Ukraine allowed to have army larger than poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary combined

The military arithmetic has been changed on the expanses from Vancouver to the Urals. This is one of the results of the OSCE Istanbul summit, where the week before last representatives of thirty states, Ukraine included, signed a new wording of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).

Can we say that it will now be safer to live in the European theater of operations?

HOW NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT MADE PEACE

A saying goes that generals always prepare for the last war, while diplomats try to avert the war they fear at the moment. In the past, Europe saw the face off of two military armadas, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, always ready to tear each other to pieces. Given the nervousness of the Cold War, as fierce hostilities as possible could have broken out over a trifle or due to excessive suspicions about the opposite bloc’s military activities.

To avert this, NATO and Warsaw Pact representatives for twenty years worked out a kind of protective device: the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, signed on November 19, 1990, in Vienna.

The main idea was simple: it was decided to equalize the quantities of the two military blocs’ offensive weapons (tanks, armored combat vehicles, aircraft, and artillery) both within Europe proper and in the geographic areas making part of or associated one way or another with the zones of direct confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This kind of equilibrium deprived generals of the temptation to launch a surprise attack. There was no question of an unexpected mass offensive. Without quantitative and qualitative superiority, such a decision would mean inevitable death.

The treaty defined the ceilings of armaments for each of the blocs: 13,500 tanks, 20,000 armored vehicles, 13,700 artillery pieces, 1,500 helicopter gun ships, and 5,150 warplanes. It was also decided to destroy excess weapons numbering about 50,000 units, which was in fact done.

It seemed one would heave a sigh of relief, but everything went wrong. The Warsaw Pact, as well as the USSR after it, disintegrated. Moscow’s former allies — the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary — opted for NATO membership. And it suddenly became clear Europe now needs a different military arithmetic.

But, while the former Soviet republics seemed to come to terms at first, the relationship with NATO looked much more pessimistic for Russia in the new military and political situation. The North Atlantic alliance de facto gained an almost three- times quantitative superiority over Russia, as far as all factors of military power are concerned. The pragmatic NATO leaders understood they could rejoice at such a setup only for a short time. Moscow was clearly put off by its outsider role. Russian generals and politicians will rack their brains in distress over how to make up for this inferiority, but, owing to their poverty, they will devise nothing better than to stuff the Russian garrisons stationed nearest to well-fed Europe with tactical nuclear missiles, making it a bad neighborhood indeed. Thus one must sit down again at the negotiating table.

Detailed talks among the representatives of thirty countries on adapting the CFE to the new military and political realities began in January 1997 in Vienna’s Hofburg Palace with a hope to do their job in eighteen months. However, they barely finished it by the November summit in Istanbul. The essence of this adaptation lies in a different arithmetic for counting the armaments. The treaty is now based on individual membership and determines the quantity of conventional weapons for each individual state rather than for military blocs as a whole (some of which have gained weight, while others have dried out and changed names). If you suddenly wish to station the troops of a foreign state on your territory, please cut back your arsenals, for you cannot exceed your ceiling.

You are welcome to visit each other, sending in regiments or battalions for joint maneuvers or peacekeeping operations. But do it in civilized way, i.e., for a short time. Visits like this have the strict temporal limit of a few months.

UKRAINE’S FLANK WAR

The signing of a revised Conventional Forces Treaty at the OSCE Istanbul summit was only important for Ukraine because it brought about the long-awaited resolution of its so- called flank problem. For Kyiv made a decision about its conventional arsenals as long ago as during the Tashkent CIS summit. Since then, generals have been ready to take up the cudgels to prove that Ukraine really needs 4,080 tanks, 5,050 armored combat vehicles, 4,090 large-caliber artillery pieces, 300 attack helicopters, and about 1,000 warplanes. Not a single tank or plane less! On the other hand, the strength of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has more than halved since 1992, and quite a few analysts are surprised: why does Kyiv need, for example, such a huge tank armada if tank breakthroughs under the slogan, Two weeks to the English Channel, are a thing of the past? Moreover, Ukraine is always poor as a church mouse, as far as budget money for defense is concerned.

Was it not simpler, in the light of adapting the CFE, to put forward a new initiative in the additional reduction of conventional arms and persuade adjacent countries to follow suit? This would win both honor and profit, for we could keep as a result the remaining arsenals in at least acceptable condition.

But Ukraine only thought about its flanks. This country inherited some more limitations from the Warsaw Pact, due to which Kyiv could only deploy a small quantity of armaments, about 7% of its total number, in five Ukrainian oblasts. The so-called flank zone embraces Zaporizhzhia, Mykolayiv, Kherson, and Odesa oblasts, as well as the Republic of the Crimea. The Defense and Foreign Ministries tried to bring home to other treaty signatories that, given a new military and strategic realities caused by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, such limitations are discriminatory for a nonaligned country. For it is impossible to rationally build defense in conditions like these. However, Kyiv’s arguments were not heeded in the Vienna talks for a long time.

A so-called new flank document was adopted in May 1997, whereby Ukraine was allowed to reduce the flank area on its territory by excluding Odesa oblast from it. This is said to have suited everybody in principle, except Rumania which bordered, across the Danube, the area then under control of the Odesa military district.

Then came another amendment. Under the final Istanbul wording of the CFE, all Ukrainian oblasts have been exempt from flank limitations, except for Odesa oblast. In the future, our generals will be able to deploy there not more than 400 main battle tanks, 400 armored vehicles, and 350 large-caliber artillery systems. In general, this is quite sufficient for defense.

But why did they impose limitations precisely on this oblast? Diplomats claim the final decision was influenced by the fact that Odesa oblast is the only one out of Ukraine’s five flank oblasts, which has a land border with neighboring countries and the most developed military infrastructure, as compared, for example, with Kherson or Zaporizhzhia oblasts. So we are told this is quite a generous gesture, also with respect to Rumania.

But this only part of the truth. What is more plausible is that Kyiv was ready to sacrifice not only the Odesa expanses to achieve its grand objective of having the Crimea exempted from the limitations. Whatever one may say, this is our state’s Achilles heel from military, foreign political, and ethnic perspectives simultaneously. So we can even applaud, for the amended Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty fully meets Ukraine’s strategic interests. Moreover, if we bear in mind that we surpass the conventional arsenals of the three new NATO members combined. In a one-to-one comparison, we leave even Germany and France (if we do not take into account its nuclear forces) behind.

YES, YES, YES TO A SUNSHINE PEACE?

Can we thus say that it immediately became safer on the expanse from the Atlantic to the Urals after representatives of thirties countries affixed their signatures in Istanbul to the reworded CFE treaty? And who is now the first among equals, expanded NATO or Russia with its only reliable military satellite, Belarus?

One Russian politician said on returning from Istanbul: “Now we have put a thin but strong net over the white American eagle.” He meant by net the approval of individual levels of conventional arms for each state. What Moscow feared most was that the expanded NATO military machine will be like quicksilver spilling over Europe as the current situation may require. But now the situation is more or less static.

Not to arouse alarm in Russia, the alliance command can deploy, if necessary, not more than three NATO- standard divisions on the territory of the three new NATO members. Moreover, 19 NATO countries in general and Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Germany, and Slovakia in particular, have expressed their readiness to make a political commitment not to increase military might near the Russian and Belarusian borders. Moreover, these countries are ready not only to increase the level of their armed forces but even to reduce and then freeze it, which, incidentally, was not demanded of Russia, except for such a trifle as its involvement in Georgia. In addition, Moscow also wrested considerable concessions from NATO regarding flank limitations for the Leningrad and North Caucasus military districts. Those limitations created for Russia the same problems as for Ukraine. In general, the West seems to have decided not to quarrel with the unpredictable Russian bear. But this is the current situation. And what about tomorrow?

There are three key factors capable of essentially upsetting the current status quo.

The first is the future of the Russian-Belarusian military brotherhood. Such steps by Moscow as the signing of a military alliance between Russia and Belarus, the working-out of a common doctrine, and the formation of the allied coalition forces, naturally strengthen Russia’s positions in the region. But, on the other hand, this creates areas of direct confrontation between NATO and the Russo- Belarusian alliance. In case the relations between Moscow and the West cool, NATO will have to seek effective options to thwart the danger from this direction.

The second zone is the Transcaucasus. Today, the troops of NATO members, primarily Turkey, and Russia are divided by a group of countries, which both sides are trying to pressure. This results in the ever-simmering Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and instability in Georgia. The desire of Tbilisi to ensure security under the North Atlantic alliance’s umbrella and statements of the Azeri leaders about their readiness to station a NATO military base in their country are still but words. But the very first practical intentions in this direction will obviously be blocked by Moscow with, as the saying goes, due account of the revolutionary moment. I do not know whether Georgia will continue to see and get used to being bombed by unidentified flying objects or something more subtle will be done with respect to NATO.

And, finally, the Ukrainian factor proper. Even in case of a new Cold War or a temporary crisis in the relations with Russia, it would be mindless for NATO to stuff Poland and other new NATO neighbors of Ukraine with troops. As long as Ukraine remains neutral, their armed forces are unable physically to engage in a direct clash with Russia. The two armed groupings, west and east of our border, are now quite content with Ukraine’s buffer role. Kyiv’s overtures to NATO will be thwarted by the Black Sea Fleet casting anchor and cutting off the gas pipeline, which will hardly be likely to evoke serious condemnation from the West. This, however, is only natural, for we must first make a final choice about our own interests and priorities.

Thus as a result we have an equation in which entirely different figures could be written tomorrow. And it will have to be solved anew if, of course, we have enough stamina and time. In the meanwhile, all hopes are being pinned on the revised CFE to take effect only after being ratified by the parliaments of all countries. This is a long and unpredictable procedure. It is worth remembering here the destiny of a different military treaty, SALT-2 (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty), which fell hostage to the Moscow- Washington axis. Every time the Russian Duma postpones its ratification, it believes it is exerting pressure on the US, which is interested in cutting the number of strategic nuclear warheads in Russia. However, with a CFE suitable to Moscow, the situation is quite the contrary. US President Bill Clinton has already said the treaty will not be ratified by US Senate until Russia reduces the strength of federal forces in the Northern Caucasus, one of its flanks.

But Russia, by all accounts, is ignoring these limitations. Due to the Chechnya War, the strength of Russian armaments in this region is 60% over the quota allowed by the treaty. It is this excess that almost foiled the signing of the amended CFE text, for there is no sense in agreements if they are not being fulfilled. On the other hand, when NATO was bashing the Serbs, as Russia is now bashing the Chechens, the Russian military decided to inspect NATO bases in Macedonia. This demand was in full compliance with the rules of the game set up by CFE. But the NATO commander in Macedonia kept the inquisitive Russians out of his installations.

“This is unprecedented!” Moscow said then in fury. Naturally, the scales of the violations of agreements by NATO and Russia are incomparable. But the conclusion is the same: all military treaties are good only in peacetime.