Aggression is inevitable

Putin’s press conference is over, news about oil prices and exchange rates are now a routine. The expected social and political consequences of economic hardships did not arrive. Discussions of what should be expected from Russia next started. They present economic interest for Ukraine; war is war, but economic and business ties have merely transformed, whether somebody likes it or not. And the status of Russian troops in Donbas remains completely unclear. It seems they will keep staying there according to the South Ossetian scheme, which is quite alarming.

But let’s start with the economy. The ongoing events in Russia just have to influence the nature of economic ties with Ukraine and other countries. Alexander Lukashenko sounded the alarm too. Of course, primarily it is about unpredictable political risks and their influence on the Russian economy. The most reputable quote of the recent time on the topic belongs to Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman. But his reasoning is based on the fact that Putin deals with the country’s economy, but not his own one, which is built into the national one, yet is separate and more important for him. However, it is impossible to understand anything in the current events without taking this detail into consideration. For example, the story of Rosneft’s 600 billion, which were printed specially for Putin’s friend Sechin, so he could buy some dollars. As a result, the last and the largest rouble crash happened.

Of course, Barack Obama concludes that Putin does not look like a person who defeated the civilized world. According to all criteria of this world, the Kremlin’s prospects are looking grim. But the Kremlin is already in a different world. For example, Krugman and Obama think that the collapse of the consumer market, retreat of clothing and car importers is Putin’s defeat. But from his point of view, it is a large achievement and significant assistance in overcoming consumer standards, which have been imposed for many years for political conciliation of the population. Now this population must become broke and hungry.

So, another Russian paradox emerges. Russia’s isolation, autarchy can be mentioned. But it is not isolationism. Breaking connections with the world, from moral to trade ones, is a foundation of Russian expansionism. Hopes that Russia will shut down in its shell are vain: Russian aggression is inevitable in all its manifestations. It is in full swing now, and will only intensify in relation to the whole world.

After all public speeches Putin summoned 40 oligarchs and discussed something with them. The topic of discussion remains unknown, and it is pointless to quote journalists, who report official version. And whatever they say...

Whatever they say, it must correlate to things that require special and the most serious interpretation. And it is often hidden in quotes that are laughed at and forgotten quickly. Among such are Putin’s deliberations on Crimea’s sacredness in his message to the Federal Assembly.

Not a priest could endure that, but a single authoritative person, not in his rank, but in other things. Protodeacon Andrei Kuraev positioned himself as an opponent of liberalism since early 1990s. But in this, he is simply a competent person. I would not say I follow him closely, but I remember his first clash with the state’s paganism – a quote about the holy fire which Vladimir Yakunin is so fond of. Putin’s old friend publicly recommended the Patriarch to deal with Kuraev.

And now the Reverend Deacon’s position is that of “cannot keep silent.” Putin’s speculations on Crimea’s sacrality are both non-ecclesiastical and non-historical and are on the verge of the myth of the Nibelungs. I will not be surprised to see Putin’s portraits in churches soon or hear of something like the Nazis’ Ahnenerbe in today’s Russia. At any rate, there are enough characters in the known foundations and other institutions, fit for the part.

So far, Reverend Kuraev is one of his kind. However, an assault on Christianity is going on. Moreover, in its worst form this is an assault of state-supported clericalism, which turns into paganism. There is nothing funny in Putin’s speculations at all: they mean lethal danger for the whole world.

The relations between totalitarianism and religion are best described in one of the books by Dmytro Pospelovsky (you can be proud of your fellow countryman, my dear Ukrainians), which can be found in Yakov Krotov’s Internet library. Therefore, I’ll skip the well-known facts about the Nazi (and Cheka) occultism, persecution of believers in Germany and Russia, and so on, and so forth.

Now we see the formation of a syncretic pagan cult in Russia, based on primitive clericalism, occultism, astrology and other suchlike nonsense. In a country of endless, cyclically recommencing horror (which is Russia) inevitably appears a morbid interest in the horrible end, which in various subcultures gives rise to the cult of apocalypse rather than the Second Coming, and expectations of the Antichrist rather than Christ.

Well, this will not be for the first time, and Russia will definitely be not unique. Doctor Faustus, as well as works of numerous medievalists, says a lot on the replacement of theology with demonology. However, we are living here and now.

Messianism has long been seen in Putin’s speeches and actions. Who knows, maybe he might consider his mission the cleansing of the world in a nuclear fire set up by the Russians, who at last realized their destiny with his help. And I find it quite probable: the road from the baptismal font in Korsun to Armageddon is not really a long one.

Putin is a false messiah of the new type in the mass culture era. And even for this era he is an innovator. This era has given birth to hosts of preachers, charismatics, bearers of sacral knowledge and other quacks of all sorts and shapes. Putin differs from them, as well as from his predecessors among Soviet leaders. As a Chekist, he should pretend to be a bearer of secret knowledge, a wise man. This is what Hitler and Stalin did, this is what Surkov did, this is what Prokhanov is doing. But Putin is “just another guy,” and as such, he gradually enters the sphere of the sacral as a neophyte, not as a priest. He invites all of us to follow him on the path of his discoveries, rather than just preach on us. This is something totally new both in the leader cult and in mass culture.

Such a great attention to mass culture is caused by another Russian peculiarity, which is not taken into account by analysts living in institutional democracies. Russia does not have politicians and politics in the civilized sense of these words. There are mass culture characters, representing both the establishment and the so-called opposition. The most prominent now is Aleksey Navalny, facing an obviously unfair sentence on a criminal indictment.

The interest in him is lost, although it is artificially stimulated. This loss, in the eyes of many, is the consequence of his jubilant reaction to the annexation of Crimea, failure in the mayoral election in Moscow, and other factors. I think this approach is wrong: he is rationally evaluated as a politician, rather than a mass culture character.

There is an underestimated film by Woody Allen, To Rome with Love, which has several plots. One of them is represented by the comic Roberto Benigni. He plays an absolutely ordinary man who suddenly became extraordinarily popular for reasons which remained unknown. And then he lost his popularity as suddenly as it was gained.

Something of this sort happened to Navalny, who set a fashionable trend in mass culture, not in politics. The trend is irreversible, and one can only wait for the media mincing machine to be done with it.

This is the strange quasi-state and pseudo-society that exists in Russia, whose rulers increasingly resemble the priests of Armageddon, and whose oppositionists catch their moment of glory, but cannot count on anything more lasting. Surprisingly, on the whole this system is stable and aggressive. Its ability to mimic a civilized state and society only adds to its danger.

As for dissidents, their situation is pitiful: they are always stuck between state-led terror and Russian upheaval. Maybe, someone will think that I want to repeat Mikhail Gershenzon’s words, from his Vekhi (Milestones): “Not only must we not dream of merging with the people: we must be afraid of it more than of all the government’s reprisals, and we must bless this government, which is the only one to still be able to protect us, with its bayonets and prisons, from popular wrath.”

This is only partly true: one must fear the Russian people. But in his reliance on bayonets and prisons Gershenzon was wrong: autocracy did not protect anyone, and it was not going to.

The incumbent regime will sacrifice the progressive community to anyone and anything, be it the Black Hundreds or Bolsheviks. Moreover, they have crossed the fatal gap and are one now.

Dmitry Shusharin is a Moscow-based historian and political journalist