Problem of the Year 2000

'WE WANT TO KNOW WHAT TO EXPECT
IN UKRAINE COME
JANUARY 1, 2000'

In late February, the US Chamber of Commerce held a seminar on The 2000 Problem in Ukraine attended by representatives of US airlines in Ukraine, experts, and members of a commission attached to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

Illia KUTSENKO (Cabinet's Board of Experts): "To solve this problem we must combine our efforts and we lack the time, financial resources, and uniform methods."

Oleksandr Baranov, Chairman of the 2000 Problem Commission, Director General of the State Informatization Agency: "The 2000 problem has been existence long enough. We analyzed it and proposed a special commission. Tentative estimates point to over 10,000 data processing systems in Ukraine, many of which are susceptible to this problem. Premier Pustovoitenko instructed us to locate the most vulnerable points. We are working on it and will have results in about two months. We don't have enough money and equipment. Officials at all levels must be made aware of this problem as not a global but local one in the first place, one that concerns each and everyone of them."

Volodymyr FURASHEV, Secretary of the 2000 Problem Commission: "The government is very seriously concerned about this problem. Work in this direction has been underway for the past 2-3 years. Over this period we have studied measures taken elsewhere in the world. The Prime Minister made it perfectly clear that if worst comes to worst our most vulnerable points will be secured: transport, power industry, and the social sector. The Ukrainian mentality is such that we count on our own resources in the first place."

Serhiy PARASHYN, head of and Twenty-First Century Power Industry and Information Sciences International Center and former manager of Chornobyl nuclear plant: "I am thunderstruck by the scope of this problem. In terms of labor intensiveness it is considerably bigger than the Chornobyl one. Yet the problem itself is simple; all it takes is correcting the date format, but this involves a mind-boggling number of interrelated data processing and control systems. After that these systems must be tested with jeweler's precision. A complex made up of 100 linked computers will be out of service if even a single computer goes wrong. What really scares me, however, is complaisance. We are lagging behind in every respect. Other countries' experience shows that finding a truly effective solution to this problems takes at least two years. Here the situation is aggravated by the fact that a great many first rate Ukrainian programmers have left Ukraine for good. Managers in the vast majority of organizations have no idea about the problem. The government commission was set up ten days ago, causing no media comment.

"The main thing is to be aware of the fact that this is not a technical but organizational problem. An expert estimate has it that we need at least Hr 140 million, and we need it in half a year."

Serhiy RACHYNSKY, Computer World Kyiv magazine: "There are three groups of bureaucrats involved in coping with this problem. The first group consists of managers of certain organizations. They need to know about a systematic approach to the problem and they must decide on the work to be done. And more often than not these people don't know what they're doing. The second group represents middle management; they know about the problem, but have to wait for instructions from superiors. The third group is made up of computer experts. They know everything there is to know about the problem; they also know how to solve the problem technically, but they cannot organize complex works, not even at their own firms, let alone an industry or the entire country. We are planning to develop a web-site containing all relevant data available."

Neil GLENNY, World Bank specialist: "My job is to assess all possible risks in Ukraine after the 2000 computer effect. I was flabbergasted to learn that so few people know about the problem in Ukraine. In the West we make arrangements well in advance, as a rule, not at the last moment. There is something I would like to emphasize in particular. You practice an approach whereby every expert must do his job well and everything will be fine. Our approach in the West is different: there is strict public monitoring of how everyone does what job. Another difference in our approaches to the 2000 problem is that it is considered a most important administrative priority in the West. In Ukraine, it is generally regarded as technical. Another thing worrying me is that I haven't seen any contingency planning. In Ukraine you often say that a given problem can't be solved quickly for want of money. Let me tell you: even if you have enough money things have to be done on time."

When asked by The Day why the US Chamber of Commerce organized the 2000 problem seminar in Ukraine, Emmy GENGLER, seminar coordinator, chair of the Chamber's Informatization Technologies and Telecommunications Committee, replied, "We want to know what to expect in Ukraine come January 1, 2000. We also want to help you solve this problem, relying on US and other developed countries' experience."

The Day's next question was, "Seminar participants have often mentioned lack of funds. Yet the Cabinet decided to allocate Hr 12 million for the acquisition of a tomograph for the Cabinet's polyclinic. This amount is almost one-tenth of 140 million needed to solve the problem and the decision was made February 26, shortly before the seminar. Is the government fully aware of the 2000 problem?"

To this Oleksandr Baranov replied that purchasing the tomograph was a scheduled transaction and assured that the government is fully aware of the problem. Volodymyr Furashev was surprised to hear about 140 million, saying the exact amount could be cited only after summing up preliminary work estimates. When asked about how soon such estimates would be available, he stressed that expecting any findings before March 1 was unrealistic, and that March 20 sounded more like it.

Among the suggestions voiced at the seminar this author would single out the one made by Djois SRONIPAH of Microsoft Corporation about uniting the efforts of computer experts in private companies to correct programs whose authors emigrated from Ukraine and supplied by firms that are no longer in existence.

However, the most intriguing proposal was about President Kuchma spending half his campaign time on collecting data on the 2000 problem and half his campaign funds on payments to programmers struggling to solve it.

(This author would like to thank the organizers of the Power Industry and Information Sciences in the Twenty-First Century conference for data, and Ms. Svitlana Symonenko for her kind invitation to the seminar.)