Prague Autumn
The NATO summit in Prague, about which so much has been written and spoken in view of its strategic importance to the European and Euro-Atlantic future, is approaching. In less than a month, seven countries are expected to be invited to join the North Atlantic alliance. Among these countries will be Romania and Slovakia bordering on Ukraine, and three Baltic states starting on the road to the general European space from that same Soviet Union as did Ukraine. The Prague summit has been correctly regarded as an opportunity for Ukraine to simply make a bid for its own future. Shortly after the summit, EU admission talks will be completed with many countries joining NATO in 1999, in Washington, and expected to join it in 2002, in Prague. Yevhen Marchuk, secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, said at the parliamentary hearings on Ukrainian-NATO relations that almost all Eastern European countries and most CIS member states have discarded the principle of self-sufficient national security. Ukraine is thus placed between two military and political alliances: an expanded NATO and the CIS collective security agreement. Anton Buteiko, former deputy minister of foreign affairs and currently Ukrainian ambassador to Romania, noted that there is not a single provision of Ukrainian law forbidding this country to join NATO.
DISPOSITION
Nothing is clear about Ukraine’s participation in the Prague summit on November 21-22. No one doubts the validity of the invitation agreed upon by the member foreign ministers in May. Yet there is no agreement among the NATO countries as to the level of Ukraine’s representation and, accordingly, the summit’s results for Ukrainian-NATO relations.
Not only Kyiv, but also diplomats from certain member states are convinced that, whatever the situation, the summit’s level (e.g., NATO-Ukraine) should not be made any lower, because this would not benefit the relationship as such. There is an undisguised desire not to see Leonid Kuchma among the summit’s guests. This desire is hard to explain and thus remains officially unspoken. Yet none of the NATO envoys in Kyiv have worked out official recommendations for their governments, nor have any of the member countries’ ambassadors to NATO chosen a specific summit program for Ukraine. It is strongly believed in diplomatic circles and within the alliance that the decision of the member countries’ envoys will depend on the findings of the US- British expert team on the Kolchuga case, to be made public shortly. Ihor Kharchenko, deputy state secretary of the Ukrainian foreign ministry, speaking at the parliamentary hearings on Ukrainian-NATO relations, was perhaps the first government official to mention complications. The diplomat specified, however, that Ukraine regards them as temporary — after all, Ukraine remains important for European security and NATO is too important a strategic partner to vent emotions. One of the diplomats favoring Ukraine admitted that the Kolchuga scandal has badly damaged its reputation, whatever the outcome of the investigation.
There is another nuance mentioned by Leonid Kuchma in Skopje recently. Ukraine’s express desire to move toward NATO has not as yet received what official Kyiv describes as an adequate response. Perhaps international experts, saying that this response ought to be expected from painstaking efforts by both NATO and Ukraine, rather than the Prague summit, were right.
The major political results expected from the NATO-Ukraine summit is a decision launching an intensive dialog (regarded as the first stage in the process of admitting a country that has stated its desire to join the alliance) and approval of an action plan (not membership action plan, but a specific bilateral action program). Apparently, the Kolchuga affair is not likely to have a strong damaging effect at this stage, because the point in question is specific cooperation aimed at achieving international security. NATO officials still avoid straight answers to straight questions: if NATO doors are supposed to be kept open, why not openly discuss the possibility of Ukraine’s eventual admission? In other words, there are a number of reasons due to which another warm “Prague fall” is unlikely, although certain positive steps will be taken, of course.
EU Secretary General Javier Solana spoke at the Warsaw conference about the problems of Ukraine’s European integration, noting that Ukraine’s buying a ticket and boarding the train to Europe is not the point. The point is that this train is changing. The same is true of NATO. After the NATO-Russia summit in Rome it became perfectly clear that the level of Ukrainian-NATO relations existing even a year ago could no longer meet even the minimum requirements — if one were to treat the indivisibility of security seriously. Much effort will have to exerted to establish the understanding that Ukraine can be a member on a par with the United States, France, and Russia.
DELAYED INTEGRATION
Everything that has happened after NSDC came up with a resolution (May 23) on Ukraine’s movement along the road of European integration, including the possibility of NATO membership, is evidence that the matter has been transferred from the diplomatic to the general political domain. Even at the start of the year we heard that Ukrainian- NATO relations, unlike European integration, depended by 90% on diplomatic efforts and defense compatibility. Eventually, first NATO officials and then Ukrainian functionaries have shifted the emphasis to deep inner transformations as a prerequisite. “Today, in order to join NATO, it is not enough to reform one’s armed forces, adjusting them to the NATO system,” Yevhen Marchuk pointed out at the parliamentary hearings. “Today, the NATO membership action plan envisages five sectors where requirements are imposed on the candidate member; in addition to defense, market, and an effective economy, it includes freedom of expression, media, and human rights. In other words, the alliance considerably enhances the requirements for candidate members, embracing a truly democratic society and advanced institutions of a civil society. The process [of admission] will thus be considerably more complicated. Unless the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian citizens support this process, NATO will not even seriously consider the possibility of this country’s membership. NATO is joined not by politicians or heads of states, but by the peoples of those countries that make up their mind to become members. In order to place this matter on a pragmatic footing in the future, we must undergo a complex process of inner transformations, so we can meet not just European standards but those existing in democratic societies; most importantly, it is necessary to provide conditions that would forever exclude the very possibility of returning to the past. Future NATO members must be extremely predictable for an alliance of this caliber. The inner development and evolution of their societies must be such as to forever bar access to power to political forces that could make a 180. Turn in their countries’ development. I am convinced that this process — the evolution of our society — is far from perfect.”
Mr. Marchuk believes that Ukraine’s movement toward NATO cannot be directed against Russia. Moreover, “Russia has shown us an example by its spectacular breakthrough in its relationship with NATO; we will have to make much effort to reach that level of cooperation.” Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn spoke during the hearings about the need to fundamentally change the public mentality to meet the universally accepted democratic standards.
After the May 23 NSDC resolution, when preparing for the visit to Ukraine of NATO Secretary General George Robertson, and at the parliamentary hearings, a great deal was said about the necessity of deep inner transformations — not so much in the defense sphere as in the whole of society — as well as the need to secure democratic standards, human rights, and conduct a national policy aimed at further democratizing Ukrainian society in order to consolidate it and achieve public support of NATO membership (at present, various sources point to 30-32% of the population favoring the idea).
The parliamentary hearings were aimed primarily at demonstrating that Verkhovna Rada will make the next move now that the executive has had its say in the matter. Now is the time to adopt an updated version of Ukrainian foreign policy principles, a new concept of national security, and a new military doctrine. This means passing a number of laws to provide for a radical military reform, to make the economy stable, understandable, and truly market-oriented; this will certainly have a positive effect on the standard of living.
The seriousness of Ukraine’s intention has not as yet been confirmed by well-done homework. At the parliamentary hearings, five months after the NSDC resolution, they were still discussing what to do. On the other hand, there were inevitable objections to Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn and European Integration Committee Chairman Borys Tarasiuk who said that there are all preconditions for the parliament to become a true venue of Ukraine’s European integration. A degree of evolution in Mr. Lytvyn’s views on the matter makes it possible to assume that he will try to do his part of the job of uniting lawmakers. The problem, however, is that those taking part in the hearings had long realized the need for Ukraine’s complete European integration, as well as those that would never change their negative attitude (e.g., the Communists with their conic opera protest). Tymoshenko’s people did not take the floor. The Socialists did not use the opportunity to present a clearly formulated program. It is too early to discuss Verkhovna Rada rallying round the Euro- Atlantic idea or the consolidation of society, for people, like some of the deputies, simply know too little about the subject. This is largely the fault of the nation’s information policy which is mostly aimed at different objectives. On the other hand, precisely this subject causes no differences between the majority and Our Ukraine. All walks of Ukrainian life out cry for modernization and practically all non-Left factions of Verkhovna Rada agree with this. These are positive aspects, as well as the fact that the future Ukrainian elite — college and university students — are mostly EU — and NATO-oriented.
According to Speaker Lytvyn, the parliament will have to adopt a revised draft of the recommendations to the president and cabinet, concerning Euro-Atlantic integration. Borys Andresiuk, first deputy chairman of the parliament’s national security and defense committee, promised The Day that the budget would have expense items to provide for military reform, etc. (until now the government maintained that no budget money could be spent on Ukraine’s membership of international associations, which sounds quite absurd). Premier Kinakh, speaking at the hearings, promised that the cabinet would pay special attention to matters concerning Euro-Atlantic integration and military policy, and that the government, jointly with the defense ministry, would publish a white paper on the development of the defense policy (as was done in Georgia a year ago — Author). Logically, something like this should have been done some five years ago.
