Yevhen MARCHUK:

William Taylor, the US Ambassador to Ukraine, has said that a number of North Atlantic Treaty Organization member states are prepared to support Ukraine’s request to join the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP).

On Jan. 15 President Viktor Yushchenko, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, and Parliamentary Speaker Arsenii Yatseniuk sent a message to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Schaeffer about Ukraine’s readiness to join the MAP. The Ukrainian leaders expressed the hope that a positive decision will be made at the NATO springtime summit in Bucharest. On Jan. 18 “the Letter of the Three” was handed to the NATO secretary general. On the same day the opposition, namely, the Party of Regions and the Communist Party, demanded that the speaker rescind his signature and then proceeded to block the parliamentary session.

Meanwhile, every day the Kremlin issues statements that traditionally maintain that in the event of a practical rapprochement between Ukraine and NATO, Russia will have to revise its relations with our country and adopt “adequate measures.”

In other words, to paraphrase the words of a classic, one can say with certainty that everything flows but nothing changes. The Ukraine-NATO subject remains a habitual trump card of the opponents of Euro-Atlantic integration, which they actively play in a dubious, if not speculative, game.

Meanwhile, the supporters of this course prefer to keep a discreet silence, perhaps for fear of losing precious electoral votes. Experts say that 10 percent of Ukrainian citizens who visit Western Europe from time to time are very well aware of why they favor Ukraine’s accession to the North Atlantic alliance. Their key argument is the high living standards in EU and NATO countries. Why is the state, which has taken a necessary, if belated, step on the road to NATO, not conducting informational efforts in this sphere? Will Ukraine be granted access to the MAP at the April summit in Bucharest? If so, how long will it take to fulfill the plan and when can Ukraine be expected to join the alliance? These and other questions are raised in The Day’s interview with Yevhen MARCHUK, who has held a number of positions in independent Ukraine.

The relations between Russia and Ukraine will depend on the course of the dialog between Kyiv and NATO. This is what Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has said. He hinted that the two countries are closely cooperating in the military-industrial sector. The work of many enterprises is exclusively based on complementary production. This work should be continued, the Russian minister said, but much will depend on the negotiations between Ukraine and the North Atlantic alliance. What kind of policy do you think we should be pursuing vis-a-vis Russia in order to minimize the number of harsh and sometimes ultimatum-like statements that are made by Russia’s top-ranking officials?

You know, in this situation it is the easiest thing to blame Russia, make a series of well-grounded complaints, and strike the pose of a hurt and insulted neighbor. This would be the simplest thing to do. I think many people will be doing precisely this. But we should take a much closer look at this problem. In the situation of our difficult relationship with Russia (I cannot call it simple) and in foreign policy in general, it is very important for the partners to be predictable even if one of them does not like this predictability. The agreement to which the Russians are referring has a provision that the two countries will not pursue a foreign policy to the detriment of each other’s security. This is true. But this does not mean at all that if the countries are members of an alliance they must coordinate their foreign policies. Even NATO member states do not always coordinate their foreign policies. Ukraine and Russia are not part of a defense alliance, so Ukraine is not obliged to coordinate its foreign policy with Russia — this would even be unconstitutional.

But how should we deal with such a powerful neighbor as Russia? This is where the formula of predictability plays an important role. It is important for your partner to find out about those decisions of yours of which he does not approve at the appropriate time and from no one but you. This problem, seemingly of a technical nature, is very important in big strategic politics, especially in Ukrainian-Russian relations. Therefore, when the Russians learned about Ukraine’s practical, concrete step from US Senator Lugar, this upset the pattern of mutual information about important decisions, even though this news was not all surprising to Russia.

Yes, we undoubtedly can and must make decisions without consulting with Russia. But when the decision was made and the letter was signed, not only should this have been made public, but it also should have been announced to such an important strategic partner as Russia. In other words, those who affixed their signatures to the letter should have instructed Foreign Minister Ohryzko to inform their Moscow counterparts about this decision in some fashion. Yes, the Russian partners could have protested, but in fact this does not matter. We know only too well that Russia will always react negatively to such actions on Ukraine’s part. But this would be a good foreign-policy action and, in any case, a palliative tactic. But to be fair, I must say that lately neither has Russia been informing its strategic partner, Ukraine, in a timely fashion about some of its very important decisions in the sphere of European and worldwide security, which also affect Ukraine’s interests. So Russia itself provided a pretext for Ukraine to behave this way. When the Russians were deciding on a higher level of cooperation with NATO on the eve of the 2002 Rome summit, they did not inform us about this. The same thing occurred when Russia warned it might withdraw from some international arms control agreements, resume the production of short— and medium-range missiles, and in some other cases. In a word: like the call, so the echo.

You say we should have warned our Russian partners about the plans to sign the letter. But it is difficult to disagree with the opposition, which is criticizing the government because the Ukrainian people learned about the so-called Letter of the Three from a US senator. Do you think this was the government’s mistake?

Not to warn about the plans, but to announce the decision. This is precisely the other side of the problem. Since less than 40 percent of the population supports Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, and since this issue is usually the subject of fierce pre-election political battles, there will always be pretexts for stirring up tensions in society. The opposition has very good instruments for this, let alone the fact that the Russian media will be adding fuel to the informational fires of passions. In other words, what you are talking about is another way — I would say childish, rather than incorrect — way of informing citizens about such an important decision. There will be all kinds of arguments — from aggressively obscene to righteously critical ones — that this should not be done.

Above all, this should not be done if we look into the future. The NATO states know very well that it is premature to speak about membership if more than half the population does not support it. It would be naive to think that on the eve of the Bucharest summit, NATO countries’ leaders will not be thoroughly briefed on the real situation in Ukraine. They will be given a detailed and excellent analytical document. I know the Brussels bureaucrats very well. They are serious analysts. In addition, 26 NATO country embassies in Ukraine are sure to exhaustively inform their leaders on what is really going on in Ukraine. On the other hand, I know that they do not have any special desire to speed up Ukraine’s accession to NATO. We know how critical the recent attitude to this was on the part of France, Germany, and some other countries. After all, NATO means 26 leaders of countries with their own problems and 26 capitals with their own vision of today’s Ukraine.

In general, the signing of a letter about joining the MAP is a strategically correct, if belated, step because Ukraine is a sovereign country that has the right to choose its own ways of ensuring its national security, all the more so as this complies with the relevant laws that were adopted by the previous government. However, this process needs profound and systematic preparatory work. First, it is necessary to conduct a serious informational and explanatory campaign for our citizens. Second, we should not forget that the Bucharest summit is not very far off. During this period of time Ukraine is most likely to see well-organized protest actions that the government can only neutralize by means of even more effective, long-term and, I stress, systematic actions. Only then will the Bucharest summit see the background against which Ukraine decided to join the MAP. We must do our utmost ahead of the Bucharest summit to grant us this treatment because this will be a serious impetus for Ukraine to bring things in line with European standards.

President Yushchenko said that the path of Ukraine’s entry into NATO will go through a national referendum. All the political parties share this stand. But can we expect an impartial people’s verdict if no information is being furnished on this issue and Ukrainians only hear biased statements and comments about NATO, to put it mildly?

I was one of those who drew up and submitted to parliament, via the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC), the much-referred-to law “On the Foundations of National Security.” It was not so simple. As a result of difficult and sometimes routine bureaucratic work, we managed to raise the public support level to 30-31 percent, not to mention the western regions of Ukraine, where the level reached 80 percent. In 2002, after the NSDC adopted a new Ukraine-NATO strategy, Kyiv hosted a meeting of the Ukraine-NATO Committee, which was attended by top NATO officials, including Lord Robertson who, incidentally, also visited Donetsk. There were a lot of roundtable debates, public meetings, and TV appearances; hundreds of influential people of different political persuasions spent several days at the alliance’s headquarters. Almost all the leading ministries, not only defense and foreign affairs, were involved in active and advantageous cooperation with NATO. What am I driving at? I mean that mere declarations of our top officials on this matter will not change public opinion much.

However, I humbly suggest that the champions of this cause are not utilizing already existing laws. Let’s take a look at what serious documents in support of the Euro-Atlantic course have been adopted or at least proposed in the past three years — practically none. Yes, there were nicely-worded and correct declarations, but there were no practical steps in the Euro-Atlantic direction, which would promote understanding of the importance of this issue for Ukraine and improve the informational and explanatory efforts. Meanwhile, such important strategic projects should rest on a government-run institutional network. Incidentally, the recent appointment of Mr. Nemyria as deputy prime minister may speed up developments in this field.

Nevertheless, Nemyria should enlist some serious infrastructural support because the foreign ministry alone is unable to do the whole job. NATO membership criteria are 70 percent non-military, so it is not the entire preserve of the defense or foreign ministries.

Mr. Marchuk, why do you think the politicians who support Euro-integration avoid making public statements about this, whereas the opponents of this course talk about it constantly, regularly, persistently and, as a rule, aggressively? In other words, when will our politicians learn to speak out on currently unpopular topics — to the detriment of their today’s rating but in favor of their ratings tomorrow?

This is a question of political consistency on crucial strategic issues. Remember that neither Mr. Yushchenko during the presidential elections, nor Ms. Tymoshenko during the regular and early parliamentary elections practically touched on this subject. It is quite easy to understand the logic of this behavior from the practical point of view: this could have brought down the rating in some large regions. This tactic is acceptable during elections, but it is a wrong approach from the angle of political strategy.

The current opposition is panic-stricken: its members claim that joining the MAP is the beginning of NATO membership.

No, the MAP status does not mean admission to NATO at all. This status can last for 5, 7, 8, or 10 years and end up in nothing because the club of the world’s 26 most developed countries will not admit a partner who may later cause problems, a partner whose government may some day include communists and reverse its policies, etc. In a nutshell, NATO does want to keep company with an unpredictable partner. Therefore, the current political leadership must show its NATO partners that it controls the domestic situation and will effectively fulfill the Membership Action Plan. This plan should be made public, be conveyed and explained to the public, i.e., it needs a propaganda effort in the finest sense of the word. It should be explained what the MAP is and the extent to which it is positive. Incidentally, this plan calls for cooperation with NATO countries in the fields of science, education, medicine, ecology, etc. This will be greatly to Ukraine’s benefit.

There is a widespread myth that the NATO boot will be trampling Ukrainian soil, and so on. This is basically nonsense. Are NATO troops stationed in the Eastern European countries that are part of the alliance? In reality, our army will be a NATO army. But to be a NATO army we must meet their standards: 50 to 60 percent of all officers should know English, there should be the same, European-type, military mentality. Incidentally, a country like Iceland does not have any armed forces, but it is still a NATO member and has far more security guarantees than Ukraine.

Let’s pretend we are optimists and day-dreamers, and assume that the first step (“Letter of the Three”) in the direction of Euro-integration is the beginning of a painstaking and persistent official policy towards NATO. When do you think Ukraine can become a member of the alliance?

I think in seven to ten years. This is realistic, but no earlier than this — not only because there still is no unanimous opinion in NATO about Ukraine, but also because we should achieve a 50-percent, or even better, 60-percent, support of this course in society. In addition, we will have to carry out a tremendous amount of work in the economic, social, and other spheres. The political system should be modernized in such a way that there will not be the slightest chance of a political reversal and restoration of the past. You can’t do this in one, two, or three years. So I think that, taking into account our realities, it will take seven years or even longer. Moreover, we still have to settle the problem of demarcating our borders with Russia. When the Romanians were being admitted, they were ready to reach any kind of compromise with us about Zmiiny Island. And what about us? The Sea of Azov and the Strait of Kerch still have no borders. Aware of this, the Russians will be delaying demarcation as long as possible. And don’t forget about the Black Sea Fleet base. Many people are now saying that the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine is not an obstacle on our path to NATO. Nonsense! It is a very serious obstacle, but not insurmountable.

In any case, the conclusion is that we must work seriously, steadily, and painstakingly. But our bureaucrats are not used to serious and routine work. Those who head ministries and agencies are politicians who are not averse to populism. But in order to be promoted from an arithmetic class to one where integral calculus is taught, one must work very seriously on oneself and set the entire governmental machine into motion for this purpose.

I would like to hear your view of the National Security and Defense Council? Can you comment on the appointment of Mrs. Bohatyriova as the council’s secretary? To what extent has the form, content, essence, and importance of this body changed in the last while?

Let me begin with the latter. Unfortunately, in the past three years or so the NSDC, the only constitutional coordination body in the field of security and defense, was frequently turned into an instrument of political spin. One could turn a blind eye to this if this instrument were used for the purpose it is meant for. What is the NSDC, including its staff, which ensures its activity? It is serious and profound forecasting. It is the formulation of diagnoses. It is the process of spotting, in society and even in nature, ongoing phenomena that can create a dangerous situation in the environmental, social, and military fields. Since ours is a transitional state, we have many different problems. The NSDC is a body that cannot be formed and turned professional overnight. It takes years for people to acquire professionalism in this sphere. The NSDC secretary is not the head of this body — the president is. The secretary is the chief of a large and complex staff, without whom the council is just a talking shop.

Yes, one can continue the political struggle at NSDC sessions and hold debates on the level of street rallies. But then it is no longer a National Security and Defense Council. The fact that the NSDC was filled with governors and those who were dismissed from other offices is easy to understand from the viewpoint of political tactics. But from the viewpoint of political essence, this means that the president, as the head of the NSDC, does not attach much importance to this body. But this body is supposed to map out a strategy. There should, of course, be somebody to prepare NSDC meetings and do other day-to-day work. Mrs. Bohatyriova is a smart and well-known politician. But her appointment is a political tactic. From this viewpoint, her appointment can be positively assessed because a strong figure was withdrawn from the opposing camp. But on the other hand, this raises a problem. Obviously, Mrs. Bohatyriova, with all her diligence, will have to spend a lot of time looking deeply into the problems that must be discussed at meetings of the NSDC.

It is difficult to deny that political expediency has prevailed over the principle of professionalism in the portfolio-distribution policy of the past few years. Ministerial offices often become a reward for political loyalty. As a result, government posts are being given to politicians who are absolutely ignorant of the problems of the department that they end up heading. What can be done about this?

I know why this is being done and what arguments are offered in its defense. In the West, a minister is not necessarily a professional — he may be a politician. But the point is that a long evolution has produced entirely different methods there. For instance, when a new minister comes into office, he can dismiss only his deputy and assistants, but nobody else. In other words, a ministry consists of professional civil servants, and while overall principles may be altered, the ministry’s strategy remains unchanged. But we don’t have this kind of tradition and, hence, sometimes we see very surprising appointments. But we must still admit that there is another side to this question. Yes, it is really crucial to attract new young people to public administration. But let them begin acquiring knowledge well before assuming a ministerial office. You know, there is such a thing as audacious ignorance — when someone is audacious because s/he is unaware of a problem. We have quite a few bold reformers of this kind.

What is to be done? Let us at least change the structure of administration. Suppose, a minister is a political figure. OK. In this case, amendments should be made to the law on the cabinet and the law on civil service, which will cool the reform— and staff-placing fervor of a new minister. Yes, a lot should be reformed in our life, but only on the basis of competence and the profound study of a problem by experts. Let us hope that Tymoshenko, who has some bitter experience of her previous premiership, will be unbiased in assessing the performance of her ministers.