QUESTION OF THE DAY
Mykhailo POHREBYNSKY, Director of the Kyiv Center for Political Research and the Conflicts Studies:
I believe that the major conclusion is that political reform can be implemented in Ukraine. A year ago, there were too many skeptics and really no the representatives of the political class who believed that Ukraine could ever have a government which represents a majority in parliament or that there could be a majority in parliament at all. Today, we do have a majority in the legislative body, and the government is a political one although not based on a parliamentary majority. Given time, we will attain both these goals. It has finally become clear that Ukraine is making progress on the path of political reform, and the outline of the reform has become more or less clear. I believe, this is the basic conclusion.
Volodymyr POLOKHALO, political scientist, editor-in-chief, Political Thought (Ukraine’s leading political science journal) :
In my opinion, this year is no different from past ones. The issue is not to what extent the President has fulfilled or failed to attain his program’s goals. As to the West’s reaction to political developments in Ukraine, those basic contradictions, features, and trends, which, in the opinion of Western experts, were typical of the Ukrainian political scene prior to the elections, remain. Moreover, the internal political struggle and that of Ukrainian oligarchs for influence is intensifying. And although the president has shown a certain measure of interest in weakening the positions of Ukrainian oligarchs, whom he dubbed clans in his inaugural address, he has added little to his willingness to force them out of politics in general. I believe there is a lack of political resources in Ukraine to go further with democratic changes. In addition, (and this is the view of independent observers — experts of the European Union, OSCE, and Western mass media) there are noticeable deviations from democratic standards in our political practices, both at the national and local levels. The distance between politics and law is shrinking, and Ukraine’s political environment is becoming more homogeneous. The mechanisms of political responsibility have not established themselves as innate features of our state. The amount of distrust Ukrainians have for their government has risen. There are no tangible possibilities for constructive cooperation of the government with the public. This is why the public opinion polls reflect the distance existing between Ukrainians and their government.
If we speak about our strategic European choice, as described by the president in his inaugural address, recent events provide evidence that Ukraine is losing ground in European politics. One might even observe a certain growth of isolation from the common processes going on in Europe. On the other hand, Russia’s pragmatic approach to Ukraine has become more obvious. With Russia’s hard-liners getting the upper hand in political decision-making, it is natural that their interests regarding Ukraine predominate. Add to this the interests of domestic financial/political clans which are involved in the supplies of Russia’s oil and gas. It is this pressure from these two main groups that has a major impact on shaping Ukraine’s foreign policy.
In my view, in 2000 Ukraine’s dependence on the West has increased and even more so on Russia. These trends, also greatly out of key with democratic and European values, are becoming more and more pronounced. In its social and political development this year, Ukraine is coming closer to Russia and even Belarus, simultaneously distancing itself from its closest Western partners — Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia.
The worst thing happening in Ukraine now is that the role of parliament is decreasing. One of the branches of power is becoming dominant, with others becoming weaker. The government is a reflection of this process. We can see how the members of our government are becoming more and more oriented toward various groups, becoming vulnerable to groundless accusations, internal squabbles, and blackmail from various segments of the establishment. This is evidence that there is a lack of consensus among Ukrainian politicians, as was precisely the case last year, on the strategies and goals of the nation’s development.
Serhiy TELESHUN, professor, President of the Spivdruzhnist Charitable Foundation:
It could be wrong, in assessing the candidate who won, not to assess other participants of the presidential race, for all of the also-rans contributed as well to the political environment and political situation we have today.
The first thing to be mentioned is that some former presidential candidates have moved to other weight categories. Take former Speaker Oleksandr Tkachenko, for example. Or Yevhen Marchuk who changed his political and administrative status. The Socialists and their leader Oleksandr Moroz also changed their political configuration, both as a party and caucus. The same goes for the leader of the Communists, Petro Symonenko, who came in highest after Leonid Kuchma. Assessing President Kuchma’s performance in 2000, I would say that the executive branch has become definitely stronger, acquiring a relatively well-defined structure. The so- called administrative resource (the power of the state administration) is beginning to play an increasingly important role in political issues.
Secondly, I would mention a new phenomenon directly related to the election of Mr. Kuchma — the emergence of a parliamentary majority in Verkhovna Rada. There has never been such a large- scale transition from quantity to quality in Ukraine’s parliament, and this process was set off by the presidential elections. In my opinion, whoever could have won the presidency, this qualitative change would still have taken place. Of course, the incumbent President’s personal characteristics speeded up this transition.
Why is it a quasi-majority? The majority we have in Verkhovna Rada is not a legal majority per se. This majority is only starting to congeal and is based on corporate, personal, administrative, and economic connections and links. A political majority calls for certain traditions, a clear-cut legislative basis, and changes in Ukraine’s political profile.
Third, I should mention the approval by parliament of the Prime Minister and his team. Cadre issues are widely discussed now, but last year the interests of the parliamentary majority and the new government matched.
For the first time since Ukraine became independent, the economic interests of various groups clashed quite openly. I expect that this process will continue for a long time, as evidenced by the experience of Russia, some other CIS countries, Yugoslavia, Poland, and others.
