Who Stands to Gain from Our Cold Peace?
The issue of antimissile — either the US national, European non-strategic, or purely Russian — defense has again been in the highlight of the week. And it seems likely to remain such for a long time.
This is a difficult issue, for it contains a host of vestiges of the past, various questions, and uncertainty. There are differing views and traditions that cause diplomatic altercation. There are no distinct and clear answers. And it is difficult to see who is right or wrong.
There are things requiring no additional explanation. Among those who unequivocally lost in the Cold War are the military-industrial giants which find it hard now to secure orders worth billions. Many strategists on both sides of the Atlantic, who studied and were formed in the period of confrontation, felt very comfortable, and most of them find it next to impossible to understand that the confrontation, at least the way it was, no longer exists. If the West, particularly the US, is to be considered an unambiguous victor in the Cold War, there must also be the losers, but Moscow is clearly loath to play this role any longer.
Simple logic suggests there can be no eternal truces, especially if the conditions under which they were signed undergo radical change. Yet, this does not mean revising the basic principles of international security. What is perhaps worth doing is attempting to put the equilibrium, based on the guaranteed mutual destruction, onto a different, more rational and modern, basis. It is the unreadiness to do so that characterizes both the administration of George Bush fils, reportedly an outright minion of the military- industrial complex, and President Vladimir Putin, who tries to raise the international prestige of Russia proceeding from Soviet ideas.
What should have put Washington on its guard is that the tests of a very expensive system have so far yielded no positive results. As a result, it could turn out that huge money will be squandered as far as the system’s effectiveness and international security are concerned. For in Western Europe, only Great Britain unequivocally supports Washington’s plans.
The so-called non-strategic antimissile system for Europe that Moscow tried so hard to tout the other day also arouses great doubts because Russia clearly lacks both the necessary funds and trust. It is lack of trust that invalidated the joint Ukrainian-Russian-European project to build the An-70-based cargo aircraft, although at that time this was connected with far lesser responsibility. Neither France, Germany, nor Italy are exactly bursting to become dependent on Moscow, which seems inevitable should they approve the new antimissile deal.
Washington’s efforts to emphasize the necessity of an adequate retaliation to possible missile attacks by North Korea, Iraq, Iran and other blacklisted countries cannot call forth much delight. Nor do they look like proposals to establish deeper mutual understanding and responsibility. Moreover, Moscow was accused of helping to strengthen America’s enemies.
Obviously, both sides are resorting to kind of a bluff that at best could result in a lasting cold peace from which the military industry will stand to gain in the short term and nobody in the long term. Perhaps the tension needs to be defused in a nontraditional way while it does not yet threaten to become a conflict. It seems, however, that those capable of doing such filigree work are in short supply everywhere.
