The Price of Strategic Partnership
The campaign began threateningly. Beaming with satisfaction, Russian gov ernment representatives went about making public announcements to the effect that there already are a number of routes for its natural gas export pipeline, which will without doubt bypass Ukrainian territory, that they have begun negotiations with Ruhrgas, Gaz de France as well as Italian and Spanish companies, which, being outraged by the alleged thefts by Ukrainians, wholeheartedly support the Russian stand, and that the Polish and Slovak governments are all for the gas pipeline being laid through their countries, bypassing Ukraine.
The bravado march was at first somewhat spoiled by the Poles, who declared they would not tolerate Russia’s implementing its plans at the expense of Ukraine. Slovak Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda at the New York Millennium Summit in fact told Leonid Kuchma the same thing: that Slovakia will not decide anything which could potentially be detrimental to Ukraine’s interests and will consult Warsaw on the matter of gas pipelines. This has not been broadcast by the Russian mass media, since, it turns out, for the present their trump has been beaten. Moreover, it was not beaten by Ukraine, for it is highly improbable that Warsaw and Bratislava simply out of fraternal feelings agreed to back Ukraine, sacrificing considerable revenues from gas transit (Russia pays and promises to pay them a lot more for transit than Ukraine can ever hope for and does not view this as robbery). This could not have been achieved without the West’s detailed counsel. Incidentally, French diplomats have not confirmed Russian statements about the losses it has incurred as a result of unsanctioned gas consumption by Ukraine.
Thus, the bravado march has acquired the features of typical political bluff (although one would be mistaken to say that the Russians are altogether wrong). This impression can be confirmed only by experts: in case Russia executes the project of a gas pipeline going through the Karelian swamps and Baltic states, the result of this will be the price of gas rising higher than that of Norwegian gas, which is of higher quality and this makes the Russian product noncompetitive.
The gas bluff coupled with the friction over language, constant political pressure, and reluctance to liberalize the trade regime create an indelible impression: Moscow, having analyzed its current capabilities, simply views Ukraine as an adversary. From the logical point of view everything comes down to this. The war in Chechnya is far from being won, and the last year’s triumphal prognoses are a more and more distant hope. The Kursk catastrophe and Ostankino fire, when President Putin could not help but admit that his country is in dire straits, do not contribute to the optimism of Russia’s man in the street. As long ago as last year’s anti-Yugoslav NATO operation Russia could easily direct their indignant criticism toward the external enemy, NATO. Now there is no such opportunity. Moscow is dependent on the West’s financial support and on its willingness to cooperate. Ukraine is to blame simply because it exists. And, faced with the same problems, it cannot react adequately. In some way it can even become a target itself. The more so that it has a distinct Russian lobby, often with access to the levers of power. Thus, there is always the chance to bluff at the right time and get something out of it.
Misfires like the Polish and Slovak reaction obviously were not foreseen, just like the fact that not only Russia has interests in Ukraine. Of course, it is highly unfortunate that the destiny of Ukraine is not shaped by Ukraine itself, but for this in the main Ukraine has no one to blame but itself.
To fear or not to fear Russia — there is no alternative to the question whether there is a need for friendship and cooperation with Russia. To fear it is not only unnecessary, but is unpardonable. One should not steal gas or beg for it at a discount reduced to the minimum. We cannot obey rules dictated to us not only because of the chance of losing our statehood, but simply out of self-respect. Only the strong and the self-confident have their arguments listened to. Especially in Moscow.
