Ukraine: 15 years as non-nuclear state and NATO membership

Ukraine’s Diplomatic Academy attached to the Ministry of Internal Affairs recently hosted the international conference “Fifteen Years of Non-Nuclear Status: Experience and Guarantees of Ukraine’s Security.”

Ex-Foreign Minister of Ukraine Anatolii Zlenko (1991–94; 2000–03) said at the beginning that the Ukrainian political community remains divided between those who support and oppose the nuclear status, as was the case in the early 1990s. The experts who attended the conference agreed that Ukraine made the right decision to rid itself of nuclear armaments.

Volodymyr Horbulin, director of the Institute for Problems of National Security, stressed that this decision was both right and necessary. Ukraine’s biggest problem at the time was the banal issue of survival. “We had token money instead of national currency. How could we finance our nuclear weapons? Ukraine was a politically and economically isolated country on the international arena; we had to break through this isolation.”

Zlenko continued the thought: “Due to historical circumstances, Ukraine found itself in possession of nuclear weapons. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had the third largest nuclear potential in the world, so the issue of nuclear weapons was high on the foreign political agenda during the early years of Ukraine’s independence. If you think that the politicians and diplomats involved in Ukraine’s voluntary abandonment of its nuclear status enjoyed their work, you are very wrong. We had to deal with powerful and cunning negotiators on the Russian and US side. Ukraine was under a great deal of political pressure, which the newly formed country found hard to bear. From the outset the United States realized that Ukraine could upset the balance of world strategic forces if it retained its nuclear status, while the Russian Federation wanted to keep Ukraine in the sphere of its influence.”

Yurii Kochubei, president of the Ukrainian Foreign Policy Society (he was the Ukrainian ambassador to France at the time), also mentioned a great deal of political pressure: “Even when we had to negotiate the terms and conditions of a rabbit-breeding contract, the first question we were asked was when Ukraine intended to rid itself of its nuclear weapons. The French side realized that Ukraine would elbow their way to the European table, unless it shed its nuclear status.”

Vadym Hrechaninov, president of Ukraine’s Atlantic Council, believes that Ukraine remains a nuclear power, even after ridding itself of nuclear arms, because it still has nuclear technologies and nuclear power plants.

After signing the Budapest Memorandum (Dec. 5, 1994), another issue arose, How real are the guarantees Ukraine had received from the nuclear powers in terms of national security? Ohryzko, as first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council, noted that this agreement expires in December 2009. What will be the next political step? Ohryzko says, “I am convinced that the Budapest guarantees remain a paper tiger for Ukraine, good enough to scare a little child. In fact, what happened in the Caucasus in August 2008 is proof of the simple truth that there is no national security with [enemy] tanks advancing into your territory.”

The experts agree on the first and second issue that Ukraine’s decision to shed its nuclear status was not properly appreciated by the international community of nations. “It never became an example to follow by other nuclear states,” stressed Deputy Foreign Minister Oleksandr Horin.

Furthermore, no lessons were learned from this experience in Ukraine and the rest of the world. Zlenko said the Ukrainian side faced the other negotiating parties with three issues: (a) guarantees of national security, (b) financial aid to help decontamination procedures, and (c) financial aid to help solve environmental issues following the destruction of Ukraine’s nuclear stockpile. None of these issues was completely resolved; some were resolved only partially.

Horbulin even admitted that over the past 15 years he has been haunted by the thoughts about what Ukraine lost and gained after becoming a non-nuclear country: “In this sense we did have certain assets, so we believed the memorandum would provide for our [national] security. In the end we realized that we hadn’t done our job to the full; on the other hand, I believe that the rest of the world is in debt to Ukraine, so we are entitled to demand security [guarantees]. All of these information, gas, and dairy-and-meat wars waged against Ukraine are proof that we have no security guarantees.”

Hryhorii Perepelytsia, director of the Interior Ministry’s Diplomatic Academy’s Institute of Foreign Policy, who was the conference’s key organizer, noted that invitations had been duly sent to the official quarters of the countries that had signed and guaranteed the Budapest memorandum, yet none had showed an interest, save for one Russian expert — Andrei Zagorsky, leading research fellow with the Center for Problems of War and Peace at Moscow’s State Institute of Foreign Relations.

So 15 years ago Ukraine became a nuclear-free country and has received nothing in return. In Ukraine, the debate on the foreign politicy vector continues, even though Ukraine is formally seeking admittance to European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

On March 13, 1995, several months after signing the Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine signed a bilateral security agreement with NATO. (Yevhen Marchuk was then the prime minister of Ukraine.) President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine took the next serious political step by signing the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine in Madrid (July 9, 1997). On May 23, 2003, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, chaired by Yevhen Marchuk, adopted a new strategy of relationships with NATO aimed at Ukraine’s eventual NATO membership.

Therefore, Ukraine and NATO have quite a few years of mutually advantageous cooperation. All insinuations notwithstanding, Ukraine’s ultimate NATO membership was adopted under President Leonid Kuchma, when the government was represented by such politicians as, among others, Yanukovych, Symonenko, etc., who are now campaigning so actively against this membership.

After the 2004 Orange revolution, Ukraine’s new leadership reaffirmed integration into the EU and NATO membership as its foreign political priorities. However, during Yushchenko’s five years of presidency, despite all the talks about NATO and the West’s favorable attitude to Ukraine after the revolution, we have failed to come closer to NATO or even sign the Membership Action Plan. Of course, there were big hopes for changes in Ukraine’s foreign policy course after Kuchma’s “multivectoral politics,” yet none came true. Once again we had the wrong kind of people as our political leaders and the Western integration project remained on paper.

As years passed, it was increasingly apparent that the guarantees Ukraine had formally received from the nuclear powers were also on paper. The question is: What kind of security model should there be for non-nuclear countries like Ukraine?

Vadym Triukhan, director of the Ukrainian cabinet’s European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Bureau, sees three such models: NATO; NATO-based European collective security and defense system, and the CIS Collective Security Agreement Organization. He believes that NATO is the best choice for Ukraine, considering that Ukraine has been on this road since the outset of its national independence.

In contrast, Pavlo Zhovnirenko, head of the board, Strategic Study Center, addressed the conference and stressed that Ukraine had wasted too much time and lost its opportunity of calmly acquiring NATO membership and that this fact should be acknowledged and taken into account. There is another question: Will NATO exist forever or only for a certain while? Ohryzko said: “NATO remains the most effective system for Ukraine, one that’s capable of providing security for every Ukrainian. Regardless of how actively this policy is counteracted, Ukraine will eventually become a member of the North Atlantic Alliance.”

Zhovnirenko continues: “I believe that Ukraine has two options to obtain safety guarantees under the circumstances. The first one is to acquire NATO membership rapidly without MAP, so as to cut short the long procedure that will leave this country vulnerable and unprotected — but this option is unlikely. I would describe the second option as virtual neutrality, including a trilateral agreement between Ukraine, NATO, and CIS Collective Security Agreement.” He says this agreement must not mention any security guarantees, only the mechanisms capable of providing this security.

These mechanisms will envisage the following:

“1. Ukraine pledges to evolve as a neutral democracy. 2. Both blocs and member countries pledge to respect the national independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, guaranteeing non-interference in its internal affairs and refraining from any forms of pressure on this country. 3. Each bloc will shortly carry out the procedures required to admit Ukraine as its full-fledged member. 4. After one bloc fulfills point 2 of the agreement, Ukraine will be relieved of the obligation to immediately join the other bloc as indicated in point 1.”

This legal formulation caused smiles in the audience, but everyone knew that everyone had the right to voice his idea, as confirmed by Borys Tarasiuk, Chairman of the VR European Integration Committee. In fact, he said that this particular option was totally unrealistic: “Here we are faced with options that are totally incompatible. I mean NATO and CIS Agreement. NATO is an international body, whereas the CIS Agreement is a virtual one, i.e., it exists only on paper.” The conference’s Russian delegate Andrei Zagorsky promptly responded by saying that there are no abstract security models:

“Ukraine is not the first country to have shed its nuclear status; we know that Yugoslavia, Switzerland, South Africa, and Brazil did so without requiring any guarantees. Even now we have a number of countries that have the potential to develop nuclear weapons, but they are not using it. Also, if a country decides on a non-nuclear status, this doesn’t mean that this country should join a security system.

“I can tell you that Russia is still interested in Ukraine keeping its neutral stand in return for additional security guarantees. If we sign a legal agreement banning the use of military force against the country’s territorial integrity, this will serve as a guarantee of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and security. Such guarantees could be the best way for Ukraine to lose its interest in NATO membership.”

Tarasiuk’s response was quick and sharp: “Let me stress again that Ukraine was the first country to rid itself of its nuclear weapons. Belarus and Kazakhstan followed suit. As for the national security guarantees for Ukraine on the part of Russia, I wouldn’t waste a nickel betting on them. These guarantees are laid down in the Budapest Memorandum, yet Russia has regularly disregarded them. We might as well ask Georgia about Russia’s guarantees.”

One is reminded of the Tuzla Island crisis back in 2003, when Russia was building a dam to make this island part of its territory. This never happened. Ukraine, instead, was seeking consultations with the guarantor countries with regard to its national security, only to be told that what was happening between Ukraine and Russia was their business.

Conference participants also discussed the neutrality status option. In fact, this issue remains uppermost in the minds of politicians and experts, considering that there is still no official concept or practical experience in Ukraine. Ohryzko believes that “discussing any kind of neutral or non-aligned status of Ukraine would mean deliberately leading the public opinion astray.”

Triukhan said: “Out of the world’s 203 sovereign countries, only ten have an official neutral status. For most other countries, this status has been formed historically, under the pressure of external circumstances. A neutral country has a markedly limited range of opportunities of asking for help when its sovereignty is threatened, compared to the member states of a collective security system. Even the presence of nuclear armaments, as a powerful containment means, does not encourage the proclamation of neutrality status and the subsequent need to rely on one’s own resources in protecting one’s national security. None of the countries with a de jure or de facto nuclear status have opted for neutrality. Moreover, all of them are members of this or that alliance.”

Perepelytsia was convinced that “Ukraine’s security today depends on the security of the international community of nations, which is being reformed against the backdrop of the world [financial] crisis. As a result, Ukraine is becoming increasingly aware of its security deficit.”

The obvious conclusion is that Ukraine must step up its efforts to seek new national security tools. There are three options: (a) individual defense; (b) collective defense, and (c) status guarantees.

Says Perepelytsia: “Individual defense means the right of every sovereign country to defend its sovereignty. Nuclear status turns out to be an important component in the context of individual defense. There is also another component, namely measures aimed at securing one’s defense, using conventional armed forces that were very powerful in Ukraine at the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse. If we had preserved this potential, we would have been able to ensure our security even without nuclear weapons.

“The second option is collective security. It stands to logic that Ukraine, while aiming to reach the standards of European democracy, should seek membership in a collective security system: in our case, NATO.

“The third option is status guarantees. Ukraine received them in 1994, but we have seen what they are worth over the past 15 years.”

After parting with its nuclear weapons 15 years ago, Ukraine embarked on the right path. However, it turns out no one has bothered to ensure our national security over these years. Indeed, why should the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, or China defend our interests? According to Perepelytsia, countries that have security guarantees do not rely exclusively on these guarantees but ensure their defense on a status-guarantee-plus-individual-defense or status-guarantee-plus-collective-defense basis.

This international conference proposed recommendations to the Ukrainian government, namely accumulation of armaments, upgrading the armed forces, joining a collective security and defense system (most of those present said it should be NATO), and making a civic contribution to the development of the state.

The big question is: “Who will do all of this and when?” We have the presidential election coming soon, and we will once again be offered all kinds of promises concerning the foreign policy vector Ukraine needs, with each presidential candidate having a vector of his own, but this will only mean wasting our society’s time (one year at best). Our experience shows that elections do not change anything.

Also, the Budapest agreement will expire this year, and this will certainly be a key issue for discussion among the leaders of the world powers. One is left to wonder what place Ukraine will be given after this 15-year memorandum expires.