Russian identity: is there an alternative to great-power status-2

(Continued from the previous issue)

“THE PROGRESSIVE PUBLIC” IS UNAWARE OF PLAYING ON THE GOVERNMENT’S SIDE, INCLUDING DOING THE JOB OF A “CLEANER”

History is also actively used in Russia to shape a modern national identity of Russians. Here, in addition to the “cult of victory,” the heritage of Kyivan Rus’ is also of great importance. One of Putin’s latest “historic” initiatives is erection of a monument to Kyivan Prince Volodymyr in Moscow. What do you think of this project? What is your opinion about the current Russian identity which combines, among other things, such contradictory concepts as “Soviet man” and “Orthodoxy”?

“The monument to Prince Volodymyr is a project as part of the Russian tradition of great-power status, declaration and confirmation of the historical unity of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian peoples. The very idea of great-power status, which comes from the idea ‘Moscow, a third Rome’ formulated by the monk Filofei in the early 16th century, has turned today into the Russian government’s ideology and, like no other one, has turned out to be consonant with the sentiments of the majority of the population, including the so-called progressive public. This is why very few of its representatives oppose the Russian aggression in Ukraine. It is quite right to speak today of Russian fundamentalism which has organically blended the features of both Russian and Soviet past. This includes the idea that the Russian people are bearers of a special morality and a special sense of justice; denial of a spiritually deprived West as a model of societal development; the vision of Russia as an empire in the future; and belief in its special historical mission. This is what Russian identity is today. In general, it is natural for any healthy society to wish to see its country great. But the fundamentalist idea of great-power status calls for strengthening the supreme leadership instead of improving the country as a whole. This leadership behaves inside the country like an administration of an occupied territory and also boosts its clout outside its limits. ‘We are not destined to live ‘in a buzz,’ as they put it now. We are in for other, hard, times,’ Sergei Kurginyan wrote. ‘And if the Russians want to keep their historical existence intact, they must become a gatherer nation again.’”

You are of the opinion that Putin has created in contemporary Russia a governmental mechanism that inherits Stalinism and calls for, among other things, absolute secrecy. But while Stalin used state-sponsored violence and repressions to form a totalitarian system, the present-day leadership of Russia is using the media to this end. As is known, Stalin managed to stay in power until the last days of his life. Is Putin’s regime equally viable? Are the hopes of many Western and Ukrainian experts for its early collapse somewhat exaggerated? What are the really weak spots in Putin’s system of government?

“Firstly, I’d like to point out that the current Russian leadership is using not only the media, but also repressions. To tell the truth, it is not mass-scale repressions and killings, as it was under Stalin, but selective pinpoint murders and arrests under the so-called ‘extremist’ 282nd Article of the Russian Criminal Code. The modern-day Russian regime has not only learned to draw lessons from the past, but is also applying up-to-date Western political techniques and information warfare. Stalinist renaissance in Russia is occurring against the most modern decorative background. Stalin and his henchman did not even dream of the potential of television and the Internet, they could not even imagine the extent to which a society can be disoriented by means of information technologies. There is no need of an iron curtain or mass repressions. The government has so much succeeded in deceiving the populace that we can point out the fact of schizophrenic public awareness in Russia. It paradoxically combines interpretation of the 1917 October revolution as a catastrophe and the wish to come back to the Soviet past, condemnation of repressions and veneration of Stalin as a statesman, anti-Western attitudes and talk about democracy, ‘Soviet man’ and Orthodoxy.

“Moreover, the government has learned not only to win information wars, but also to turn public indignation to its own account by much more refined methods than it was done under Stalin, when it was necessary to ‘whip up the fury of the masses.’ Today, the progressive public is in many cases even unaware of playing on the side and under the rules of the government, thus strengthening it and doing, instead of it, the job of a ‘cleaner.’ The example of this is the so-called anticorruption campaign with Aleksey Navalny at the head.”

“THE SOFT SPOT OF THE REGIME IS LACK OF HISTORICAL PROSPECTS”

“By contrast with Andrei Piontkovsky and the like-minded experts, who have been talking for many years about death throes of the current Russian government and foretelling its early downfall, I can see no signs of death throes. On the contrary, I can see a steady consolidation. Stalin also consolidated his power in this way.

“The point is that a governmental system of this type has no fear of misrule, embezzlement, or corruption. Of course, these things disturb it, but they are an immeasurably lesser evil for it than organized resistance. All the government is supposed to do is keep these unpleasant things within certain limits. As for organized resistance, it is not visible in today’s Russia. It is no accident that the authorities have been perfecting their skills of political manipulations, propaganda, and crowd-pleasing measures in all these years. It is not without reason that it has been reinforcing law-and-order bodies so consistently.

“Therefore, you can accuse the government, as much as you want and quite deservedly, of arbitrariness, misrule, corruption, etc., but you should not forget that this daily routine of Russia distracts the people from the goals of the supreme leadership and scatters their forces in a never-ending struggle for existence. Moreover, guided by the traditional ideas of great-power status, the authorities are not only successfully tackling their own problems, but are also positioning their country on the world arena in a way that pleases them. And nobody can so far oppose this – neither in the country, nor in the world. Moreover, you can easily see Western leaders make step-by-step concessions, for they are unaware of what this policy may lead to as a result.

“The soft spot of this government is lack of historical prospects. I think the following phrase of Herzen was prophetic: ‘One more century of the present despotism will destroy all the good qualities of the Russian people. It is doubtful that, without an active personal involvement, the people will preserve their nationality and the civilized classes – their enlightening efforts.’”

You claim that perestroika was a KGB-planned operation aimed at seizing the party power by the special services’ apparatus in order to privatize state property. Is it possible to transform the system of government in modern-day Russia ‘from below,’ and, if so, under what conditions?

“No, I don’t think it is possible. How can one hope for a mass-scale protest movement and ignore at the same time the fact that the Russian populace fully depends on the authorities? For the Kremlin has not only concentrated state property in the hands of its proxies, but has also placed the people of Russia under its care. It has given the people the living standards that are higher than in the Soviet era: apartments have been privatized, there is no shortage of goods, and you can listen to, read, and watch whatever you want. The people of Russia have in fact found themselves in a position of hostages. But the point is that this position is acceptable for the vast majority, all the more so that borders are also open for traveling. As for potential grassroots protesters, they are today under a tight cover of security forces and police equipped with the most sophisticated technical appliances. It is unlikely that the ‘knife-wielding riffraff’ will ever dare them, as Vladimir Bukovsky suggested in an early-2013 interview, in which he was trying to persuade us that a mass movement would begin in the regions before the spring of that year. Besides, do not forget such an important thing that it is usually allowed to expose the government in the capital, whereas this is fraught with very serious consequences in the provinces.

“Do not deceive yourselves and others – nothing can oppose the current situation in Russia. Unlike Yury Pivovarov, who said in 2013, too, that ‘this is the first time we have a mature civil society,’ I did not see at the time and, all the more so, do not see now any conditions – historical, mental, or social – for the emergence in Russia of such a society or the opposition in the shape that is known in the West. They cannot emerge in the conditions of the current vertical chain of command and the omnipotence of special services.”

The Day’s FACT FILE

Irina Pavlova is a historian, Doctor of Historical Sciences, and political writer. Author of the books The Mechanism of Government and the Construction of Stalinist Socialism (2001), Stalinism: the Making of a Mechanism of Power (1993), The Red Guards in Siberia (1983), as well as a series of scholarly articles in the journals Voprosy istorii, Otechestvennaya istoriya, EKO, Gumanitarnye nauki v Sibiri, and Russian Studies in History. Editor of and contributor to a series of almanacs Memory Redux (1991, 1994, 1997). Published political essays in Siberian publications, magazine Znaniye – sila, in the portals Grani.ru and Rufabula.com. Posted regular commentaries on the website of the Voice of America’s Russian service.