“Ukraine Must Be Explored”
Ahead of the December 26 rerun of the runoff elections, more and more people are voicing their views of the events unfolding in Ukraine and offering their forecasts of how the situation will develop. Liliya SHEVTSOVA, Ph.D. in history and senior associate at the Moscow Carnegie Center, is certain that the Ukrainian revolution is special. “A protest against imitation democracy,” is how Ms. Shevtsova describes recent events in Ukraine. She is certain that the Kremlin’s policy during the presidential campaign in Ukraine was Russia’s biggest foreign policy failure since Vladimir Putin took office. Ms. Shevtsova has identified the causes of this failure as “a total lack of understanding of social sentiments and political processes in the post- Soviet space” and underestimation of the “Ukrainians’ European choice factor.” Liliya Shevtsova discusses the Kremlin’s possible future strategy and the future of Ukraine in an interview with The Day.
“How can we avoid becoming disillusioned with the outcome of the revolution?”
“All revolutions in the postwar period have followed a similar pattern: revolution meant breaking through the confines of the old rules of the game. Revolutions could lead to a certain stabilization or consolidation of power, and sometimes to restoration [of the old power]. In any case, revolutions cause the so-called post-revolutionary syndrome: disillusionment, which may be extreme at times, or a post- evolutionary hangover. It is absolutely impossible to avoid this syndrome, since revolutions are normally carried out by people who, although united by their rejection of the past, have no vision of the future. The problem is whether the victor will be able to become the leader of national accord. Without a doubt, there’s likely to be disillusionment among his more radical supporters and dissatisfaction among his sworn enemies. There are only two ways to end a revolution. The first is a radical one: the winner takes all but continues to face a vast number of dissatisfied groups and political leaders who may unite and begin a restoration [of the old power]. The other way involves compromise, and deals, if you like, which take into account the interests of as many sides as possible. But according to this scenario, there will always remain an element of discontent among the radicals. In my view, the probable winner, Yushchenko, is a politician prone to consensus and compromise. Many people accuse him of being indecisive. But perhaps his indecisiveness will lay the foundation of a future compromise. Yet it will be an unfortunate thing if this indecisiveness translates into the absence of a strategy.”
“Will the Kremlin revise its policy on the Ukrainian elections?”
“The key message of spin doctors and politicians who interfered with the Ukrainian elections is ‘We have won, but had our victory stolen. The events in Ukraine are the stratagems of a malicious third party, the West, America, and gentlemen in pith helmets.’ It is an attempt at self-exculpation by finding an enemy-traditional, tried-and-true, typically Stalinist rhetoric. It hasn’t yet been ruled out that these forces may go even further, given their immature lack of understanding of the ongoing processes. In this case they might again decide to support Yanukovych or seek another alternative to Yushchenko. But I believe that pragmatic reasoning will prevail, and they will not go that far.
“The very fact that entire political groups in Russia are refusing to recognize their defeat is symptomatic. Quite probably, this will cause a turn in Russia’s domestic politics. On the other hand, it’s an encouraging sign that Putin has finally said that if Ukraine wants to join Europe, the European Union should admit this country as a member. This proves that the president remains pragmatic and doesn’t want another cold war with the West over Ukraine. In my view, he will continue to follow this line because Putin is a wise man despite his numerous mistakes. I think he has come to realize that he risks losing the pro-Western vector in the name of which he began his first presidency. I do not rule out that Yushchenko’s first visit will be to Moscow, where they both will sit down at the table and try to reach an understanding over a cup of tea. After all, Putin had to talk to Saakashvili, whom he clearly couldn’t stomach at first. But they have since met and established some form of understanding, at least in what concerns Ajaria.”
“For how long will the events in Ukraine complicate Russia’s relations with the West?”
“Without a doubt, after the Russian leadership’s moves to restrict democracy in Russia and the events in Abkhazia and Ukraine, Russia’s partnership with Europe and America has suffered a major blow. Illusions about the possibility of positive transformations in the Russian political regime, and Russia’s rapprochement, and even integration with the West, have been laid to rest. The cooling of relations will continue, but the West will never go as far as to rekindle the cold war and confrontations with Moscow, at least as long as Putin’s pragmatism lasts. Russia plays too crucial a role as a geopolitical player, a factor of stability in Eurasia, an ally in the antiterrorist campaign, and an element of the global nuclear safety system. Therefore, the relationship of selective dialog and partnership will continue. Bush, Chirac, and Schroeder will do their utmost not to push Russia from the orbit of the Western world so as not to allow Russia to become marginalized. Putin, for his part, has also learned his lesson the hard way and will try to do everything not to enter a conflict with the West over Ukraine.”
“Are some of the stereotypes of the way Russia views Ukraine reversible?”
“Until recently, the Russian political elite viewed Ukraine as an extension of Russia, which accidentally found itself within the bounds of a ‘false sovereignty.’ Today they are forced to admit that it is hardly possible to manipulate this independent country. Another conclusion is that the West is not likely to allow Russia to manipulate and influence the post-Soviet space on the scale that it did before. The third conclusion is that Ukraine must be studied. Now it will attract greater attention because Ukraine is Russia’s major strategic partner, its bridge to the West or buffer zone between Russia and Europe. Ukraine is a major transport system and natural gas carrier.
“Perhaps the Russians will realize that they will have to give up the old Soviet myth about the fraternal Slavs. But I don’t rule out the strengthening of marginal groups that will use this process to reinforce the mobilization rhetoric inside the country, building on sentiments in Ukraine’s southeast. But I don’t believe that this nationalistically patriotic and noisy hysteria about Ukraine will play a decisive role.”
