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Last week Ukraine did its best to prove that its so-called multidirectional foreign economic policy was indeed directed along so many vectors. The following is a far from complete listing of countries where Ukrainian politicians undertook to defend their nation's interests:

Ukraine: preparatory talks completed with the IMF; talks started with the Italian President and Canadian Prime-Minister; France: a Ukrainian parliamentary delegation presents its credentials to the PACE; Belarus: Ukrainian Speaker Oleksandr Tkachenko arrives to strengthen fraternal ties with the Belarusian President Lukashenka; Russia: a group of comrades from Ukraine renders moral support to the Council of the Federation members for ratifying the Grand Russo-Ukrainian Friendship and Cooperation Treaty. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian President enjoying a well-deserved holiday at the Swiss winter resort of Davos meets and holds talks with the US Vice President, leaders of European countries, and other annual World Economic Forum participants.

This all looks impressive, but every "vector" was determined not so much by the scope of a given event as by the Cabinet's chosen economic strategy.

Take Poland: last week Polish farmers, chagrined by government policy, took to the streets demanding that the Polish borders be closed to cheap European products. What chance do the protesters stand? Not much, it seems. The Polish liberals are not likely to adjust the country's "Europe-oriented" economy to the farmers' isolationist requirements, although the latter are quite understandable. Several years ago the Polish government adopted a strategic course aimed at joining the European Union. Economists tend to regard this strategy is being prompted by political rather than economic considerations. In other words, the transitory benefits which Poles can receive by their forced adoption of European-type business norms (actually, in the market economy) were not were not clear to ordinary Poles. Lifting restrictions on European imports made local noncompetitive producers' life difficult; they were simply no match for their European counterparts in terms of both government subsidies and farming costs (the latter being higher in Poland). Simultaneously, trying to keep pace with Europe was of tremendous importance as Poland had once and for all adopted a system of values acceptable and understandable the world over. There is every reason to expect its economy to measure up eventually. Ukraine is a different story altogether.

Last week saw Ukrainian politicians busy doing what they usually do: begging for money in the West and strengthening the foundation of that very structure in the East which this money, when and if borrowed, will effectively destroy. So this is Ukraine's much-advertised "multivector" approach, the reader might wonder. Yes, supposedly, except that it does not exist. The Speaker, apparently not much of an expert on political hypocrisy, spoke of this quite frankly at Minsk Airport Wednesday night: "Disunity has not benefited our peoples, as one and all realize only too well these days. Hence, the fraternal independent nations of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia must restore all those severed economic and cultural ties, raise their political cooperation to a new level, both within the CIS and on the international arena," Oleksandr Tkachenko declared. It should be noted, however, that both Ukraine and Belarus are far from being in the best of shape, as both are "shaken by deep-going economic crisis." Mr. Tkachenko summed the "treatment prescriptions" borrowed from foreign "well-wishers," saying they would not cure but only aggravate this disease, and that "even people recently markedly trustful of overseas sages are aware of the fact," adding that "under the circumstances we must soberly assess the situation that has developed, make the best of the experience accumulated over the past decades, and correct the mistakes made in the last several years. We will, of course, overcome this economic chaos and make our countries, which are independent yet united by common goals and actions, strong and prosperous. Only this approach will allow us to take a worthy place in the international community as full-fledged and truly respected members with whom everyone else will have to reckon, never daring to impose their will."

This seems logical: foreigners have to foot the bills, especially during the presidential campaign, and Ukrainians ask Belarus's and Russia's advice on how to spend this money. Incidentally, "Batska" (Papa) Lukashenka had an opportunity to acquaint himself with advanced socialist experience "in a hostile environment." Not so long ago the Belarusian President signed an edict restoring government price controls and planning. Belarusians, standing in lines for low quality goods in short supply, still look back to the bright Soviet past with lingering hope, yet the outcome of this strategy (granted extremely consistent official steps) will be more like North Korean or Cuban present realities.

Another event last week called forth the emotions of all exponents of fraternal friendship with Russia: the Federation Council decided to postpone ratification of the Grand Treaty with Ukraine to February 16. President Kuchma said the only reaction to this could be "disappointment and uncertainty about tomorrow."

In fact, this intermediary result, as well as the treaty itself, received markedly differing comments from those opposing and supporting Ukrainian-Russian economic integration. The opponents attribute this period of coolness in Ukrainian-Russian relations to the strengthening of ties with the West, something small business craves. They further believe that the economy may evolve interpreted by contradictory factors: the harder it is to maintain contacts with Russian politicians in business, the stronger the dependence of Ukraine's politicians in business on Western capital. Indeed, many in Ukraine envy the Baltic states, for they have benefited from Russia's energy blackmail, winning their economic independence. Apparently, domestic businessmen adopt such an unpatriotic stand because of prompting by the powers that be. Oleksandr Razumkov, responsible for Ukraine's economic security, seriously believes Ukrainian bankrupt entities will be better of by enhancing ties with Russia's "virtual economy." Early in 1998 various estimates placed Ukraine's energy supply debts to Russia at $600-800 million US. Now it is about $1.5 billion. So who has consumed all this gas and who is going to pay for it? Apparently, it was consumed by those allowed to make things nobody needs and at their selling prices. Otherwise enterprises would be forced to produce only that which they would be sure to sell and pay their natural gas bills. Those not measuring up would have to change ownership or even close down. See how unreal all these requirements to the current Parliament and Cabinet sound? Thus their only alternative is returning to Russia's tender embrace.

In other words, all those domestic exponents of return to union with Russia crave the treaty as an instrument that will allow them to count on Russian resources to try to keep the Ukrainian economy afloat. Their Russian counterparts, in turn, hope that this alliance will make it possible to get live money or property for at least some of the energy supply arrears. It is also true, however, that the Russian opponents of the treaty also have certain "virtual dividends" in mind. They oppose it because the treaty will mean a redistribution, implying benefits not only for them, but also for their Ukrainian counterparts.

By Iryna KLYMENKO, The Day