Partnership and Realism in Place of Advocacy
“I wish Ukraine saw Germany as the kind of partner it wants to have,” said Matthias Kleinert, chairman of the board of Daimler Chrysler, at the international conference, Ukraine after the Elections, organized by the German Society for Eastern European Studies in Berlin. Christof ZЪpel, State Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, outlined two guidelines for deepening Ukrainian-EU cooperation: (a) security and (b) the economy. The conference in Berlin served as further evidence of EU attention gradually returning to Ukraine, primarily on the part of Germany, perhaps the only EU country following such a political course. From those taking the floor, anteroom talk, and political consultations it followed that positive shifts, albeit small, were underway. However, after losing so many chances, even regaining our original position was not easy. According to Oleksandr Chaly, state secretary of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, Ukraine declared some changes in its official stand. As before, Kyiv is convinced that Ukrainian-German relations, by their very essence, are not subject to any political conjuncture so the outcome of the parliamentary elections cannot influence them in any way. Ukraine, however, would now like to use the notion of advocate because, as Mr. Chaly put it, “an advocate helps in return for money” [in Ukr., advokat means both advocate and lawyer].
As for cooperation in terms of security, its boundary lines are being determined after the NSDC resolution to work out a strategy aimed at Ukraine’s accession to the NATO-based security system. NATO and Russia signed the Rome Declaration, instituting the NATO-Russia Council, fundamentally altering West-East relations. This could offer Ukraine fresh opportunities, especially in view of two aspects. The security issue, so very sensitive for further European development, has been dealt with in a different vein after the September 11 terrorist attacks. It was noted during the conference that there is no coincidence about practically all Bundeswehr deliveries to Afghanistan being made by Ukrainian aviation as part of the antiterrorist coalition. Yet there is the other aspect of EU doing its utmost to block the influx of illegal immigrants, enforcing tougher border and other controls. Ukraine is led to understand that much depends on how well it can keep its frontiers secure with EU expanding. In fact, this is also a matter of cooperation.
With the economy many point to Ukraine as a venue of vast opportunities. German businessmen are reluctant to discuss their problems in Ukraine and deny that the degree of attention being paid Ukraine directly or otherwise depends on its relationship with Russia, or that the attention being enjoyed by Russia is disproportionately large compared to German business activities in Ukraine (a lot was said late last year about German business being close to an investment breakthrough in Russia). Per Fischer, member of the board of Commerzbank (one of the most influential in Germany) and of the German-Ukrainian Forum, insists it is safe to assume that Ukraine takes a “solid and sound second place” in German business ratings and that this is a good index, because Russia is simply larger than Ukraine. In addition, German businesses are not as active in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as those from other countries, because they are convinced that quick energy investment payback is not the main thing. Ukraine’s investment attractiveness increases with EU expansion, they maintain, adding, however, that Ukraine is not as yet prepared for large-scale German direct investment; it lacks the legal framework and infrastructure, its banking system is weak, so much so that it cannot adequately handle potential investors. Perhaps these issues should be discussed by the leaders of the German-Ukrainian and Ukrainian-German Forums (the latter is presided over by Premier Anatoly Kinakh). Prime Minister Kinakh could not be present at the German-Ukrainian Forum and the conference. The German side received his absence with understanding but not the absence of the Ukrainian-German Forum leadership (the latter was represented by Vice Premier Volodymyr Semynozhenko who is not as yet a member of the UGF leadership). In fact, their absence made one wonder if Ukraine was actually interested in a stable cooperation, let alone showing elementary respect. Of course, the polite Germans kept their doubts to themselves. Meanwhile, the 130 UGF members included Daimler-Chrysler, Commerzbank, other powerful corporations, universities, associations, noted politicians who might well have become part of the Ukrainian lobby in Germany, especially now that there is a stated interest in contacts with regions and cities; also, in transport corridors. Experts say industrial cooperation still has prospects, particularly in the military sphere. “We are prepared for serious military-technological cooperation with Germany,” said Ukrainian Ambassador Anatoly Ponomarenko but did not specify further. The German state of Saxony-Anhalt is looking for partners in Ukraine. A public forum called Germany and Ukraine in Europe is planned to be held this fall, after the Bundestag elections, said the newly re-elected chairman of the German-Ukrainian Forum Kleinert. In a word, the Ukrainian lobby apparently depends largely on the Ukrainian attitude.
“It is true that Ukraine was long underestimated in Europe,” admitted Rita SЯssmut, chairperson of the Society for Eastern European Studies and former Speaker of the Bundestag, adding that “Ukraine is an extremely important partner among countries that are not EU candidate members.”
State Minister ZЪpel called for a realistic stand and for making “true partnership agreements.” Bohdan Havrylyshyn, the Ukrainian premier’s adviser, is convinced that “Ukraine will become a WTO member and an associate member of the EU within five years.”
Helmut Lippelt, Bundestag deputy of the Green Party (represented in government by Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer), believes that an “agreement on association with Ukraine would be a perfectly natural occurrence,” but he also predicts that it is going to be a long road; “we forget that Europe must also change and that the EU expansion process will not be without small catastrophes.” He proposes finding “a stand in between, directed toward Ukraine.”
Roughly the same views are expressed by politicians representing the current CDU/CSU Right- Center opposition (with a fair chance of winning the next elections). Hence, the leading German political forces outwardly take a similar stand toward Ukraine: owing to the need to shift the accents and character of German-Ukrainian relations and a desire to meet this country halfway, retaining the freedom of maneuver and not assuming any clear obligations (not at this stage in any case). Ukrainian diplomatic sources insist that coming to terms with the German Right over Ukraine’s European prospects could be even easier than with the current administration. In fact, there are indications of German diplomats seriously considering official support of Ukraine’s aspired associate EU membership. The latest consultations on the issue proved in Kyiv’s favor.
Germany has arrived at the conclusion that isolation bears no fruit, The Day was told by a German expert, and so they are looking for new approaches and new content of the bilateral relationship. But this will not be easy.
