Russia Is Too Busy for Ukraine. And Ukraine?

A year ago, even at the start of this year much was said about stabilizing Ukrainian-Russian relationships and that this stability was of vital necessity for European stability in general. But then came Kosovo and events in Russia, and the subject seems to have been shelved. Meanwhile, a sober look at the situation shows that Russian-Ukrainian relations, even if actually nonexistent, cannot be stable. Regardless of all the talk about unshakable friendship, eternal family ties, and undying strategic partnership, it all boils down to Ukrainian arrears on natural gas supplies from Russia and Russia having its naval base in Ukraine, considering it a lasting military bulwark. In addition, Russia is supposed to be always stronger than Ukraine and the latter to remain its eternal subordinate. Ukraine taking orders from Russia serves the interests of both sides, considering that with each passing year Ukraine loses yet another large segment of the Russian market.

A Russian political scientist friend of mine, often quoted by Western media, feels certain that the problem is rooted not only in Moscow being too busy with other problems to bother about Ukraine but also in the fact that none of Russia's political forces has put up with the notion of Ukraine existing independently of Moscow and intending to do so permanently. And that Russia, unlike Ukraine, has no intention of developing any real strategy of any intergovernmental relationships.

He may have a point.

Yet there is another aspect, making it clearly apparent that the situation in both these countries will change, with the coming presidential elections in Ukraine and parliamentary elections in Russia, whether Moscow and Kyiv like it or not. Whoever comes out on top in the Duma, Luzhkov or the Communists, or some third party, little will depend on the chummy contacts that have formed between Leonid Kuchma, his entourage, and Messrs. Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin, or Berezovsky. Likewise, it is apparent that Ukraine must brace itself for the likelihood of the Russian state soon being steered by people who could not care less about UN resolutions, including those on Sevastopol and such. There is also the likelihood of mounting pressure on Kyiv, with increasingly demanding — and quite proper — reminders of outstanding bills to be paid. Sooner or later, Moscow is sure to come up with a new policy toward Ukraine, no longer as comparatively neighborly, almost like kinfolk, as it has been these past several years. Ukraine is still to demonstrate at least a desire to defend some of its positions. As it is, I am not likely to feel any more stable, confident, or secure having a Russian navy deployed right under my nose with its weapon systems targeted on God knows what enemy, with my government making every effort to keep our strategic neighbor in its condescending attitude toward my country, when my leaders keep shifting between blaming Russia for all our troubles and visiting Moscow to once again bow and scrape, especially on the eve of the elections.

And in Russia the situation remains vague. This country faces a very painful post-Yeltsin period and Russian-Ukrainian relationships are not likely to win appreciation in the international community. Yet it is also true that the elite in Russia and Ukraine is too busy to bother about this just now.