE is one of the main structural elements of the OSCE. It is very important to make it possible for us to return to a situation in which all signatory countries adhere to its terms and conditions. We must, nevertheless, adopt a realistic approach and realize that the methods that the OSCE has at its disposal are not enough to resolve the issue of Russia’s moratorium on the CFE.

Can Russia’s withdrawal from this treaty be viewed as a threat?

As I have already said, Finland believes that it is very important to return to the full implementation of the CFE. This treaty plays an important role within the framework of enhancing measures aimed at maintaining trust.

Even official Kyiv has declared that Russia’s withdrawal from this treaty poses a threat to Ukraine. Perhaps it is worth calling a spade a spade in the dialog with Russia. Perhaps Finland should tell its big neighbor that its withdrawal from the CFE is a threat?

Well, here the choice of words is probably not the point. We are prepared and will continue to be prepared to explain to Moscow the importance of Russia’s rejoining the treaty. Naturally, this hope concerns all the signatories. I understand the reasons for your question. We share Ukraine’s opinion on the consequences of Russia’s withdrawal from this treaty.

GEORGIA TAKES A NEW STEP TOWARD DEMOCRACY

During the December parliamentary elections in Russia there were differing opinions of the proper role of OSCE observers monitoring elections in post- Soviet countries. What OSCE structure will monitor Russia’s presidential elections in early March?

Both OSCE structures: the Parliamentary Assembly and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. So far there are no invitations, but I believe that monitoring the presidential elections in accordance with set rules will serve Russia’s interest — by this I mean having long-term observers and those assigned for the duration of the election campaign.

Suppose the Russian government does not invite the OBSCE to send observers. How much will this influence your assessment of Russia as a democracy-building country?

I would like to tell Russia’s representatives that the best way for them to prove to the other OSCE members that they are building a democracy would be by keeping the doors open for observers.

Would you care to comment on the recent presidential elections in Georgia? I have just received a preliminary report on the elections [the original Ukrainian-language article was published on Jan. 10 — Ed.]. The remarks mostly concern the possibilities of a parity approach of the ruling and opposition parties during the elections. There are technical shortcomings. Some principles are unacceptable from Finland’s point of view. On the other hand, certain critical remarks made during the course of the presidential campaign are made in other countries as well. My impression is that Georgia has taken another step in the direction of democracy.

Experts continue to debate Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of the OSCE after the recent parliament elections, where only one party made it to parliament. What do you think?

I understand the motivation behind this question. However, I would like to call for understanding its antithesis. Is there a more effective method — or a training camp of sorts — for Kazakhstan to be properly educated than the one we have chosen, allowing Astana to assume such a great responsibility? We know full well that the situation will be complicated. Since a resolution was made within the OSCE framework, we will help Kazakhstan in every way. I would say that this means raising Kazakhstan’s bar high.

THE HOLODOMOR AND LIPPONEN’S ADVICE

Finland was not among the countries that signed a joint statement on the Holodomor in Ukraine (1932-33) during the meeting of the OSCE Council of Ministers in Madrid, although your neighbor Sweden did. Why didn’t Finland sign this document?

This document has never been placed on my desk. This issue is not among those that I have to decide on. I apologize for our having seemingly overlooked this matter.

Is the Finnish parliament prepared to recognize the Holodomor as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people? Will the executive branch facilitate this recognition?

I must familiarize myself with the available criteria. Of course, it is important to uphold justice. I understand this necessity and the pressure being brought to bear. In solving this problem, it is always necessary to have a situation in which all historical facts are clearly stated.

Don’t you think that the way the Finnish government is acting fits the recipe of the ex-Finnish Prime Minister and Speaker Paavo Lipponen, who recently advised Estonia to refrain from cooperating with Georgia or Ukraine if this will damage Tallinn’s relations with Moscow? How much weight does the Russian factor have in Finland, forcing your country to be cautious about cooperating with countries if this cooperation is not to Russia’s liking?

I have high praise for Mr. Lipponen, who is an experienced politician. It is very difficult to understand what could stand in the way of such good understanding and cooperation among European countries. I have repeatedly talked about the need to strengthen trust. For example, I have personally been seeking to facilitate contacts between Finland and Ukraine. It is very hard to think of arguments to the contrary, what with our trying to develop relations with Ukraine and strengthening understanding between our countries. That kind of approach would damage our contacts and interests. If Finland and Ukraine continue their bona fide cooperation, it will by no means imply anything like Russia’s isolation. In my opinion, it is very important not to drive wedges between countries in the OSCE. We are living in a world where mutual dependence among countries is increasingly apparent. Much depends on politicians to make our contacts effective and functional.

“WE WANT TO BE AMONG THE PLAYERS WHO ARE GENERATING SECURITY”

You will probably agree that NATO is also an effective organization. The Finnish media have announced that a report on NATO will be prepared by the end of the year, under the foreign ministry’s supervision. Could you outline any possible consequences of NATO membership or non- membership for Finland?

First, it should be noted that a decision on Finland’s joining or staying out of NATO will be made proceeding from our own security needs. Naturally, we are approaching this issue with an eye to progress and the situation in neighboring regions. However, all the keys to this decision are in our hands. The report you mentioned is not meant to figure out whether Finland needs NATO membership. This report does not contain any final recommendations. It offers more information on the consequences of our decision.

Judging by the available information, can you assess the opportunities that NATO membership or non-membership would offer in view of the world’s new challenges and threats?

Finland is not going to apply for NATO membership in the nearest future. On the other hand, we are supporting and developing our Partnership for Peace program. We are contributing a lot of financial and human resources to our ability to participate in the resolution of crises. For example, we are assessing Finland’s participation in the European Union’s Battlegroup and NATO’s quick deployment forces. Personally, I see no obstacles for Finland to start such cooperation even this year. We want to be among the players who are generating security. Partnership for Peace currently provides good prerequisites and opportunities to this end. This fall we will submit a study to parliament, which will contain our views on the threats and challenges to our security. Our political apparatus will also assess the changes to our status from the standpoint of security.

Your answer implies that the issue of NATO membership remains open for debate by the current government?

So far, the government of Finland has made no decision indicative of a desire to apply for NATO membership. The government’s program is keeping the doors open here.

ONE SIDE OF THE EU ENERGY POLICY COIN

Finland is the only Baltic country not boycotting the construction of the North European gas pipeline, known as North Stream. This project is being called into question by many Baltic countries from the standpoint of ecology. Why is the Finnish government supporting it even before the ecological consequences of its construction on the bottom of the Baltic Sea have been studied by experts?

Resolving issues pertaining to ecological safety are a precondition for Finland’s approval of this project. First, we must examine ecological experts’ findings and then make our final decision. Second, it would be strange if Finland opposed this project in principle. After all, it was a Finnish initiative.

But what about the EU’s uniform energy policy, which is supported by Finland? Some EU members, including Poland and the Baltic countries, are against this project.

The EU’s energy policy is an excellent example of how the European community of nations can play a leading role on the global level. Climate change is a good answer. However, the other side of this coin is that I do not want to maintain any illusions. Energy policy, energy supplies, and decisions made in the power engineering sphere are largely within the national jurisdiction of EU member countries. North Stream is a good example. Here the decision of the German company is what really matters, and the European Union as such is not playing any role in this project. As for the EU’s energy policy, it is anything but homogeneous.