Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry begins revising relations with Russia
Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Anatoly Zlenko has paid a working visit to Moscow, where he was received by President Vladimir Putin of Russia. This would be an absolutely routine piece of information, were it not for a number of accompanying circumstances. First, it was the new Ukrainian Foreign Minister’s first official visit, which in itself cannot but testify to some changes in the accents of Ukrainian foreign policy. Secondly, this was the first visit of a Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russia for quite a long time, which was perhaps a downside, given the natural importance for Ukraine of its relations with Russia. The point is not even in the fact that Russia still remains Ukraine’s principal source of energy resources and that all recent contacts have been shadowed by the problems of gas and Ukrainian debts. What perhaps became the greatest “achievement” of bilateral relations was a real, if cold, war which raged all through the summer after the events in Lviv, where composer Ihor Bilozir was murdered and the city authorities attempted to ban broadcasting Russian popular music. A whole series of Russian media publications on a new network of export-oriented gas pipelines, reportedly to bypass Ukrainian territory with the knowledge and consent of the West, can only stress the “successes” of Ukrainian diplomacy in the Russian direction.
This is why Mr. Zlenko had every reason to state before he began talks with his Russian counterpart, Igor Ivanov, that he was dissatisfied with the development of Ukrainian- Russian relations. In his opinion, the Russian vector of Ukrainian policy has failed to enlist appropriate support at the level of ministries and agencies, the relations saw “too long a pause” after signing the basic treaty, and this was taken advantage of by forces not interested in the development of strong ties between Ukraine and Russia. This is why Mr. Zlenko went to Moscow “to develop relations with Russia at the proper level.”
Such words might suggest that the ministers and presidents previously failed to tell something to the public at large. For example, that in the times of Minister Borys Tarasiuk, of whom Moscow took a dim view, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine had almost no relations with Russia, in any case, on a level which requires the use of a proper intellectual and other potential. A new center was never set up in Kyiv (either in the Foreign Ministry, which would be logical, or the Presidential Administration). There were only backstage semiofficial arguments over “exclusive rights” to deal with Russia. As experience shows, this had the worst possible effect on the state of relations.
It can already be concluded by the first results of Mr. Zlenko’s Moscow visit that it is no longer very important who will be the next person in charge of Russian- Ukrainian relations. After all, the presidents instructed precisely their foreign ministers to monitor the Sochi agreements.
What is Moscow’s attitude toward Mr. Zlenko is not a new question. In all probability, nobody has ever doubted that he will defend the interests of his own country, not of somebody else’s, doing this diplomatically but toughly. It will be recalled that none other than Mr. Zlenko negotiated the difficult issue of Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament culminating in signing the tripartite Ukrainian-US-Russian agreement in January 1994, which also provided for paying compensation to Ukraine for the armaments to be taken away. Despite all evil-minded comments, the Russian press then acknowledged the first success of Ukrainian diplomacy. And if precisely Mr. Zlenko gets down, as Mr. Ivanov put it, to “revising” vital bilateral relations, we can hardly expect him either to compromise on something that oversteps the limits of the reasonable or to show any enmity toward Russia.
On the other hand, Ukrainian Foreign Ministry sources believe that, with Mr. Zlenko in office, Ukrainian foreign policy, the Russian vector included, is bound to change for the better, but only if foreign policy will be dealt with by him alone.
Foreign policy is also connected with rather complicated cadre problems, if only for the reason that today in the embassies of Ukraine in Moscow and of Russia in Kyiv there are in fact no such bright and well- known figures, such wolves of diplomacy as former Russia Ambassador Yuri Dubinin. Nor are there any old guard representatives with tremendous experience of cooperation with former party apparatchiks, such as previous Ukrainian Ambassador Volodymyr Fedorov who could open any door in Moscow at any time. However, the change of power in the Kremlin also signaled the end of the good old days of no necktie meetings between presidents Kuchma and Yeltsin.
The time has come of vigorous, pragmatic, and sometimes very tough striped-pants diplomacy so vividly demonstrated during the Kuchma-Putin talks in Sochi on October 16. It seems to be almost impossible to clear the logjams on the Russian front without this. In all probability, Mr. Zlenko, given his huge experience, relative noninvolvement in the internal political life of Ukraine, and influential connections in Russia, might become a good man to fulfill the not-so-simple task of bringing Ukrainian- Russian relations to the elementary norm indispensable for the neighbors, no matter how different their interests might be.
Russia is also showing interest in normalizing the relationship: Interfax reports in particular that President Vladimir Putin of Russia convened last week a special session of the Security Council of Russia in order to work out the mechanism of fulfilling decisions aimed at the activation of bilateral relations. Yet, Mr. Putin simultaneously ordered speeding up the talks on constructing a gas pipeline bypassing Ukraine. In addition, according to Russian Vice Premier Viktor Khristenko, Ukrainian and Russian experts should coordinate their approaches to an intergovernmental agreement on the conditions of Turkmen gas transit to Ukraine. It is noteworthy that Mr. Khristenko noted that transit tariffs will be the same for Ukraine as those for Russia on Ukrainian territory. This seems fair at first glance — the rules should be the same for all — unless we take into account one small detail: the Russian transit quantities are far higher.
Obviously, there is vast room for diplomatic work. The more so that Moscow, under the circumstances mentioned, is not going to drop its attacking thrust in bilateral relations.
With this in view, we can conclude: with all due respect for Minister Zlenko, diplomatic efforts alone will not suffice. Ukraine must finally put an end to the practice of having several foreign policies: presidential, parliamentary, governmental, etc. The current time requires a consolidated, coordinated, and clear policy exclusively based on our national interests. Russia, incidentally, can only serve as an example here. And the Russian vector can become the first one on which our state could test a truly pro-Ukrainian policy.
