The price of freedom

On December 1 we mark the 25th anniversary of Ukrainian independence. As is known, a quarter of a century ago this day, the first nationwide elections of the president of Ukraine and a referendum on independence were held. The latter offered only one question: “Do you support the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine?” The act’s text was printed right on the ballot paper. The referendum’s results are well known and have never been seriously questioned, as far as likely rigging is concerned. The turnout was 84.2 percent of the eligible voters, or 31,892,000 people, 90.3 percent of whom voted for independence. It is interesting to recall the outcome of voting in Ukraine’s regions. In Crimea and Sevastopol, 54.2 and 57.1 percent of the voters, respectively, opted for independence, and Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts each showed 83.9 percent of those who answered the referendum’s question positively. It looks great now, but, at that time, these were the worst results after Crimea and Sevastopol. Then came Odesa, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv oblasts with 85.4, 86.3, and 89.5 percent, respectively. In all the other regions, more than 90 percent of the voters favored independence. These results were quite predictable.

Let us recall the time the referendum was held. There was still euphoria over the almost bloodless suppression of the August putsch and the establishment of what seemed to be full democracy. Russia had already announced the upcoming price liberalization, which meant in practice robbery of the bulk of the population and a sharp drop in the living standards of Russians. Ukrainians naively hoped that this cup would pass from them. And there seemed to be reasons to think so. In the Soviet era, Ukraine was supplied with foodstuffs and a number of industrial consumer goods much better than the vast majority of the Russian regions, except for Moscow and Leningrad.

The well-developed Ukrainian agriculture supplied not only Ukraine, but also a number of other union republics with food. Most Ukrainians hoped to keep their relative prosperity intact and were striving to keep clear of Russia, where economic chaos had been on the rise in the last few months of 1991. It is no wonder that independence was supported not only in the regions of Central and Western Ukraine, where supporters of restoring Ukrainian statehood, who had formed the Popular Movement of Ukraine (Rukh), wielded a great deal of clout, but also in the regions of Eastern Ukraine, where the Russian-speaking population was prevalent, and in the “Soviet preserve” of Crimea.

Only a few specialists were aware that Ukraine’s relative prosperity in the Soviet era was based on petrodollars, and the main deposits of oil and gas still remained in Russia. They knew that independent Ukraine, almost deprived of the energy resources that can be converted into hard currency, would have a hard time at least in the first years. But there was still a hope at the time that Russia and Ukraine would still maintain friendly relations, for it was a democratic Russia, the Russia of Yeltsin and Burbulis, Starovoitova and Travkin, Gaidar and Chubais. They were all considered democrats at the time, but far from all of them turned out to be such in reality. Who could foresee, for example, the “liberal imperialism” of Chubais? And the Russian politicians who still adhered to democratic ideals were gradually ousted from the government and some, such as Starovoitova, were even physically liquidated.

Maybe, far from every Ukrainian remembers today that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine issued an appeal to the people on the eve of the referendum, which said among other things: “Today, not to support independence means nothing but to support dependence. This raises the question: dependence on whom? Where is the country we are eager to depend on and, therefore, to work for? As is known, none of the neighboring and other countries of the world intends to declare Ukraine dependent on it. This would be absurd.

“So there is no alternative to independence.

“Only an independent Ukraine will be able to form any interstate associations with its neighbors – first of all, with Russia which is the closest to us.”

This appeal still sounds very topical, except for the last phrase – about closeness with Russia. Today, it is being read with a bitter and tragic irony. Who could possibly think in December 1991 that fewer than 23 years later Ukraine would have to fight against Russia, that Russia would tear away Crimea and try to bring its puppets to power in the Donbas by use of force in order to tie up Kyiv to Moscow forever? It is not democratic Russia that is fighting against Ukraine – it is the Russia of Putin and Medvedev, Sechin and Miller, Shoygu and Lavrov who have nothing in common with democracy. But the main question Ukrainians are asking themselves today is: why did it happen so? Why did Ukraine lose a part of its territory in the 23rd year of independence and was drawn into an undeclared hybrid war with the neighboring state that was considered, at the moment of independence proclamation, as a friend and ally in the struggle against the USSR center in the person of Mikhail Gorbachev? To clarify this, we will have to make a brief excursus into history.

Throughout almost the entire period of its existence as an independent state, Ukraine has remained heavily dependent on Russia – not only economically, but also politically and culturally. Only the first years were an exception, when Leonid Kravchuk was elected president on the day of the independence referendum and very much was done to strengthen Ukraine’s political independence and develop the Ukrainian language and culture – in comparison with the Soviet-era situation. From Kuchma onwards, dependence on Moscow was increasing.

The Orange Revolution was a short pause – only until Yushchenko and Tymoshenko began a bitter face-off. Playing on the president-premier contradictions, Moscow managed in fact to paralyze Ukraine’s foreign and domestic policy and achieve, in most cases, its goals in Kyiv. And the Yanukovych presidency needs no comment at all. But now, after the Revolution of Dignity, in spite of all the difficulties and losses, the remaining high level of corruption, complete ineffectiveness of the judicial system, and clearly insufficient effectiveness of the political system, Ukraine has become a state really independent of Russia.

Ukrainians are at last aware of being Ukrainian and will never give away the independence they won in Donbas battles no matter who the president is. And, if there is a normal political situation in the country, independence opens up new prospects for socioeconomic development. All you have to do, to begin with, is establish at least elementary order in your house.