What kind of Ukraine does Russia need?

Arkady MOSHES, Chief of the Security Sector for Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic Region, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow:

“It could show the absence of a clear policy toward the post-Soviet space, including Ukraine. There’s a paradox here, but nothing new. In Yeltsin’s era there were attempts to reduce the influence of the Communists in Russia, though they weren’t quite successful.

“Another matter is Russia’s decision, for reasons unknown to me, to play high on the eve of [March 31, 2002] parliamentary elections in Ukraine. This was a strategically near-sighted move. Considering the possibility of Viktor Yushchenko’s return to the post of Prime Minister, considering the role his faction will play in the parliament, moreover considering the prospects for the 2004 presidential elections, it was at least unwise to cut themselves off from this faction.

“Obviously, Russia is interested in a stable, economically sovereign, and friendly Ukraine, not a stagnating Ukraine.

“There’s another aspect worth mentioning here. I’ve always been against describing political processes in Ukraine as a loan translation from the Russian political process with 3-4 years’ lag. What happened during the parliamentary elections shows that there really is no duplication. Ukraine lacks anya structure similar to Russia’s Yedinstvo [Unity]. But it has forces that emerged thanks to consolidation of liberal reform circles and moderate nationalists. These forces are interested in changing the regime rather than personalities. Russia has never had this, Ukraine has it. So Ukraine is no longer a field for repeating Russian techniques and Russian mistakes.”

Mykhailo HONCHAR, Vice President of the Strategy-1 Foundation:

“Ukraine remains a sort of field of phantoms for both the Russian public and the political establishment. I think this attitude explains which of the Ukrainian political forces Russia prefers to deal with. The attitude toward the Ukrainian Communists might be entirely different from their attitude toward the Russian Communists. The latter objectively hamper economic development, so they are being pushed off the political stage. The attitude toward the Ukrainian Communists follows a different criterion: they are for the closest possible alliance with Russia, so their pro-Russian orientation is the basic factor in Moscow’s attitude toward them. Moscow can connive at the skidding economic reforms in Ukraine. The problems Ukraine has because of that help Russia make economic profits, particularly in the process of privatization in Ukraine. Because of the absence of a clear and consistent domestic economic policy in this country, the bulk of Ukrainian heavy industries are now directly or indirectly controlled by Russian financial industrial groups. If the Ukrainian Communists continue to brake reforms, this would be objectively beneficial for Russia.

“I think the outcome of parliamentary elections in Ukraine has been quite beneficial for Russia. Moscow would be most satisfied to see a coalition of the parties which the Kremlin believes to support active Russo-Ukrainian relations: SDPU(o) [Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United)], CPU [Communist Party of Ukraine] and the For a United Ukraine bloc. But I don’t think there’ll be any drama for Russia if the parliamentary majority is formed by [Yushchenko’s] Our Ukraine bloc, Yuliya Tymoshenko’s bloc and the Socialists. For all the declared pro-Western orientation of Our Ukraine and Tymoshenko’s bloc, a number of their members who entered the parliament have close business ties with Russia. In fact, in the eighteen months of his premiership, Yushchenko never made clear his foreign political priorities. I think that regardless of all expectations of some sharp turn toward the West, should the coalition be headed by Our Ukraine, Ukraine will not change its course, and it would not take Russia very long to find a common language both with its old partners and the other blocs in the Ukrainian parliament.”