Under the disguise of democratization

Transnistria is again in the limelight. Moscow’s Nezavisimaya Gazeta wrote that “Tiraspol wants to replace the peacekeeping mission on the Dnister with Russia’s military base. According to a source in the environment of Transnistria’s president, Yevgenii Shevchuk discussed this prospect with vice foreign minister of the Russian Federation, Secretary of State Grigorii Karasin, during the latter’s visit. This would enable Transnistria to counteract the Romanian threat which, according to security minister Vladislav Finagin, will gain momentum after Romania’s president Traian Basescu resumes power.”

The news caused a lot of commotion, especially in Chisinau and Bucharest. Such sharp statements and offers stem from the results of the recent referendum in Romania. Due to a low turnout, the results were void, and President Basescu remains in power. Meanwhile, Basescu is known as an ardent champion of annexing Moldova. Given that the Chisinau leadership (including the incumbent President Nicolae Timofti) teams with supporters of unionism, Tiraspol would raise walls. In a conversation with Karasin, the Moldovian president said straightforwardly: “Your time in Moldova is out. The peacemaking forces in the Dnister security zone have accomplished their mission and must be replaced with a civil mission under an international mandate.” He reiterated this statement, which is also backed by the EU and US, observers in the negotiations on the Transnistrian conflict.

Moscow had had serious fears that the process of reintegration might begin once Shevchuk became president of Transnistria. A series of steps of the new leadership in Tiraspol, meant to span the two banks of the Dnister, might lay foundations for the prospective unification. However, Moscow slammed the brakes.

That was even easier, due to the critical economic and financial situation in Transnistria. Shevchuk’s predecessor Igor Smirnov left the treasury almost empty, and there was no money to pay salaries to the state-financed employees. Without financial and economic aid from Moscow, default loomed large and seemed inevitable. After waiting long enough to make Shevchuk totally spooked, Moscow started to transfer money. Yet there remains a huge debt for gas, approximately 3.5 billion dollars. The debt had been amassing for years, and Tiraspol is merely unable to pay it. This leaves Moscow with plenty of strings to pull.

During Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency, Moscow negotiated with Berlin to find the solution to the Transnistrian crisis on the basis of Moldova’s territorial integrity. The plan provided for gradual withdrawal of Russian military peacekeepers from the territory of the unrecognized republic. With Vladimir Putin’s formal return to power, the situation has somewhat changed.

This became immediately perceived within the triangle Tiraspol – Chisinau – Bucharest. The Romanian leadership literally doubled effort to Romanize Moldova. Bucharest makes little secret of the fact that Romania only recognizes Moldova as a whole, complete with Transnistria – i.e., the left bank of the Dnister. Expansionists’ plans expand even farther. The hottest heads dream of Ukraine’s territory as well. A graphic example can be seen in the incident with Serghei Lascu, leader of the Romanian ultra-nationalist National-Christian movement Noua Dreapta (New Right). He was detained at the Ukrainian border, whereupon a border guard officer announced that Lascu was a persona non grata in Ukraine and that he was denied entry for five years. The reason for this was “the organization in South Bessarabia and North Bukovyna of actions which posed threat to the territorial integrity of Ukrainian state.”

A new round of political games began for Moldova and Transnistria. Russia’s vice foreign minister Karasin, who visited Tiraspol to take part in the celebrations on occasion of the 20th anniversary of the peacekeeping operation on the Dnister, said that the Chisinau-Tiraspol conflict must be solved by way of Moldova’s annexation of Transnistria as a special region. At a forum, held on the same occasion, Karasin went even farther as he said that Russia did not rule out the solution of the Transnistrian crisis via federalization of Moldova.

It is quite possible that Moscow is working on the federalization option simultaneously with the creation of a military base in Transnistria, by way of saying “thank you” for the help with reintegration. And while the news of the base received an enthusiastic welcome in Tiraspol, Chisinau and Bucharest broke out in protest so violent that Karasin had to deny any such plans in his brief interview to the Russian newspaper Kommersant. “The foreign theoretical speculations to the effect that Russia wants to have its outpost here are completely artificial. We have no interest in this.”

Surprisingly, there has been increasingly frequent talk of federalization – not only of Moldova, but also Ukraine. Is this a pure coincidence? Viktor Medvedchuk’s initiative is hardly a mere chance, if his old-time connections in Moscow are not to be discarded.

Putin’s return to presidency ushered in a political revision on most of the post-Soviet space. RBC Daily reports that Kremlin will now build its relations with the CIS and Baltic states on the basis of detailed analytical reports, rather than on the spur of the moment. The Kremlin’s analytical materials will consider the influence groups in Central Asia and forecast Ukraine’s fate in case of possible federalization. The Presidential Administration is prepared to spend from 400,000 to 1,400,000 rubles per report. Sergei Markov, too, confirms this information. “Government used to act on the impulse, but when new possibilities appeared, it began to rely on the latest technology.”

At last, Moscow has now come to realize that direct bribery of the ruling elites of the neighboring countries has become obsolete. They will accept money and resources at preferential prices, yet the seekers of “unions” and “spaces” are all wrong characters. Why accept Kyrgyzstan to the Customs Union if its leadership is as comfortable as a cat on a hot tin roof, trying to maneuver among Moscow, Washington, and Beijing? Tajikistan is even worse, as Moscow has to consider Iran’s special interest. Uzbekistan has broken loose altogether. So the Kremlin begins to act more subtly – or at least so it will have us believe.

Moscow thinks that in case the federalization of Moldova turns out to be a success, the same model can be applied to Ukraine as well, and this would give an opportunity for a more effective influence on Chisinau and Kyiv. The main objective is to weaken the territorial integrity, make some regions become closer to Moscow. In other words, instead of buying the whole country, only some regions will be bought. It is “cheap but good” tactics.

The new potentialities of Moscow politics should not be underestimated. Their main point is pushing the idea that is destructive for Moldovan and Ukrainian statehood under the cover of democratization. The analog of such policy is the so-called language law. Its defenders shield themselves with European standards, references to democracy and human rights. It is not important that their shield is too thin. To some extent it finds a reflection within Ukraine. But most importantly, it gives Moscow another reason to put pressure on Kyiv. It is not the greatest one, but still, it clearly shows that Moscow is well supplied with ideas that put the state integrity of CIS countries in danger.

So, we move to Kyiv’s sluggish and insensible politics in such an important for Ukraine Moldovan-Transnistrian direction. Moscow’s activity in Transnistria has never benefitted our country. And if we are standing on the firm foundation of Moldova’s territorial integrity, we should give a clear statement on the federalization of the neighboring country. And do it for our own sake.

COMMENTARY

Oazu NANTOI, program director, Institute of Social Policy (Chisinau):

“What military base can be created on this tiny piece of land with unrecognized status, that solely depends on Ukraine and will provoke the scandal?! What tasks does this base have to solve? This information is mere nonsense, thrown into the mass media.

“And concerning Tiraspol’s new administration, I do not recognize Shevchuk as a president. He is the head of the illegitimate government on the part of the territory of the Republic of Moldova. This whole ‘pro-Russian’ talk depends on the following things: a) the special operation group of Russian military forces serves as protection for Russian secret agencies, which control Shevchuk; b) Transnistrian regime is bankrupt (their budget deficit is over 70 percent), and it is financed by the Russian Federation. Transnistria does not pay for Russian gas they use, and their gas debt has already exceeded 3 billion dollars for a population that is less than a half of the population of Chisinau. Besides, Shevchuk has no freedom of action whatsoever, even if we assume he dares to think about any other options [of exiting the currently existing situation. – Ed.]. They simply do not exist, because Russia keeps him underfoot. This explains the pro-Russian policy of this region.”

Interviewed by Ihor SAMOKYSH, The Day