Ukrainian Question Posed to Brussels

President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko is off on his second European trip after inauguration, this time visiting Brussels and Strasbourg. He is taking part in a Ukraine-NATO Commission summit meeting today and will address the European Parliament tomorrow. Not coincidentally, his and President Bush’s European tours are taking place at the same time, and the extraordinary NATO summit in Brussels yesterday served as another proof. George Bush tried to sell a New America to the Old and New Europe, while Viktor Yushchenko wanted to introduce a New Ukraine closely associated with his name. As it is, Europe is warily watching a new-old Bush, while trying to ward off, using verbiage and other diplomatic means, Ukraine’s current tangible pressure (even if mostly in terms of declarations so far). It so happened that changes in Ukraine coincided with the incredibly complicated process altering the Transatlantic partnership content and form. Under the circumstances, neither NATO nor EU can be discussed using terms dating from the late 1990s, yet there are many who would want nothing better than, for example, an early 1990s status quo.

First Vice Premier Oleh Rybachuk flew to Brussels, where the Ukraine-EU Action Plan was to be assigned, before the Ukrainian president’s arrival. On several previous occasions he had made it clear that Ukraine would formally apply for EU membership soon — in a matter of months if not days. But then it had transpired that not all cabinet members were familiar with all the action plan clauses, particularly those dealing with cooperation in the energy and transport spheres (e.g., transport corridors). The action plan, drawn up within the European neighborhood policy framework, appears an adequate instrument which might well serve as a supplement to the Ukraine-EU agreement made ten years ago.

If only it contained specific membership progress landmarks. The ten clauses worked out by EU in the last couple of months offer no answer to the question why definitions such as European neighbors are applied to Ukraine he last couple of months offer no answer to the question why definitions such as European neighbor are applied to Ukraine, on a par with Morocco, and not to Switzerland or Iceland that are not EU members. Or what was there to hamper a dialogue on visa concessions (rather than restrictions) a number of years ago; who is there to benefit from portraying all Ukrainians as potential illegal immigrants; what is there to prevent such migration flows being legalized (as was done many years ago with regard to people from Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Poland)? Diplomats and law enforcement agencies in various EU countries are still unable to provide statistics adequately illustrating the public attitude to such visa restrictions, and whether they really help combat drug trafficking, white slave labor, arms sales, and so on. Moreover, German police statistics show that people from EU countries mostly perpetrate such rimes. Explaining this to ordinary people in Austria or the Netherlands is easier said than done. Heads of governments, saying that their public opinion is not prepared to see Ukraine as potential EU member, appear to rely on that public opinion. However, very similar statements were made fifteen years ago in regard to Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Lithuania. Political decisions were made on these countries in the mid-1990s miraculously changed the leading media editorial policies as well as social moods. Apparently, speaking in the European Parliament once, twice, even ten times won’t be enough to change this attitude. But this must be done, while shouldering the heavy burden of domestic work (something the previous Ukrainian administration though best to avoid). There must be a consistent diplomatic to achieve a major breakthrough. In fact, some members of the European Commission point to this need.

Ukraine-NATO relationships are in a complicated phase, owing to a number of factors. President Yushchenko could be right to refuse to comment on Ukraine’s NATO membership prospects. Officials from Brussels, NATO countries, and affiliated research centers admit that the alliance is in a state when the old identity is being lost and the new one has to be worked out forthwith. European countries are getting increasingly convinced that the point at issue is not so much the proverbial US umbrella as the need to establish an equal partnership and to learn to come to terms. There are several factors: President Chirac refusing to accept President Bush’s policy, on the one hand, and Schroeder facing domestic political problems on the other, resulting in Washington being openly opposed by Berlin and Paris. Add to this London’s heartfelt desire to see a solid Trans-Atlantic Alliance relying on new principles, including the countries of New Europe prepared to support Washington. What makes the German-French position vulnerable is that they aren’t offering any alternatives, just as they don’t seem to be inclined to seek an understanding. Be that as it may, George Bush’s European tour could be regarded as the first step made in that direction. The more so that Mr. Bush has been using the word Europe increasingly often in a positive context. After inauguration, he has on several occasions declared that it was necessary to revise the relationships. The Brussels summit will be trial ground where the interested parties will show precisely how they are prepared to meet each other halfway, considering the global political changes, without pretending that nothing much has happened.

The Ukrainian issue will be one of the touchstones showing the alliance’s preparedness not only to save by patching up the holes, but also to adequately respond to the current situation. NATO may become a powerful Transatlantic tool — this concept is popular with many analytical centers in the member countries, especially considering the problems of the Middle East, Persian Gulf, and the Black Sea. In this context the importance of Ukraine as a country capable of carrying out its mission as security contributor will only increase. Frequent visits of NATO analysts to Kyiv and other factors are proof that work is underway to determine the climate and content of these relationships. On the other hand, it is clearly apparent that a tremendous amount of work (revising the existing military inspection reports, functions, strength, operating level of the armed services, bringing domestic military standards into conformity with those of NATO) will have to carried out come what may. The year remaining till the parliamentary elections in Ukraine is perhaps not the best time for making declarations about a Euro-Atlantic future, yet it’s time enough to accomplish a great deal, including the creation of a pro-Ukrainian “lobby” in Europe and the United States. Much will depend on George Bush’s personal response to Viktor Yushchenko and the tone set when discussing the Ukrainian issue with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Bratislava. Much will also depend on how Ukraine will measure up to the promises being made by the president and the cabinet. Ukraine has for the first time received an opportunity to make those regarding themselves as leading players of the world political game to treat this country with respect. Make, not ask as them to do so, for such as the rules of the game.