Ukraine and NATO on the road from acquaintance to candidacy
Last week was saturated with political contacts on a high level between Ukraine and NATO. This was a certain audit of indices, according to which Kyiv is crossing the interim finish line between last year’s Prague summit, when the Ukraine-NATO Action Plan and Target Plan 2003 were passed, and next year’s Istanbul summit, where announcements on the admission of new NATO members will be made and, as we in Kyiv hope, also about Ukraine joining in a Membership Action Plan. First, Ukrainian Defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk and, last Friday, Foreign Minister Kostiantyn Hryshchenko discussed in Brussels at the Ukraine- NATO Committee and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council meetings the situation in terms of bilateral relations, partial implementation the plans signed in Prague, and the prospects for the future. Thus far it is difficult to come to conclusions on the intentions of the NATO member states regarding the Istanbul summit based on the Brussels statements. In part, NATO Secretary General George Robertson at his meeting with Minister Hryshchenko endorsed that Kyiv should proceed with its work aimed at meeting the criteria necessary for the NATO membership, reports Interfax Ukraine.
Meanwhile, the West urges Ukraine to proceed with reforms, simultaneously pointing to its achievements in the spheres of reforming the defense and security sector. However, one cannot help but notice that the context of the talks is gradually changing. The period of familiarization between Ukraine and NATO, officially referred to as “special partnership,” is coming to an end. The next stage in the relations could perhaps be called “partnership.” However, it should be remembered that the process of obtaining membership by a country enjoying this status can last quite long.
In the year after Prague one could register changes in both Ukraine’s and NATO’s general political stands. Kyiv ceased distinguishing between European and Euro-Atlantic integration. To the contrary, one can hear from the country’s leaders more and more often that Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration and the process of its coming closer to NATO are to further its integration into the European Union. The Central and East European countries that now are candidates for EU membership and in fact NATO members (which is to be ratified precisely at the Istanbul NATO summit) set their tasks and goals the same way. It is quite a different matter that for them this was truly an action plan, while for Ukraine it still remains on the level of declarations, in spite of the truly significant improvements in the defense reform along with starting the process of the civilian democratic control over the Armed Forces. Nobody believes in declarations anymore — take, for example, last year’s situation concerning the Prague summit and Ukrainian delegation’s participation in it. Considering that situation, adopting the Action Plan and Target Plan-2003 should be in itself viewed as a success, which was still to be firmed up. In the post-Prague period, the National Center for Euro-Atlantic Integration had been created along with the State Council for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. The West has repeatedly marked the progress in reforming Ukraine’s defense sector.
Among key points one can name holding an international conference last May in Washington with the participation of the US and NATO member states’ defense ministers, which clearly demonstrated that at least NATO is unwilling to slow down the rate of developing its relations with Kyiv, along with frequent visits here by NATO leaders, General Secretary Lord Robertson included, and permanent contacts and meetings on experts and ministries level.
On the other hand, it would be premature to speak about a distinct stand of all NATO member states toward Ukraine. While a year ago only the United States and Poland spoke openly about their support of Ukraine’s NATO aspirations, now we can speak about support from Turkey and perhaps a few others. However, this is hardly enough for being confident in the fact that a Ukrainian lobby has already been formed in NATO.
An important factor that is not directly connected with the issue of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration, the decision to send a peacekeeping detachment to Iraq still had a considerable influence on the development of the Ukraine-NATO relations, considering the role played in NATO by the United States. However, Washington has always implied that, important as it is, the Iraq case does not mean solving all problems. To obtain complete and unconditioned support, Ukraine still must prove that it really wants to become a normal democratic country with market economy, freedom of the press, and civilian control over the Armed Forces.
In fact, one might say that after signing the Action Plan and Target Plan for 2003 the Euro-Atlantic integration cause has turned from a diplomatic issue into a domestic one. This is why the West, and primarily the US, will expect from Kyiv to secure fair and democratic elections 2004. Another important fact is that claims regarding corruption still exist to, say, Bulgaria and Romania which are expected to become members in Istanbul.
“We can’t become allies or even extremely good friends with countries that trample on principles Americans consider very important. And, for that matter, a country that aspires to become truly part of the Euro-Atlantic community cannot do that; it has to accept the principles this community holds very dear,” Ambassador of the United States to Ukraine John Herbst said in his interview with The Day (No. 33, November 4, 2003). His sharp reaction to the events surrounding the Our Ukraine forum in Donetsk is also evidence that all Ukrainian internal developments will be closely followed and affect the Istanbul summit decision.
Thus, what is to Ukraine’s credit for 2003 are progress in the defense reform and implementing the Action Plan. Among liabilities there is obvious underfulfilment of the Action Plan and Target Plan 2003 in terms of democratization and necessary changes to Ukraine’s legislation along with information policies. Evidence of this are polling data: people are unaware of what NATO is like and why Ukraine should join it. One can hardly speak about complete trust in the Ukrainian authorities by the Euro-Atlantic Community, since the opinion is quite popular among Western experts and politicians that the decision to adopt a strategy oriented on Ukraine’s movement toward NATO along with sending Ukrainian peacekeepers to Iraq were pursuing a tactical purpose, removing the country from isolation.
Thus, it is plausible that the Istanbul summit will bring Ukraine only support to its efforts in reforms and integration along with preparedness to assist it in conducting the defense survey and broadening cooperation in peacekeeping operations (in part, a document might have been already adopted by then on using Ukrainian transport aviation). However, what Ukraine really needs is a qualitative advance by joining the MAP and defining it as a future alliance member, with which a deepened political dialog and negotiations on entering NATO should begin.
Even in case NATO gives a positive answer about Ukraine joining a MAP, it should be remembered that, in spite of the positive current condition of Ukraine-NATO relations, Ukraine will be no exception to the common rule. And this rule is that every aspirant country has to go through three or four yearly Membership Action Plans.
