On Russia without illusions

The issue of the Russian aggression against Ukraine was raised with a new urgency at various international forums in the week of January 19-25. It got another meeting of the UN Security Council (UNSC) dedicated to it, talks in the Normandy format were held in Berlin, and it was discussed at the International Economic Forum in Davos as well. It all was to no avail, though, just as in previous cases. The UNSC was once again prevented from adopting any resolution on the Donbas crisis settlement by Russia using its veto power as one of the five permanent members of the council. In Berlin, four foreign ministers representing Ukraine, Germany, France, and Russia managed to release a statement calling once again to cease fire and withdraw heavy armaments. They also called for the contact group to create “the required number of working groups,” which would deal with specific aspects of the Minsk Accords.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Pavlo Klimkin tweeted early on January 22 that the Berlin meeting, held on January 21, was a Borodino, that is, a diplomatic battle which had neither winners nor losers. “We have made a step forward on one item of the Minsk Accords, agreeing that the tripartite group will meet to discuss the withdrawal of heavy armaments, and Russia has promised to bring Oleksandr Zakharchenko and Ihor Plotnytsky to the negotiating table. Russia does not want to discuss other items, though. It does not work this way. They have also promised to talk to the terrorists, that is, talk to themselves. Do not buy into Russian disinformation, please: there are no new ‘Vladimir Putin initiatives,’ nobody is discussing or supporting them. We have the Minsk Accords and need all of them to be fulfilled,” the minister stressed.

Meanwhile, the chief of German diplomacy Frank-Walter Steinmeier saw a significant progress made at the talks in Berlin. In particular, he said that the Normandy Four were in agreement in matters of the demarcation line and withdrawal of heavy armaments. However, German expert on foreign policy, senior fellow of the European Carnegie Center in Brussels Ulrich Speck is fairly critical of Steinmeier’s optimism, stating: “Big risk for German-led diplomacy on Ukraine: that peace negotiations are being used by Russia as an instrument of its territorial conquest.”

And the answer to this, as senior editor of The Economist and senior vice president of the Center for European Policy Analysis Edward Lucas told The Day, should be as follows: “We need to raise the cost of doing business for Mr. Putin and his friends – this means going after their dirty money in the West and prosecuting the bankers, lawyers, and accountants who helped launder it.”

The Day turned to Ukrainian and foreign experts for comments on the Berlin agreements and their views of the tools available to the West to force Putin to fulfill his part of the Minsk Accords.

Volodymyr OHRYZKO, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Kyiv:

“I was not too optimistic about the talks that took place in Berlin, because I really doubt that the Russians will fulfill what they have agreed too. Repeated violations of previous agreements are proof enough of it. Further to it, I frankly do not really understand what our interest is in entrenching this line of actual occupation of Ukrainian lands. If it was about withdrawing Russian armaments from Ukraine, I would then understand the meaning of such negotiations, but if we consider entrenching the presence of Russian forces in Ukraine an important achievement, I cannot detect why do we need this heroic effort. In this context, I was, truth be told, pleased with the statement from the US Permanent Representative to the UN Samantha Power, who was very clear in her formulations of what really needed to be done; her approach stands in stark contrast, unfortunately, to that of members of our government, who are trying to achieve wrong goals. So, there is hope that the West is really going through a rethink of the situation, but the question is how quickly it will materialize in practical assistance.

“I see two main priorities here. Firstly, Ukraine needs financial aid, but not of the kind we are seeing discussed now. I suppose that everyone has paid attention to the statement by Minister of Finance of Ukraine Natalie Jaresko that it totals 15 billion dollars. She was right to speak truth when she said that it could not be compared with what happened in Greece. Of course not, for Greece received more than 150 billion euros. Clearly, that former sum is a completely inadequate assessment of Ukraine’s real funding needs.

“Secondly, we certainly need a real military assistance. However, it is not France that is the crux of the issue. There are 27 other members of NATO that can provide assistance to Ukraine should we finally formulate what we need, when, and how many.”

Susan STEWART, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin:

“I think that Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s comment about perceptible progress having been achieved, but no breakthrough, sums up well what many people in Germany feel about the results of the talks. It is good that some agreement was reached on at least one important issue (pullback of heavy weapons) but no one believes that this is the beginning of the end of the war and the larger conflict between Russia and the West. As for me personally, I am skeptical that even this agreement will be implemented. It depends not only on Russia, but also on the separatists, and even though Russia has significant influence over many separatist groups, either this influence may not be sufficient to achieve implementation or Russia may be content to accept non-implementation and blame it on the separatist forces. I believe that this is from the Russian perspective a step taken to appear constructive and to return attention to the role of the Contact Group. It seems to me that part of Russia’s current tactics consists of strengthening the role of the Contact Group and simultaneously reinforcing the Russian claim that Kyiv and the separatists are the parties to the conflict and that Russia is not directly involved and therefore is in a position to play the role of mediator or ‘peacekeeper.’

“The West needs to keep up the current approach of sanctioning Russia and supporting Ukraine in its reform process. Much more attention should be paid to this process in order to be able to implement the necessary conditionality instead of simply relying on the IMF to monitor progress. The West, and the EU in particular, should also work much more closely with Ukrainian civil society, which can provide well-founded information about how reforms are progressing and where potential problems lie. Together the EU and parts of Ukrainian civil society could put effective pressure on the Ukrainian president, government, and parliament. A reforming Ukraine will be a much more credible actor in its relations with the EU and a stronger opponent to Russia. However, I do not expect anything the West can be expected to do to convince Russia to pull out of Ukraine in the short term. The key is to keep up the pressure in the medium to long term and not to give in to those in the EU already calling for some degree of normalization of relations with Russia.”

Dr. Stefan MEISTER, Head of Program on Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Robert Bosch Center, German Council on Foreign Relations:

“I don’t think this is in any sense a breakthrough and you never know how serious a Russian agreement is in these days. It reflects the will and the strong negotiation pressure from the German side, to stop the spiral of upheated war in Ukraine, that’s it. It might be the beginning of the implementation of the Minsk agreement, but we don’t know and also the German government is very skeptical about any Russian agreement. My major concern is that we still have contrary strategies in Russia and the EU. While the EU wants to have from the Russians a clear progress on the situation in eastern Ukraine and the implementation of the Minsk format to talk about other issues of the common relations, for the Russian leadership the war in eastern Ukraine is only a tool, to improve its bargaining position with regard to the big questions of security, energy and so on in the relations between Russia and the EU. They will not stop this war, unless the EU (and the US) are willing to talk about the big questions for Europe. So, we need a parallel process negotiating on Ukraine, fulfilling the Minsk agreement, and a format to talk with Russia about the big questions.”

Dr. Andre HAERTEL, political scientist and advisor, International Relations Department, Institute of Political Science, Friedrich Schiller University Jena:

“The position of Germany is quite clear and focuses on the implementation of the Minsk protocol. The Normandy talks (with its high level representation) are a helpful vehicle to motivate and put pressure on the Contact Group and both the Russian and Ukrainian governments to effectively work on implementation. However, as the Russian side refuses to acknowledge its direct role in the conflict and sees itself still as a ‘peace facilitator’ rather than a conflict party, the talks are asymmetric and focus on Ukraine as a source of the conflict mainly. Russia, on the opposite, takes the comfort to put the blame on the separatists if implementation of any agreements is not in their interest. The main problem for the other participants (Germany, France) is the lack of transparency and effective control instruments. In reality, there is a lack of trust in both the Russian and Ukrainian side and a lack of knowledge about what they do on the ground and what their strategies in the Donbas really are. Therefore the interest in an effective monitoring regime, which however both Kyiv and Moscow are trying to undermine for obvious reasons.

“I think that no one in Germany has illusions about any Russian commitments made in Berlin. Putin has made very clear at the end of past year that he will do everything to support the separatists and that a return to the pre-May 2014 status will not be allowed to happen. The talks and their results stand in striking contrast to that and to the facts on the ground. Moscow knows that in their current state, the two entities (DNR, LNR) can hardly survive – they need more territory and a better strategic position. There might be something in the argument that Moscow – before a large summit in Astana – wants to gain as much as possible to have a better negotiation position. For Ukraine the situation is dire: it can only try to avoid the separatists gaining more ground at specific spots, while its own offensive would both trigger a Russian offensive (maybe even overt) or a loss of Western support. Therefore it is well advised to cover its operations and talk about them only in a defensive manner.

“The West now seriously has to make up its mind how it wants to achieve its goal of territorial integrity for Ukraine while not putting more sanctions on Russia. The problem here lies also in definition: Putin might formally agree to ‘hand back the Donbas to Ukraine,’ but the conditions will severely undermine Ukrainian sovereignty. Therefore, nothing is won if Russians formally give up on Novorossia and if the EU just lifts sanctions. However, the EU is also currently unable and unwilling to provide Ukraine with so much political and economic perspective that it could effectively enjoy long-term protection against a revisionist Russia. At some point, and the last thoughts of Mogherini about EU-Russia confirm that there will be a rapprochement and some ‘understanding’ also concerning Ukraine and the EU’s de-facto role in the post-Soviet space. I see but the leverage mostly on the Ukrainian side – building an effective military and state administration, diversify energy sources, and keep the country unified as for its geopolitical choice      – those are effectively the only long-term solutions to its sovereignty problem. EU and its member states can assist here, but they will never take ultimate responsibility (militarily).”

Andreas UMLAND, German political analyst:

“The problem, as before in Geneva, Normandy or Minsk, is what these talks and their apparent results will then actually mean. There are three options: 1. The apparent agreement will again be entirely meaningless. The events on the ground will develop without substantial change. 2. The current situation will be frozen meaning that only the ceasefire will be implemented, but the other parts of the Minsk agreements will not be implemented. This would mean that the so-called DNR/LNR are becoming de facto territories of the Russian Federation. 3. The Minsk agreements will be implemented which means that the Donbas will gradually return under Kyiv’s, at least partial, control. Russia would be awarded for such a development with an end to all of the more effective sanctions.

“I would not exclude any of these three developments. Unfortunately, however, Crimea will remain de facto a part of Russia, for the years to come. It will also mean that some of the West’s sanctions will remain in place.”