Who Will Win Their Votes?

The ratings of the leftist forces are dipping, yet their representatives remain influential simply because their leadership is a highly desirable bargaining chip before the second round of the election campaign. This assumption is driven by polls reflecting the political moods in Ukraine on the eve of the presidential election-provided, of course, none of the campaigners pulls off a special stunt.

Practically every serious sociological study conducted in late summer and early fall has shown that the two most popular presidential candidates, Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych, are far ahead of the other contenders. The Democratic Initiatives Foundation and SOCIS conducted the latest polls on Sept. 1- 4. The results show that 31% of the electorate are prepared to vote for Our Ukraine’s leader Viktor Yushchenko, 24% for Premier Viktor Yanukovych, 7% for the Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko, 6.5% for the head of the Socialist Party Oleksandr Moroz, and 2% for the Progressive Socialist Natalia Vitrenko in the first round.

Thus, it is safe to assume that no left-leaning contender will make it to the finals, a marked distinction between this year’s presidential race and the one in 1999.

At the same time, the total ratings of the three major candidates amount to 15-16%, a potential which, if put on the Yushchenko- Yanukovych scales, may well secure each candidate’s victory, considering, among other things, that both are keeping level with each other (and are likely to keep going that way until they cross the finish line). On the other hand, without the left’s 15-16%, neither of the favorites can count on winning the required 50+1% votes. Therefore, the communist-socialist electorate will determine the winner of the second round.

Although the communist electorate, specifically Petro Symonenko’s supporters, is one-third smaller than it was in 1999, it is the most numerous among leftist voters. Whom will they back if the Communist Party of Ukraine has to choose between Yushchenko and Yanukovych? Ideologically, the forces rallying round Viktor Yushchenko are hardened opponents of the communists; the latter have identified the former as bourgeois nationalists, a terms coined back in the Stalinist period. The Reds may also view Yanukovych as a class enemy, considering his market economy stand. However, an undeniable advantage, so far as the left are concerned, is his image as a pro-Russian politician. Had this election campaign been held at the start of Ukrainian independence, the communist choice would have been indisputable, as any alliance between Ukrainian national patriots and communists was unthinkable in those days. Recent political realities, however, show that right-communist cooperation is an actual possibility, at least when they are facing a common opponent, the powers that be. Quite recently, a year or year and a half ago, the anti-governmental “Group Four” parliamentary coalition collaborated rather well, staging joint rallies in front of parliament.

Among the participants were Yushchenko and Tymoshenko’s people, but also supporters of the communist leader Petro Symonenko and socialist Oleksandr Moroz. So the possibility of some of the communist electorate backing Viktor Yushchenko should not be dismissed — and the same applies to Viktor Yanukovych. “In Soviet times, being called a nationalist in the east of Ukraine was the same as being called a murderer,” Leonid Kravchuk, MP (SDPU (U)), the first president of Ukraine, told The Day, adding, “it made the communists’ hair stand on end and their eyes bulge. To them, being a nationalist was something really horrible. All my attempts to explain that being a nationalist didn’t mean being a fascist, only a normal individual who loved his native land, were never understood.” Mr. Kravchuk believes that if the CPU urges its electorate to make up their minds in the second tour, even without identifying the candidate, most of them would vote for Yanukovych. “Be that as it may, Viktor Yushchenko is associated with nationalist forces,” noted Leonid Kravchuk. Political scientist Volodymyr Malynkovych generally agrees with him, believing that three-quarters of the communist electorate are likely to back Viktor Yanukovych: “Communist voters will think along Banderite lines as friends of Russia; they see nationalism and fascism, on the one hand, and common history, the Great Patriotic War fought together with Russia, a single Soviet Union, and so on, on the other hand... our communists are communists not because they are on the left, but because they are nostalgic for the past.”

People’s Deputy Oleh Zarubinsky (NDP) voices a somewhat different opinion: “The communist electorate isn’t as homogeneous as meets the eye. They have a nucleus, people willing to cast their ballots as the leader instructs them. Yet there are also many impoverished people who remember who issued their pensions, regardless of how this was arranged... Another aspect is that Viktor Yushchenko’s campaign has become more socially oriented, so a large part of the communist electorate, especially in the countryside, may vote for the leader of Our Ukraine.” Mr. Zarubinsky’s colleague Oleksandr Volkov, who is not affiliated with any fraction, thinks that those who vote for Petro Symonenko in the first round might find themselves divided fifty-fifty between Yushchenko and Yanukovych in the second round. Mr. Volkov believes that some of the communist Symonenko’s voters may back the “nationalist” Viktor Yushchenko because many ordinary Ukrainians are dissatisfied with what is happening in the socioeconomic sphere. “People aren’t living any better, actually, so they will seek another stand, a person other than the one representing the government. The current political system has made every effort to get Viktor Yanukovych fully involved and affiliated as a candidate, automatically shifting all of its negative experience, all its goofs on his shoulders,” said Oleksandr Volkov.

Heorhiy Kriuchkov, an influential member of the communist fraction in Verkhovna Rada, agrees that the communist electorate’s voting in the second round will be determined by socioeconomic factors. The premier may benefit from the implementation next year of his concept of maintaining minimum pensions and salaries at the living wage level. At the same time Kriuchkov believes that domestic and foreign political factors will not play a major role. The CPU fraction member stresses that “neither candidate is good enough” for his party. But the Communist Party will make its final choice depending on the situation, even prior to the election date. He further assumes that most of the CPU electorate, faced with the Yushchenko-Yanukovych alternative, will vote against both candidates.

Despite a certain ideological similarity between the CPU and SPU, the same interlocutors appear to have polarized views on the positioning of the socialist party’s electorate. Most respondents agree that Oleksandr Moroz’s electorate has an acutely oppositional, antigovernment attitude. So “those who are accustomed to voting for Moroz will vote for Yushchenko, against the government,” Oleksandr Volkov says with conviction.

The nationality factor is of lesser importance to the socialists, although some among the socialist electorate — especially in central Ukraine-may regard Yanukovych’s pro — Russian stance as a negative factor. In an interview with The Day several months ago, Yosyp Vinsky, a major socialist party functionary, was asked whom the socialists would support if and when Yanukovych and Yushchenko made it to the second round. He said they would never back Yanukovych. True, several days ago, Yosyp Vinsky said that choosing between Yushchenko and Yanukovych was like choosing between two evils, as “neither of the candidates is acceptable to the socialists.”

Our Ukraine MP Borys Bespalov claims this year’s elections are not ideological, so in the second round the leftist electorate will support the one whom they consider to be the most decent. MP Mykola Tomenko, another member of Viktor Yushchenko’s team, singles out emotional attitude among those factors capable of influencing the voters’ choice; whether or not a given candidate supports the government; also the ideological factor (which he believes is least important). Taras Chornovil, a former Yushchenko fraction member, views it differently: “Both sides are too certain that the leftist electorate will support them. When I hear from Our Ukraine people that communist voters will cast their ballots fifty-fifty, or that slightly more than one-half of the communists will vote for Yushchenko, I feel like laughing out loud. Likewise, I don’t think many of them will vote for Yanukovych in the second round. The leftist electorate will most likely vote with their feet, and no one will go to the polling stations.”

Politicians and experts agree that in the eyes of the leftist electorate Viktor Yushchenko has quite an edge because he refuses to accept the existing regime and its candidate — an attitude more manifest in the socialist camp — and because he takes a dim view of the cabinet’s socioeconomic policy. Experts also believe that this electorate can be encouraged to back Viktor Yanukovych by means of arguments connected with the foreign and national cultural policies, as well as by the government’s achievements in resolving acute socioeconomic problems. Practically all the experts agree that more supporters of the SPU will vote for Yushchenko in the second tour than the CPU, and that the reverse will be true with regard to Yanukovych. Experts’ findings are corroborated by the poll results mentioned above. Thus, 40.3% of Moroz supporters said they would back Yushchenko, but only 20.9% of Symonenko’s followers followed suit, compared to 18.6% of Moroz supporters and 26.4% of Symonenko’s adherents. For the moment these results preclude predicting the winner, since the main battle has yet to take place. Volodymyr Malynkovych believes that the leftist electorate may be seriously influenced in the second round by the status of political reform. If this reform is actually carried out, says Mr. Malynkovych, it will mean that the president will no longer deal with any social projects or the economy, so the left will no longer view Viktor Yanukovych as a dangerous figure. This will allow him to win additional CPU and SPU votes, and this may well decide the outcome of the 2004 presidential campaign.

The striking similarity between this year’s five leading presidential candidates and those of 1999 (with three leftist party candidates vying in both cases) leaves one wondering about the rate at which this society is struggling to change for the better, as well as about its maturity. The experience of Ukraine’s former socialist neighbors shows that leftists are losing influence in those countries where social, economic, and political reforms are effectively underway. Therefore, the Ukrainian electorate’s persisting confidence in forces adhering to leftist ideologies is further proof that reforms are considerably slower at the microeconomic level than are required in the course of transforming mass consciousness. In this fourteenth year of strengthening the Ukrainian state, the man in the street is only just now beginning to feel the effects of all-embracing reform processes, and is barely aware of his connection to them. For that reason the so-called nostalgia of a large part of the older generation, most vulnerable to such upheavals-for the days of the state’s paternalistic attitude toward its citizens is likely to remain the biggest trump in the hands of leftist presidential candidates vying in election campaigns at all levels. An analysis of the status of Ukrainian society, proceeding from the division of votes between the leading presidential candidates in 2004, will very likely be one of the main results of this presidential fall season.