What church do we call “our own”?

Now that Ukraine is celebrating the 1,020th anniversary of the baptism of Rus’, sociologists would like to know Ukrainian attitudes to some historical landmarks in Ukraine that are connected with the establishment of Christianity here, as well as peoples’ attitudes to the creation of a single Local Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

This is the substance of the discussions being conducted by President Viktor Yushchenko and our leading clergymen. A public opinion survey carried out by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KMIS) indicates that the residents of western Ukraine have the best grasp of history or at least have an unbiased attitude to it: 78 percent of residents there said that “only Ukraine” or “probably Ukraine” is the successor of Kyivan Rus’. Nationwide, 55 percent of respondents gave this answer, with the fewest number of respondents who share this viewpoint living in the eastern regions. Only slightly more than 35 percent are convinced that Ukraine can be called the successor of Kyivan Rus’.

The sociologists obtained even more interesting information from the answers to the questions, “Which Orthodox church has a greater right to be considered the historical successor to the Orthodox church established in Kyivan Rus’ 1,020 years ago?” and “What is your attitude to the formation of a single Local Orthodox Church in Ukraine? Valerii KHMELKO, the president of KMIS and a professor at the Sociology Department at National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, told The Day why there are such different views of history and the peculiarities of the national religious cross-section.

Professor Khmelko, everybody studied history in school, but for some reason, as many as 23 percent of eastern Ukrainians and 16 percent of those in the south consider present-day Russia to be the successor of Kyivan Rus’. There are many Ukrainians who find it difficult to answer this question: 16 percent nationwide, about 17 percent in central and southern Ukraine, and 26 percent in the east. Why is that?

“To a large extent this is connected to interpretations of the history of Kyivan Rus’ that people are hearing. For example, many historical events that are important to both Ukraine and Russia are interpreted in Russia in its own way, quite differently from the way it is done here. This applies primarily to the Russian mass media, particularly television. This information is mostly received in the eastern and southern regions, which are predominantly populated by Russian-speaking people.

“The other factor is that monoethnic Ukrainians, i.e., people who consider themselves only Ukrainians, form a vast majority in the western region (more than 90 percent), while they account for only 32 percent in the eastern part.

And when I see that only 34 percent of eastern Ukrainians share the view that Ukraine is the successor to Kyivan Rus’, I conclude that this is in fact the opinion of monoethnic Ukrainians. Our research shows that people who consider themselves half- Russians and half-Ukrainians account for more than 40 percent in the east — they refer to themselves as belonging to two nationalities; hence the results.”

Does this mean that, no matter how the history of Ukraine is taught in schools or universities, people still interpret it in their own ways?

“Textbooks with a new interpretation of Ukrainian history appeared not so long ago, so only young people have been exposed to an interpretation of the history of Kyivan Rus’ other than the one that was offered during the Soviet era. But I looked at the attitude to this among different age groups and found no radical differences — the results are approximately the same. So textbooks are only the beginning. We need a generation that will know not only the material from textbooks but will also learn to think and search for relevant, unbiased information on their own. But the most difficult thing is the emotional element in treating history. This is the scene of a never-ending battle not only over the attitude to history but also over language, NATO, or the Russia-Belarus union. The farther west in the country, the more there are people who are oriented to the West and, vice versa, the farther east, the more there are people who like the idea of cooperation with Russia.”

It is surprising that many people found it difficult to answer: 18 percent of Ukrainians could not say whether Ukraine or Russia is the successor to Kyivan Rus’, and in the eastern regions this percentage reaches 26.

“Psychologists call this an ambivalent attitude. But the point is that they have no alternative to the idea that both Russia and Ukraine are successors to the same extent. A sizable part adheres to this viewpoint, and they find it hard to prefer either of the countries.”

When respondents were asked which of the Orthodox churches has a greater right to be considered the historical successor to the Orthodox church established in Kyivan Rus’ 1,020 years ago, a little more than 32 percent and 15 percent named the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate and that of the Moscow Patriarchate, respectively. But it is noteworthy that 37 percent of respondents in almost every part of Ukraine found it difficult to answer this question. What explains this indecision?

“The percentage is even higher in the eastern regions — 43 percent. The point is that this is a very complicated question, the question of canonicity. It is not just ordinary people who cannot give a clear answer — we have very few experts who can explain this. Up to 36 percent of people with a higher education admitted that it is difficult for them to say something on this subject. Regionally, 25 percent of eastern Ukrainians consider the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) the legal successor to the church established in Kyivan Rus’, and 17 percent named the Russian Orthodox Church. Most churches in this region belong to this patriarchate, so it is little wonder that they give such a response: this church is closer to them. The church that claims that it offers liturgies in Ukrainian is in fact doing this in the Russian language. This is another, linguistic, aspect of the problem.”

Clearly, Ukrainians also find it difficult to form an opinion about a single Local Ukrainian Orthodox Church: your survey shows that about 34 percent of people do not know what this is: 31 percent in the center, 38 in the south, and as many as 51 in the east. The largest number of supporters of a Local Church — 38 percent — is in the west. Is this related to the number of people who consider themselves believers, and why are people unaware of what a Local Church is?

“To know this, you must have some information. But where can the man in the street get it? Have you seen any educational programs on the radio and television or newspaper publications on this subject? As a sociologist, I have not studied this, and most people are unaware. And when the president speaks about the necessity of establishing a Local Church in Ukraine, he never explains what this is, and this idea is therefore interpreted through the prism of people’s attitudes to the president’s personality. It is, after all, not the president’s business to explain the essence. I don’t think it is related to people’s religiousness, although the difference in the number of believers in the various regions is as large as it was before: those who consider themselves atheists account for over 44 percent in the eastern region and 8.5 percent in the west. Those who say they belong to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate make up 31 percent in the west and 8.5 percent in the east. Conversely, 18 percent in the western region and 30 percent in the east lean towards the Moscow Patriarchate. Incidentally, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church has more followers in the western regions than anywhere else in Ukraine: 31 percent versus 1 percent in the central region and practically nobody (0.2) in the south and east.”

Do you think the formation of a Local Church could solve the question of unifying the Ukrainian people and other spiritual problems?

“How can we form one denomination, one patriarchate, in the current situation? I have not heard even one rational idea on this issue. There are so many different religious currents in Ukraine that it is very difficult to say if they could unite under a certain patriarchate. As time goes by, the number of denominations is increasing instead of decreasing. There was a time when there was only one Christian church; then it began to split. And they are not getting united but disunited over all kinds of details and nuances of faith, which makes it very difficult for a layman to understand this unless he seriously looks into the matter. The historical process shows that we are witnessing differentiation, not integration, of religious confessions. What are the stimuli for them to gather, figuratively speaking, under the same roof?”

This means that when people answer the question about their attitudes to the creation of a single Local Ukrainian Church based on either the Kyiv or Moscow patriarchates, without knowing too much about the matter, they are...

“...doing this according to their preferences — they name those who are closer to them. I think only theologians can answer this. Those who want Ukraine to have a Local Church should know what this is (in principle, this means that other churches will either have to join one or disappear). But all the churches that we have want to go on existing as they do now.”