Responsibility Zone
Ukraine’s being invited to take part in the stabilization forces in Iraq is hardly a secret, especially after statements by Polish functionaries about the possibility of deploying the Ukrainian contingent in the Polish zone of control. The point here now is somehow different: Does Ukraine really need this? What are the pluses, minuses, and undercurrents? How can this issue be resolved in view of the apparent legal controversy? As previously, being prepared to make a major political decision comes first. The political grapevine has it that there will be no problems with 5-6 officials to work out and make this decision on the executive side. Thus, NSDC Secretary Yevhen Marchuk has made his stand clear; he is for Ukrainian participation in the stabilization forces. On the other hand, there is the problem of Ukrainian legislation that cannot be transgressed in any way (but which apparently could be changed) and Verkhovna Rada. Iraq has no legitimate government, so there is no one with whom to negotiate the issue in keeping with the laws of Ukraine. Other nuances include the possibility that we could miss the global process train when failing to reach consensus within Ukraine. Two Ukrainian laws — on peacekeeping activities and the deployment of Ukrainian military units abroad — provide for situations other than the current one. Last but not least, the moral aspect is surely to be raised and capitalized upon during parliamentary hearings.
Ukraine formally did not approve of the war in Iraq, yet it sent that radio-chemical-bacteriological defense battalion. It could not take part in any hostilities, of course, but it could be regarded as Ukraine’s contribution to coalition policies. Now that the war is over, the question is, What will happen to that contingent of 430 officers and men, numerically fourth in the region? Will they be sent home? Somehow, none of the countries involved in the operation is in any hurry to do so. The Ukrainian-Kuwaiti agreement has a six-month term. The said battalion could serve as a reliable foothold, using which Ukraine could gradually establish its position in postwar Iraq. This is only common sense and an opinion voiced by Ukraine’s political elite and experts. This, however, takes political will, the enactment of an appropriate law, and an agreement on a number of key aspects (finance, security, etc.). US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is reported to have promised assistance from Washington to finance the Polish contingent in Iraq.
The desirability, if not necessity, of Ukrainian participation in the stabilization forces in Iraq could be explained rather simply. First, Ukraine has its interests to protect there: some $300 million worth of trade before the war, so losing this opportunity would make no sense at all. Iraq has the world’s largest oil fields and Ukraine’s reluctance to use this energy supply source would look very strange (among other things, it would help load the Odesa-Brody oil pipeline, as was stated yesterday by Oleksandr Todiychuk, chairman of the board of the privately held Ukrtransnafta Corporation). Second, and even more importantly, such participation would actually place Ukraine among the founding members of a new international security and stability system, whose contours are now taking shape. The more so that France, Germany, and Russia have taken a sharp turn in their stand, showing a significantly milder approach, seeking opportunities to join the process. Third, Kyiv, Washington, and London unofficially confirm that Ukraine’s political will could help further improve Ukrainian-US-UK relationships (the more so that a degree of progress is already on record). Ukraine will need US-UK support if it seriously expects to further develop its relationships with NATO with the goal of eventually joining the alliance. The latest Ukrainian-NATO consultations are evidence that precisely this approach has been adopted.
The next round is discussing the problem at the current meeting of Ukrainian, US, and Polish diplomats, and of the Ukrainian-US foreign policy committee in Kyiv starting tomorrow. Then the issue will be debated by an international conference in Warsaw, a week from now. Incidentally, Ukraine’s involvement was first hinted at after the coalition meeting in London on April 30, where Ukraine was represented as an observer by Yevhen Marchuk.
Deploying a Ukrainian military unit in the so-called Polish zone of responsibility in Iraq is also not simple. First, no such zone exists. Secondly, Kyiv recalls that Ukraine has a considerably larger potential in coping with such matters than does Poland, and for this reason Warsaw should keep the ambition-munitions ratio in mind. Third, although Poland has already made a political decision, this does not mean a final commitment.
And there are risks to be considered. Among other things, nobody can guarantee that there will be no hotbeds of resistance in Iraq.
The cost of nonparticipation has been discussed; Ukraine would risk losing a serious chance to break out of the periphery of global processes, and that it might well get no other such chances just now.
In fact, Ukrainian participation in the stabilization forces does not guarantee any bonuses. Kyiv will have to struggle to get them. In addition, although Ukraine’s political will is sure to be taken into account, countless other issues remain to be solved, relating to the political reform, freedom of the press, and economic policy. These issues are raised during every Ukrainian-US high-level meeting. Kyiv admits that there really is something to be said about them.
